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On 26 July, 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed into law the National Security Act 
of 1947 on board the C-54 presidential aircraft Sacred Cow at Washington National 
Airport. The Act had been rushed from Capitol Hill to receive the President’s signature 
while he anxiously waited to attend to his dying mother in his hometown of 
Independence, Missouri. Notwithstanding the tragic personal circumstances for President 
Truman, this was a singular moment of unprecedented governmental reorganisation in the 
history of the American Republic. The National Security Act marked Washington’s 
attempt to meet the challenges posed by its pre-eminent position on the world stage 
following the devastation of the Second World War.  
 
At the time the greatest importance was attached to the unification of the Departments of 
War and the Navy into the National Military Establishment (NME), to be headed by a 
Secretary of Defense.1 This reflected the arduous and often controversial road towards a 
merger of three military services. But the National Security Act was also significant for 
creating the National Security Council (NSC) and a fledgling peacetime intelligence 
organisation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The NSC was established to provide 
a trans-departmental national forum for the first time in peace for the President and his 
cabinet officers and senior advisers to consider national security and foreign policy 
matters. Meanwhile the CIA’s role was to evaluate and disseminate intelligence centrally 
from the departmental intelligence agencies to assist the NSC in the formulation of U.S. 
foreign policy and objectives.  
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Writing in 1977, Daniel Yergin identified the creation of the National Security State in 
the United States and the beginning of the Cold War.2 Yergin and much of the 
scholarship that has followed recognised that the full scale reorganisation of the 
government apparatus in 1947 was a seminal moment, marking American attempts to 
meet the challenges posed in a peacetime environment, but one framed by Cold War. 
Emphasis was placed on the military aspects of the reorganisation in light of new 
definitions of national security interests that demanded a state of military readiness, as 
well as American politico-economic initiatives in Western Europe.3  
 
The scale of this effort was indeed unprecedented. It comprised the unification (or at least 
coordination) of the military services, the mobilisation of peacetime intelligence, the 
expanded role of the State Department and creation of the NSC forum to develop national 
security policy. However, the inauguration of the National Security State did not 
necessarily mark the emergence of a governmental system able to overcome all of the 
challenges of the post-war world. This was particularly the case for the United States in 
the early Cold War as it struggled to develop a coherent basis for its policies, its 
operations, and its national security objectives. Washington struggled to develop foreign 
policy on a unified, national basis partly because of the entrenchment of internal divisions 
within the government bureaucracy. Although the drafters of the National Security Act 
hoped to ameliorate administrative tensions and parochial attitudes in one organisational 
sweep, such attitudes proved intrinsic to the system and therefore persisted. 
 
 2
The first goal of this thesis, therefore, is to examine the tensions prevalent within the 
American system, despite the creation of the National Security State in 1947. Disorder is 
a problem common to all bureaucracies, to a greater or lesser extent, as a certain amount 
of “self-interest” will inevitably generate friction within competitive structures. Post-war 
Washington was no different, with officials often unable to see past the horizon of their 
own departments, their own sections, and their own egos. But the unprecedented scale 
and ambition of the endeavour to reorganise the government apparatus in 1947 meant that 
such divisions were greatly magnified. Furthermore, at the beginning of the Cold War the 
stakes were extremely high in the international context. This intensified the need for 
Washington to overcome internal rifts so that it could meet the challenges on a unified 
organisational basis posed externally by the Soviet Union. The intensity under which the 
government bureaucracy laboured heightened divisions and rivalries around Washington. 
 
However, this thesis does not simply aim to illuminate systemic disorder. It hopes to 
demonstrate the ramifications of this upon the processes and delivery of American 
foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. For the National Security State, as it 
emerged, did not simply constitute a framework of agencies and departments from which 
methods were decided upon how to take up and “win” the Cold War. What developed 
from 1948 onwards was an organisational attempt to create a set of national policies to 
overcome the challenge posed by Russian power and influence. This amounted to more 
than the development of militarised national security policies designed to establish 
preponderant American power over the Soviet adversary. It also involved projects and 
operations well beyond the scope of U.S. initiatives to “contain” Soviet expansion by 
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stabilising American interests in Western Europe. Supplementing these fundamental 
aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the late 1940s was an attempt to meet the challenges 
posed by Russian power within the Soviet orbit itself, by a range of psychological, 
political, economic, diplomatic and paramilitary methods.    
 
This thesis therefore does not propose final answers for what American policies sought to 
achieve in the early Cold War. As will be seen, such clarification was never achieved by 
American officials. Instead what emerged were certain specific aims to destabilise 
regimes within the Soviet bloc territory. This resulted in the sanction and adoption of 
various activities, although overall objectives and methodologies remained ambiguous as 
they were developed at the policy level. 
 
This raises important questions over a prevailing tendency in the scholarship of the 
period to impart a sense of coherence to American actions against the Soviet Union in the 
early Cold War.4 Ideological projections of a battle against Soviet tyranny led to politico-
economic and military steps to establish a Western European system resistant to Soviet-
communist expansion. But beyond this, containment was not adopted as a global strategy 
to mobilise all the elements of the American government in tandem with private groups, 
to retract and ultimately overthrow Soviet power. 
 
The central focus of this thesis therefore is to analyse the dynamic that existed between 
the disunited administration under President Truman and its development of Cold War 
policies against the Soviet Union and the “satellite states” of Eastern Europe. The 
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following pages will contend that bureaucratic wrangling substantially undermined the 
formulation of national policies and the implementation of coordinated operations, a 
factor often overlooked by historians who can retrospectively imbue a misleading sense 
of unity upon the processes of foreign policy making. It is not necessarily surprising that 
bureaucratic divisions resulted from the effort to forge a new system and set of policies to 
undertake the Cold War, given that American bureaucrats and policymakers were not 
working from an existing template. But more importantly, the inseparable interaction of 
the “disorganisation” and the crafting of policies resulted in a fundamental failure on the 
part of the Truman administration to develop a coherent strategy towards the Soviet bloc 
in the early Cold War. This constituted a significant failure to define clear and realisable 
objectives to direct the American conduct of the Cold War, a shortcoming that played its 
part in sustaining bipolar antagonisms for many years to come.  
 
The central premise of this study is that disorder ultimately prevailed over design. This 
occurred on two levels. Despite the achievements embodied in the National Security Act, 
the bureaucracy was fragmented and unable to overcome narrow interests for the national 
benefit. Furthermore, this had a direct bearing on the failure to design a strategy for 
winning, or at least effectively participating in an offensive Cold War against the Soviet 
Union. In other words, Washington failed to resolve both its internal and external Cold 
Wars.  
 
This notion of disorder should not ignore or negate the efforts made by the Truman 
administration in the late 1940s to unify a set of methods and objectives in its pursuit of 
 5
Cold War victory. Attempts were made to clarify and orchestrate the American approach, 
particularly through the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS) under the 
direction of Russian specialist George F. Kennan in 1948-9. Moreover, it certainly seems 
that the possibility did exist to define a viable strategy against the Soviet bloc. But efforts 
like these invariably produced greater internal tension rather than resolution, meaning 
that a clear definition for U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War was never fully developed 
or adopted. Without this guiding framework, the American approach to the Soviet bloc 
was as fragmented as the bureaucracy that produced it.  
 
Although the United States struggled to develop a unifying concept of American 
objectives towards the Soviet Union, the National Security State did organise itself to 
pursue methods for undermining the Soviet adversary. This thesis concurs with the body 
of scholarship that has effectively demonstrated that the American politico-economic and 
military approach to Western Europe in the early Cold War years was planned and 
implemented in a fairly clear and organised fashion. This was in stark contrast to its 
programmes for the Soviet bloc countries. In fact, the pursuit of its Western European 
policies limited and ultimately undermined the successful attainment of its aspirations in 
the east. The successful “containment” of Russian expansion at the edge of the “iron 
curtain,” or rather the attainment of U.S. objectives in pulling together a western bloc 
under political, economic and military ties, stimulated a parallel effort led by Moscow to 
establish an eastern bloc. The partition of Germany was at the geographic and strategic 
core of east-west divisions, generating a new level of Cold War antagonism. Once the 
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bipolar schism was established it became untenable for the Truman administration to 
directly influence affairs within the Soviet bloc by methods short of war. 
 
The desire to project U.S. values on the entire European continent, manifest since the 
Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the Yalta “Declaration of Liberated Europe,” continued to 
influence the attitudes and aspirations of American policymakers at the end of the Second 
World War. As Eduard Mark has effectively demonstrated, the importance of Eastern 
Europe to Washington was “derivative rather than intrinsic.”5 Despite American 
impotence in Eastern Europe and its relative geopolitical insignificance to the United 
States, the Cold War was rapidly defined in zero-sum terms. Despite the totality of the 
politico-ideological clash, it could not be settled by military power.6 Therefore in the late 
1940s Washington rationalised its desire to “liberate” countries under predominant Soviet 
influence through a surrogate range of limited measures brought together under the 
bracket of “political warfare.”7  
 
This study utilises the official definition of political warfare, as it was designated in 1948 
within the celebrated document NSC 10/2 at the heart of the U.S. Cold War political 
warfare programme: 
[…] such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; 
economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, 
demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, 
including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and 
refugee liberations groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist 
elements in threatened countries of the free world.  
 
Washington understood political warfare to encompass a wide range of psychological, 
political, economic, and paramilitary methods to destabilise the Soviet bloc. The effort 
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was predicated on the condition that activities conducted or directed by the American 
government would be “covert” to conceal U.S. responsibility for them.8   
 
Senior figures in the Truman administration including Secretary of State George Marshall 
regarded the ability to “plausibly disclaim” American links to political warfare as a 
fundamental guideline to avoid ratcheting up Cold War tensions with Stalinist Russia. 
This was crucial to avoid a direct conflict with the Soviet Union over an area that was 
deemed to be non-vital to American interests. On the other hand “plausible denial” was a 
decisive limiting factor as it undercut the potential success of the “liberation” campaign 
waged in a region under Soviet hegemony. The National Security State could therefore 
pursue various methods and demonstrate its power, as well as the limitations of that 
power. But this was undertaken without a clear resolution of its objectives or a strategy to 
realise those goals. Political warfare did not therefore unify American capabilities and 
objectives but instead left a legacy of operations for future administrations. 
 
This study acknowledges the vast range of scholarship that has identified the 
development of the National Security State and the strategy of containment to defend 
American interests in the west at the beginning of the Cold War.9 In particular, John 
Lewis Gaddis’s Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy and We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History as well as 
Melvyn Leffler’s A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman 
Administration, and the Cold War deserve recognition as pre-eminent histories of the 
period. These studies have approached the early Cold War years from the perspective of 
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“grand strategy.” This has allowed Gaddis, Leffler and others to engage major thematic 
approaches to the Cold War and undertake vast and authoritative examinations of the 
period. However, it should also be noted that such an approach tends to de-emphasise the 
nuances and intricacies of foreign policy making.  In this sense, exploring certain aspects 
of the period on the “micro” level holds certain advantages.    
 
Indeed it is striking that the “traditional” histories of the Cold War, including the works 
of both Gaddis and Leffler, overwhelmingly minimise or ignore completely 
Washington’s attempts to challenge communist power inside the Soviet bloc in the 
postwar years. Perhaps one reason for this is that the U.S. government itself struggled to 
clarify its own position on “liberation/rollback” during the presidencies of Truman and 
Eisenhower. Historical focus on “grand strategy” emphasises broad and distinctive 
strategies based on clearly defined policy objectives. This does not sit easily with such an 
elusive and ambiguous feature of the American experience in the early Cold War. This 
study therefore hopes to modify the notion of a guiding sense of coherence, sometimes 
implicit and other times explicit, that has prevailed within the body of “grand strategy” 
analyses relating to American actions in Europe in the late 1940s.  
 
Furthermore, identifying Washington’s sanction and initiation of aggressive designs to 
challenge communist and Soviet power beyond the west makes problematic many of the 
inferences contained within “traditional” Cold War narratives. For instance Gaddis’s 
notion that “as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union a cold war was unavoidable” 
tends to imply that a reactive and defensive quality permeated American actions.10 
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Similarly, Leffler argues that American policies were motivated primarily by the “specter 
of Soviet/Communist expansion” into Western Europe.11 According to this view, 
Washington perceived Stalin as an inherent (if cautious) aggressor, compelling Truman 
and his advisers to respond to protect vital American geopolitical and ideological 
interests in the west.  
 
The traditional narrative has focused on the military and political threat to Western 
Europe posed by Soviet power in the east. It did not lie within the boundaries of this 
study to explore Soviet sources to address the question of Stalinist expansionist designs 
on the west in the postwar years. It is undoubtedly true that the American perception of 
the Soviet threat to Western Europe was a primary motivating factor behind U.S. actions 
in the west in these years. Nonetheless, effort is made in this thesis to redress the 
imbalance of the traditional historical narrative by also exploring how the American 
aspiration to confront Soviet hegemony in the east, downplayed by Gaddis and Leffler, 
sat in tension and contradiction with U.S. “containment” policies towards the west.  
 
In so-doing, no attempt is made in these pages to apportion blame for causing the Cold 
War on either side. In general, the historical debates between the orthodox and revisionist 
camps have in recent years moved beyond the narrow practice of what Yergin describes 
as “onus-shifting.”12 For example, as Charles Maier has noted, it is important to 
differentiate between an acknowledgment that one consequence of the Marshall Plan was 
to accelerate the bipolar division of Europe on the on hand, and the conclusion, on the 
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other, that the United States was therefore primarily to blame for causing the Cold War. 
ERP confirmed rather than caused the schism between the superpowers.13   
 
This thesis instead aims to contribute to a re-evaluation of the dynamics of the American 
approach to the Cold War between 1945 and 1950. It hopes to demonstrate that, while 
U.S. policies were not simply defensive, there was no clear or viable U.S. strategy to 
“win” the Cold War at its genesis (although this does not by implication mean that 
American policies were intrinsically “tragic”).14 Conversely, it aims to refute triumphalist 
notions of American “victory” posited in the 1990s as the shockwaves of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union still reverberated.15 Advancing more nuanced understandings of the 
events that defined the origins is a valuable and timely exercise, particularly now that 
there is sufficient distance from the end of the Cold War to judge in a more dispassionate 
fashion. 
 
The role of bureaucratic structures and the contingent influence of individuals- 
presidents, bureaucrats, legislators and private interest groups- is highlighted in terms of 
both shaping and invariably undermining the pursuit and successful application of a 
coherent foreign policy. This builds upon the fresh contribution made by Amy Zegart’s 
Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC.16 Zegart locates the 
manifestation of the CIA’s “flawed” design in its inability to act as a centralised 
coordinator and collector of intelligence. This study develops this concept to also 
examine how the place of the intelligence agencies within the bureaucracy impacted upon 
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the development and implementation of an offensive covert political warfare campaign 
against the Soviet bloc. 
 
Less emphasis is placed in the following pages upon the fundamental importance of the 
shortcomings of the bureaucratic architecture of the National Security State than is to be 
found in Zegart’s work. After all, improvements made in the early 1950s to the 
organisation of the political warfare campaign did little to ameliorate the overall success 
of the programme. This study therefore moves beyond Zegart’s hypothesis by 
emphasising the primary significance of strategic disorder as the root source of the 
problem. Ultimately, strategic incoherence surrounding American aims towards the 
Soviet bloc, rather than the perceptible weaknesses in the organisation of the campaign, 
was the pivotal factor that undermined its potential to succeed. 
 
An emerging group of academics has begun to delineate a broader conception of 
American actions beyond the containment strategy for Western Europe, of which the 
most salient to this study have been the recent works by Zegart, Gregory Mitrovich and 
Sarah-Jane Corke.17 The recent scholarship has moved past the parameters of traditional 
history to chart several under-explored terrains. This includes the place of culture and 
ideology in the Cold War,18 the role of intelligence as a component of peacetime foreign 
policy,19 and the development of an aggressive “State-private” campaign of covert 
operations to challenge the Soviet Union.20 Accordingly, this work seeks to both 
compliment recent historical examinations in the area of political warfare but also to 
interrogate them. By building on these bodies of work a broader interpretation can be 
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advanced to underscore the nuances embodied in the notion of systemic and strategic 
disorder.  
 
In particular this thesis critiques the notion that the Policy Planning Staff’s George 
Kennan was at the centre of a coherent approach that successfully unified American 
capabilities, methodologies and objectives.21 Instead the argument is put forward that a 
prevailing destabilising dynamic existed between the bureaucracy, including officials 
within it like Kennan, and the policies and strategies that were produced. This raises 
important questions over the place of political warfare in U.S. strategy and the notion of a 
coherent and extensive campaign to “roll back” or undermine Soviet power that has 
recently been heralded by some historians.22  
 
Instead, U.S. policies were inconsistent and contradictory. Marc Trachtenberg discerns 
that “one is struck by how little was actually done and by how long it took to implement a 
“rollback” policy.”23 This points to the fact that there were limits to American power in 
the late 1940s. Moreover, in relation to Eastern Europe Washington was acting from a 
position of fundamental weakness. These difficulties were exacerbated because the 
policies developed in the early Cold War were never provided with an overarching 
unifying strategic framework. Instead of an overall policy- whether it is labelled 
“containment” or “liberation/rollback” or “Titoism” or any other appellation- there were 
various policy impulses that ranged in nature from defensive to aggressive and in 
motivation from economic through geopolitical to ideological. These impulses were in a 
perpetual state of flux and reaction, constantly shifting and developing as they were 
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affected and nurtured by internal and external factors. The various policy conceptions and 
impulses were at any given time apportioned ranging degrees of emphasis by different 
individuals, offices and departments within the government. The prevailing dynamic was 
a swirling cocktail of divergent interests and forces. This effectively meant that no 
coherent strategy could emerge and take primacy over the multiple policy impulses at 
hand within the government bureaucracy- and increasingly within the private sphere.  
 
In making these contentions this study hopes to engage with Sarah-Jane Corke’s recent 
publication titled US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare 
and the CIA. Corke rightly identifies “the gap in the historiography” in which 
“traditional” histories of the Cold War “have downplayed the persistence of American 
interventionism behind the Iron Curtain.” In her effort to address this deficiency, Corke 
convincingly argues that the failure of U.S. covert operations in the early Cold War was 
based upon “the persistent inability of the administration as a whole to reconcile policy 
and operations successfully and to agree on a consistent course of action for waging the 
Cold War.”24  
 
This important observation opens up the possibility for further interrogation, in order to 
explain more fully why the U.S. strategy towards the Soviet bloc was so fundamentally 
undermined during the Truman years and beyond. This is an important endeavour that 
deserves more attention. For example, recognising that Washington was unable to resolve 
its basic strategic aims in the early Cold War significantly modifies Leffler’s assertion 
that the Truman administration wisely developed “sophisticated strategies” to “attract the 
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Soviet satellites westward” over the long term.25 Examination of the confused and 
inconsistent approach actually undertaken by Washington towards the east disproves the 
hypothesis that the U.S. planned to draw Soviet bloc nations into its own orbit over the 
long-term by undefined forces of “magnetism.” Such a notion of prescience and strategic 
coherence is based not upon evidence of actual U.S. policies and practices of the period 
but on hindsight and our knowledge today that the Soviet Union would eventually 
collapse.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, this thesis also attempts to move beyond Corke’s analysis by 
emphasising the significance of the failure of U.S. policymakers to reconcile divergent 
American objectives and capabilities in Western and Eastern Europe and the impact that 
this had on the political warfare programme. The persistent failure to accept and link the 
two regions resulted in Washington’s inability to develop a unified policy that integrated 
these inter-related elements. While a policy of “liberation” was not of direct relevance to 
Western Europe, its feasibility and necessity was intimately linked to the context of 
Western European policy. American policies towards the Soviet bloc were likewise 
intimately connected to the approach towards Western Europe even if they were not 
themselves intrinsic to the programme of “containment.” Washington’s failure to 
adequately define and unify its basic strategic aims and capabilities on a pan-European 
basis undermined U.S. actions in the broader Cold War struggle. Its prioritisation of 
Western Europe from the outset played a major part in undermining later attempts to link 





To establish this approach this thesis has incorporated material from a number of archival 
sources from the United States as well as recognising the vast array of secondary sources 
focusing on the early Cold War period. Of particular value for research has been the 
availability of archival documentation at the Truman Presidential Library in 
Independence, Missouri and the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The 
valuable source of archival evidence has made a major contribution in the effort to 
illuminate the nuances and inner-workings at hand as the Truman administration 
formulated its policies and approaches to the Cold War. This is also supplemented by the 
numerous published collections of primary documentation from the early Cold War as 
well as official declassified investigations and reports now available to the historian.26  
 
The richest well of primary documentation to inform this study has been the numerous 
papers, memoranda and internal government communiqués available in the archives and 
in several publications including the Foreign Relations of the United States series. A 
fairly large body of these documents has both survived and been declassified to make 
them available to historical research, particularly by the Department of State. However 
limitations must also be recognised with this type of evidence, particularly in relation to 
government papers and directives. For although such documents provide insight as 
statements of “policy” they do not necessarily tell the whole story within the government 
apparatus. For instance the record of a government directive in isolation does not divulge 
the process of its development. It also sheds no light on the action of executing the policy 
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in the field. Therefore it is crucial for the historian to investigate whether such documents 
were indicative of broader, trans-departmental interests and whether stated capabilities, 
objectives and intentions were successfully and consistently implemented by the 
operational branches of the government.  
 
This problem is somewhat counterbalanced by the availability of internal communiqués 
and memoranda between Truman administration bureaucrats and policymakers. This 
helps to shed light on the biases and special interests of officials and departments that 
invariably shaped the process of developing policy positions towards both Eastern and 
Western Europe in the late 1940s. This source of documentation proved particularly 
insightful in revealing the motivating factors and differences of opinion that lay behind 
the twists and turns that occurred during the long bureaucratic turf wars between the 
Departments of State and Defense and the CIA over the control of a new 
psychological/political warfare capability. 
 
This notwithstanding, obstacles continue to face and at times frustrate researchers of the 
early Cold War period. The most glaring deficiency is found in the primary 
documentation concerning the operational arms of the executive branch of the U.S. 
government. This was particularly problematic when investigating the activities of the 
Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), America’s first agency specifically created to 
undertake a broad spectrum of peacetime political warfare activities abroad. It is not clear 
to what extent documentation on the implementation of the political warfare programme 
in the late 1940s exists but is still being withheld within the vaults at Langley, or has 
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already been destroyed long ago by prudent overseers of the intelligence world. The 
habitual problem for the researcher, of gaining access to classified documents, is in this 
instance sometimes also compounded by the fact that much of the evidence of the “secret 
war” was never originally recorded in written form. As a result official written 
memoranda detailing the actions and opinions of agencies like OPC are unfortunately 
scarce.  
 
This difficulty can be overcome to some extent by supplementing official records with 
the valuable reservoir of oral histories and recollections recorded by many of the 
principals themselves. These are collected in the archives as well as in numerous 
autobiographies and secondary accounts of the period.27 While it is recognised that over-
reliance should not be placed on first-person recollections, the biographies and oral 
histories of numerous figures involved in the development of the political warfare 
programme added valuable insight and colour to this study and helped to fill in many of 




This work follows a general chronological progression although there are thematic 
overlaps in the narrative. There is one exception to the chronological order. Chapters 4 
and 5 are constructed to consider different thematic elements of the same period spanning 
mid-1948 to mid-1950. The study has been structured to navigate a dense historical 
period, where possible, in a coherent and linear fashion. This has been done with great 
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care taken not to impose a misleading interpretive sense of order on the numerous 
overlapping and intersecting events and factors that litter the early Cold War period. 
 
Chapter 1 looks at the origins of political warfare within the development of a peacetime 
intelligence system in the United States. The chapter is divided into 2 parts. Part 1 
examines the creation of the Central Intelligence Group, demonstrating that bureaucratic 
rather than strategic factors overshadowed its development and a political warfare design. 
Part 2 explores the intentions behind the drafting of the National Security Act of 1947 
and the establishment of the National Security State. While there was no strategic plan to 
mobilise political warfare against communism in Europe at this stage, the creation of the 
National Security State was salient in facilitating this capability later.  
 
Chapter 2 explores the factors behind the Truman administration’s shift towards a 
peacetime covert psychological warfare capability from the summer to the end of 1947. 
The development of the European Recovery Program (ERP) and Soviet launch of the 
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) were pivotal to the demand for covert 
operations in Western Europe. Internal bureaucratic disputes rather than the Soviet 
adversary are shown to have undermined the formal launch of a peacetime covert 
psychological warfare programme. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the administrative conflict that undermined a coherent and unified 
bureaucratic approach to the development of the political warfare capability between 
January and June 1948. U.S. approaches to the strategic containment of Western Europe 
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were undertaken in France and Italy, alongside Congressional approval and 
commencement of ERP contrasted with the lack of a strategy towards the Soviet bloc. 
The emergence of four primary actors within the bureaucracy undercut the refinement of 
a coherent strategic approach through the implementation of covert political warfare. This 
section looks in detail at the minutiae of the development of NSC 10/2 to demonstrate 
that it marked an ineffective bureaucratic compromise that mobilised capabilities but 
failed to resolve strategic goals and approaches.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the development of U.S. Soviet bloc policy from mid-1948 to mid-
1950. The central premise is that growing disunity within the bureaucracy resulted in the 
formulation of contradictory policies under NSC 20/4 that left strategic goals ambiguous 
and inconsistent. While sections of the government attempted to encompass the newly 
created Office of Policy Coordination into its plans, the main thrust of policy continued 
to prioritise strategic goals in Western Europe through the creation of positions of 
strength. This undercut a commitment either to “liberate” Eastern Europe or to adopt 
alternative methods with or without the use of political warfare to pursue the unification 
of Europe. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the divergence of American policies towards the Soviet bloc and the 
implementation of political warfare operations between mid-1948 and mid-1950. The key 
contention is that the failure to devise a strategic basis for U.S. actions, alongside 
inadequate machinery to oversee OPC, resulted in the non-strategic conduct of a political 
warfare offensive at the operational level. From this situation wide discrepancies emerged 
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between the stated policy objectives formulated at the policy level in Washington and the 
goals of Cold War activists on the front line of the Cold War. While the space opened up 
for the launch of provocative and aggressive missions against regimes within Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, the effort was not coordinated within the bureaucracy and 
most importantly this was not tied to a viable strategy demarcating how it could be 
successfully accomplished.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the legacy of bureaucratic and strategic disorder beyond 1950. 
While the political warfare capability was reinforced and expanded by the Korean War 
and NSC 68, its strategic alignment with coherent policy aims towards the Soviet bloc 
was not forthcoming. Despite organisational and strategic efforts between 1950 and 1953 
to clarify U.S. aims and capabilities in the Cold War, the lack of a resolution left a legacy 
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-1- 
THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL WARFARE: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACETIME INTELLIGENCE 
AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947  
 
Over the past sixty years the Central Intelligence Agency has become notorious for its 
covert political warfare capability.1 Yet the acquisition of an offensive capability was not 
even a consideration when the Agency was originally established. In retrospect some 
historians have implied that the CIA was always intended to intervene abroad through 
clandestine political actions.2 But the full political warfare capability was in fact 
sanctioned several years after its founding. This is an important distinction corroborating 
the lack of a long-term design for a peacetime political warfare strategy and organisation.  
 
A key point to address, therefore, is not that the Agency originally pursued a political 
warfare agenda, but that certain factors determined that this occurred at a later date. Its 
development was, of course, externally tied into the evolving post-war geopolitical 
situation. But it was also borne out of a convergence with internal bureaucratic and 
strategic factors. 
 
Before 1947 senior American policymakers did not conceptualise peacetime foreign 
policy outside the conventional structures of the diplomatic and military services.  Thus 
no consideration was given to the formulation of plans to undertake political warfare in 
 27
peacetime. Increasing emphasis was given to developing capabilities to meet the 
challenge posed by the Soviet Union as the wartime alliance faltered in peacetime. But 
the development of unconventional capabilities to meet this need received scant attention.  
 
The establishment of a peacetime intelligence system was therefore not initially 
motivated by the perception of a Soviet threat.3 Government officials recognised the 
merits of peacetime intelligence long before the emergence of Cold War antagonisms, 
although the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946 fell well 
short of fulfilling its peacetime requirements. The formation of this nominally centralised 
intelligence body generated a considerable amount of friction within the government 
bureaucracy which undermined the potential effectiveness of CIG in its original form. 
During 1946 demand grew for intelligence on Soviet intentions and capabilities, and this 
facilitated CIG’s expansion, value and effectiveness within the community of 
government agencies. It was only later, when American policies were reconfigured 
towards the Cold War from mid-1947, that this agency was also linked to the perceived 
need to implement countermeasures against the Soviet threat in Europe. 
 
Prior to 1947, plans for a future covert capability for wartime implementation were 
initiated. These were not linked to a coordinated peacetime interventionist agenda or to 
CIG or any other civilian organisation. The interdepartmental studies conducted by the 
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) were strictly limited to 
psychological warfare, such as the uses of propaganda and other devices to affect enemy 
morale, rather than the broader political warfare spectrum.  
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Peacetime political warfare evolved later along a different trajectory. The National 
Security Council briefly assigned a peacetime psychological warfare capability to the 
fledgling CIA late in 1947.  The external factors that motivated this move did not 
converge before the statutory founding of the CIA in July 1947. Thus there was no 
longer-term strategic development of a peacetime political warfare programme against 
the Soviet Union prior to this point. 
 
This notwithstanding, it is important to examine the origins of the Agency because CIG’s 
evolution unwittingly provided the organisational machinery and a potential legal basis to 
implement political warfare in the future. Most significantly, espionage and counter-
espionage functions were secretly approved by Congress and the executive, although no 
thought was initially given to expanding into offensive political warfare operations at the 
time. The authorities affirming CIG/CIA’s secret intelligence function contained 
loopholes opening up possibilities for a broader capability, but this was not exploited by 
CIG, the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) 
or the White House prior to mid-1947.  
 
The institutional hostility characterising CIG’s early existence also influenced the 
Agency’s later acquisition of an interventionist capacity. Ironically, the efforts of rival 
agencies to maintain its emasculation compelled CIG to expand from its meagre origins 
to survive in the cut-throat institutional environment. Its vital need for statutory 
recognition inadvertently provided it with more credible legal authority to conduct 
political warfare than its competitors, but at no stage was the push for legislation linked 
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to a move into operations. Legislation was regarded as essential both to formalise its 
institutional position and to protect its jurisdiction from jealous administrative predators.  
 
In particular, the growth under CIG’s second director General Hoyt S. Vandenberg laid 
an institutional platform allowing the future CIA to undertake political warfare. This was 
neither inevitable nor arrived at by design. But CIG’s awkward and non-strategic 
development ultimately shaped CIA in ways that gave it an edge over rivals as an 
offensive operational unit. The incorporation of its espionage capacity in mid-1946 was 
most significant. The partial preservation of the wartime Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) within the War Department’s Strategic Services Unit (SSU) led to the formation of 
the Office of Special Operations (OSO) within CIG and a mandate to collect secret 
intelligence abroad and to conduct counter-espionage activities. Ultimately, this provided 
the young agency with the expertise and an operational base from which to expand into 
broader political warfare actions when later called upon by the President and the National 





The Organisational Roots of Political Warfare: From OSS to CIG 
General William “Wild Bill” Donovan seems to have made the first formal suggestion for 
the United States to acquire a peacetime political warfare capability. Donovan headed the 
Office of Strategic Services, America’s wartime intelligence and special operations 
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organisation.4 Towards the end of 1944 he sent several proposals to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt outlining his vision for a peacetime centralised intelligence service. Donovan 
hoped to preserve OSS in the peacetime era as the end of the war against the Axis powers 
drew close. In two documents sent in October and November 1944 respectively, the OSS 
chief innocuously proposed that one function of the peacetime intelligence service should 
be to conduct “[c]landestine subversive operations” and “[s]ubversive operations 
abroad.”5 In Donovan parlance this meant political warfare.6 At this stage he was simply 
inserting the principle of a political warfare capability into his proposal to mirror the 
functions carried out by OSS. In other words, Donovan was not specifically advocating 
the preparation of a peacetime political warfare programme, but that a centralised 
intelligence agency should be empowered to implement it should one ever be required. 
 
Donovan’s proposals fell on deaf ears. But the failure of his overall proposition to win 
over President Roosevelt had nothing to do with his passing reference to a peacetime 
covert political warfare capability. He was primarily opposed because the Departments of 
State, War and Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) suspiciously eyed his 
concept as a challenge to their existing powers.7 This stemmed primarily from the 
wartime intelligence services within the departments, each of which was “jealous of its 
own sovereignty and jurisdiction” according to Agency historian Ludwell Lee 
Montague.8 Controversy surrounded Donovan’s call for a permanent centralised 
intelligence agency and it was subsequently leaked by one of these “rival” agencies to the 
Chicago Tribune and Washington Times-Herald in February 1945.9 A corollary effect 
was that this ruled out any immediate consideration of the peacetime organisation of a 
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political warfare capability. But the general public (and Congress) were alarmed by the 
prospect of an American “Gestapo” with unbridled domestic powers rather than the 
sanction of clandestine interventions abroad.10  
 
Donovan’s OSS was dissolved by Executive Order 9621 on 20 September, 1945.11 The 
concept of political warfare then played no part in the acrimonious debates that ensued 
over the development of a peacetime centralised intelligence system.12 There was no 
agenda to inaugurate political warfare in the period and no proposal was forthcoming in 
another policy paper to set up a peacetime capability until the autumn of 1947. Although 
trans-departmental resistance posed a severe challenge to Donovan’s vision of a 
powerful, independent and truly centralised post-war intelligence agency, creating 
discontinuity between OSS and the fledgling peacetime organisation.13 But the 
bureaucratic wrangling related to fears that a centralised body would usurp the current 
powers and jurisdictions of existing departmental intelligence units.14  
 
CIG was created by presidential directive on 22 January, 1946.15 It was an enfeebled 
entity with several glaring institutional weaknesses built into it.16 This reflected the need 
for Truman’s personal intervention to drive through CIG’s establishment to overcome the 
obstructionism of the disenchanted departments. In its original form CIG was far from 
Donovan’s vision of a powerful, centralised, operational agency capable of conducting 
political warfare abroad. Instead it was regarded as a coordinating mechanism, not an 
independent agency.17 CIG did not even command its own personnel, budget or facilities 
but was instead dependant for these on the allocations of its departmental competitors. It 
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was placed under their authority with the department heads comprising the National 
Intelligence Authority, while the departmental intelligence chiefs held an “advisory” role 
on the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB).18  
 
CIG’s first director Rear Admiral Sydney W. Souers accepted that CIG’s role was limited 
to “serving the departments under supervision and control of the department heads in the 
National Intelligence Authority.” The body’s diminished status was confirmed at the 
second formal meeting of the NIA. Secretary of State Byrnes, Secretary of the Navy 
Forrestal, Secretary of War Patterson and Truman’s personal representative in the NIA 
Admiral Leahy formally designated it a “cooperative interdepartmental activity” rather 
than an independent agency. Betraying the fact that CIG was the product of compromise 
between departments reluctant to relinquish their own intelligence functions and 
capabilities, it was agreed that there should be “adequate and equitable participation” in 
its activities by the State, War and Navy Departments as decided by the NIA.19 Yet these 
benefactors in Navy, War, Justice and the State Department were all determined to 
undermine CIG’s central authority rather than to furnish it. As one historian has 
observed, CIG was “a central authority in name only” from the outset.20  
 
Despite its beleaguered origins, two clauses delineating CIG’s mandated functions and 
duties were contained within the January 1946 directive that offered it a future 
operational capacity.21 CIG was directed to perform “such services of common concern 
as the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently accomplished 
centrally.” It was also charged to undertake “such other functions and duties related to 
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intelligence affecting the national security as the President and the National Intelligence 
Authority may from time to time direct.”22  
 
These vague authorities originated in the Donovan proposals. Although CIG and the NIA 
did not look upon them as a gateway to expanded powers, these clauses were retained in 
later authorities providing the legal loopholes used by the administration to authorise 
covert operations. The inclusion of these innocuous clauses in the January 1946 directive 
establishing CIG was therefore crucial to their retention in the later draft proposals that 
went before Congress a year later that ultimately provided CIA with an unprecedented 
peacetime capability to intervene abroad.  
 
CIG’s Expansion: The Non-Strategic Development of a Political Warfare Capacity 
The seeds of an operational agency therefore existed from the outset, but not an agenda. 
Initially CIG’s most pressing need was to address its fundamentally weak position within 
the administrative structure. The most practical way to do this in any competitive 
environment is to grow in size and stature and this is exactly what the Group attempted to 
do. From January 1946 to July 1947 it gradually acquired new functions and duties 
augmenting its value as a member of the government community, thereby enhancing its 
institutional life expectancy. Its expansion simultaneously laid the organisational 
platform for the CIA’s capacity to conduct political warfare in the future. 
 
The acquisition of a secret intelligence collection capability was salient as it transformed 
CIG from a dependent “coordinating mechanism” into a semi-independent and 
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operational organisation in its own right. Although political warfare was not envisaged by 
the CIG leadership or the broader administration when OSO was established, intelligence 
collection- in other words espionage and counter-espionage- shares common methods of 
operation, as well as organisational and security needs. Both practises are also based on 
the same principle of foreign peacetime intervention. This was the organisational root, 
therefore, of the CIA’s budding political warfare capability. The Agency inherited a 
limited but nonetheless practical base of expertise and experience from which to expand- 
a platform that other competitor agencies lacked.  
 
There was no thought in the mind of CIG’s second director General Hoyt S. Vandenberg 
to exploit the espionage duties as a stepping stone to broader powers. But his energetic 
and highly effective expansion of CIG’s functions, in particular, ensured an operational 
future for the Agency.23 Facing the prospect of institutional redundancy, DCI 
Vandenberg wasted no time at the task of carving out a role for the Group. In a draft NIA 
directive to the IAB on 20 June, 1946 (ten days into his new post) Vandenberg proposed 
among other things, “a redefinition of the functions of the Director of Central Intelligence 
which will give him the necessary authority to augment the Central Intelligence Group so 
that he may effectively perform his assigned missions.”24 Within a month of his tenure he 
received an additional $10 million in funds to add to CIG’s existing $12 million 
authorisation. He was also given clearance to expand the Group’s permanent staff from 
165 to 3,000 people by the end of the fiscal year, just ten weeks away.25  
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Many of Vandenberg’s requests were officially accommodated in National Intelligence 
Authority Directive (NIAD) 5. This directive assigned responsibility for intelligence 
collection to CIG, authorising it to conduct “all organized Federal espionage and counter-
espionage operations outside of [the] United States and its possessions for the collection 
of foreign intelligence information required for the national security.”26 The 
incorporation of espionage into CIG heralded an important moment in the early history of 
the Agency and the destiny of a political warfare capability.27 This outcome was 
unintentionally facilitated by the efforts of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy 
and Donald Stone of the Bureau of the Budget, who “cooperated quietly and with great 
foresight to preserve the most important functions of OSS” according to future Director 
of Central Intelligence Richard Helms.28 John Magruder, the director of SSU in the War 








Following the approval of NIAD 5, from July 1946 CIG absorbed former OSS personnel
including a very small nucleus of political warfare expertise. Unglamorously, however, 
the main factor behind the transfer was administrative expedience. The OSS agents
been transferred into the War Department and reorganised as SSU when OSS w
dissolved after the war. This was understood by all concerned to be an interim 
arrangement until a permanent home could be found. In the meantime SSU felt the 
knock-on effect of the slashes in federal spending after the war. Naturally the parent War
Department did not feed the adopted SSU before its other needy components withi
department, as the Unit had only recently been transferred from OSS as a holding 
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measure.30 Alfred McCormack’s Research and Analysis branch fared little better in the 







m career prospects in intelligence or because their 
laries were simply not affordable.34  




Diminishing budget and resource allocations made it increasingly untenable for SSU to 
preserve the “facilities and assets of OSS” that were deemed to be “potentially of futu
usefulness to the country.”32 By February 1946 an exasperated Magruder resigned in 
protest at the heavy “attrition” of OSS assets, informing Patterson of the “urgent need fo
clarification of the status of the SSU if its assets [are] to be preserved. […] the assets of 
the organization continue to be sapped by attrition of high grade personnel, and its moral
lowered at a rate accelerated by continuing obscurity in the Unit’s future.”33 Some O
veterans like Philip Horton in France, Richard Helms in Germany, Alfred Ulmer in
Austria and James Angleton in Italy did stay on to administer the skeletal postwar 
service. But many important members like Frank Wisner were lost because they either 
became disillusioned about the long-ter
sa
 
Magruder believed in the principle of centralised peacetime intelligence “on the
national rather than departmental requirements.”35 But the transfer to CIG was 
fundamentally an administrative necessity if its valuable intelligence networks across 
Europe, North Africa and the Middle East were to be saved. When Truman established 
CIG, Magruder therefore requested that the NIA obtain “at the earliest practicable date a
objective analysis of the functions and assets of the SSU and an appraisal of their value 
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for employment operationally in the Central Intelligence Group.” DCI Souers appoin
committee chaired by Colonel Louis J. Fortier to look into the matter and it quickly 
approved Magruder’s recommendations that SSU be transferred to CIG based on “the 
national interest and the preservation 
ted a 
of existing organization and facilities for tapping 
reign intelligence systems [….]”36 
uct 
s 
d be a 
ervices Unit 
ill be employed to inaugurate the program under the new auspices.”39  
d 




A secret intelligence capability was eventually organised within the Office of Special 
Operations under Donald Galloway on 11 July, 1946. Galloway was instructed to cond
“all organized Federal espionage and counterespionage operations outside the United 
States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required 
for the national security.”37 At the time of the transfer SSU employed 400 field officer
as well as 260 staff in Washington and 1,432 in auxiliary roles, although not all of these 
were rehired by the new office.38 Budgetary restrictions determined that OSO woul
modest undertaking, at least at the outset. DCI Vandenberg stipulated that “Only a 
limited number of carefully selected individuals formerly with Strategic S
w
 
CIG thereby acquired a base of interventionist expertise. This included a rudimentary 
nucleus of OSS political warfare specialists to ensure that “the necessary elements an
assets for the paramilitary branches will not be lost.” This was deemed important to 
“preserve the capabilities for sabotage, support for underground forces, [and] clandestine 
subversion of enemy morale.”40 But there was no immedi
 group beyond undertaking analytical and training duties: 
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[A] nuclei of no more than nine persons from the Morale Operations Branch
and three persons from the Special Operations Branch will be transferred to
the Secret Intelligence Branch to process and stu
 
 
dy information on foreign 
evelopments in clandestine propaganda and sabotage and to preserve the 
 
ars. 
But in er recalled:  
s to be 
e 
he new 
rganization. When Steve Penrose briefed me on my responsibilities in 
 
lected the widespread assumption that life would revert 




 on the Soviet Union rather than on waging covert political 
arfare operations.  
d
techniques evolved by O.S.S. in the past war.41  
The preservation of nine political warfare specialists in total in SSU represents a humble 
beginning for the capability that would swell OPC/CIA’s ranks in a matter of two ye
 1945-6 this eventuality was not envisaged, as Richard Helms lat
The OSS political and psychological warfare operatives seemed 
spontaneously to have scattered at the end of the war. The fact that covert 
action had not figured in the discussions on how secret intelligence wa
organized and who would control it may have convinced the OSS Moral
Operations specialists that there would be no role for them in t
o
Central Europe, he made no reference to any covert action.42  
The dissipation of the majority of OSS’s political warfare agents back into civilian 
careers at the end of the war ref
b
 
The Onset of the Cold War: Wartime Psychological Warfare Planning  
Although in 1946 U.S. policymakers did not yet call for an offensive political warfa
programme, senior officials began to identify an emerging threat posed by Russian 
power. Over time a consensus formed in Washington regarding the politico-ideolog
and military nature of the Soviet threat. Growing American anxiety stimulated the 
demand for a greater quantity and quality of intelligence on Soviet intentions and 




 CIG was subsequently informed of the “urgent need to develop the highest possible 
quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time.” To facilitat
interdepartmental “Planning Committee” was established to draw up “a plan to 
coordinate and improve the production of intelligence on the U.S.S.R.”
e this, an 
g 
 intentions 




verberated around Washington, 
lthough his role as a consultant to CIG remains murky. 
 
44 SSU/CIG 
therefore organised itself to take a more active interest in the Soviet Union. In the sprin
of 1946 the Special Projects Division for the Soviet Union (SPD/S) was created under 
Harry Rositzke, forming the basis of OSO’s Soviet Operating Division in 1947.45 The 
increasingly suspicious nature of CIG estimates and analysis regarding Soviet
c
 
George F. Kennan, the State Department Russian specialist who later played a cen
role in developing a peacetime political warfare programme, was in a position to 
influence the alarmist anti-Soviet tone of CIG reports following his recruitment a
“Special Consultant to the Director of Central Intelligence.”47 Kennan famously 
expressed his own anxieties in the Long Telegram dispatched from the American 
embassy in Moscow in February 1946. Kennan did not regard Soviet military expans
as the primary threat to U.S. interests in Western Europe.48 Instead he identified the 
“subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government 
does not admit responsibility” on the ideological-political level as particularly hazardous 
for the United States.49 His dire analysis of the Soviets re
a
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Kennan did not yet call for an American response in kind with covert political warfare 
operations of its own. He later acknowledged that in 1946 he believed the priority was to 
prevent the establishment of predominant communist influence in Western Europe. 
“When we have stabilized the situation in this way, then perhaps we will be able to talk 
with them [Russia] about some sort of a general political and military disengagement in 
Europe and the Far East- not before.”50 This did not yet entail extending secret support to 
non-communists and discrediting of the left. Therefore it is extremely unlikely that his 
consultancy work with CIG went beyond informing the intelligence reports on Russia. 
 
Seven months after the Long Telegram was sent the first Cold War interdepartmental 
report was completed by the U.S. Government. This was undertaken in response to a 
White House request for the opinions of senior American officials regarding Soviet 
policies and intentions. Two Truman aides Clark Clifford and George Elsey canvassed 
the Secretaries of State and Navy, Admiral Leahy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director 
of Central Intelligence and other senior figures, before submitting the final paper to 
Truman in September. The opening lines of the Clifford-Elsey report were stark:  
The gravest problem facing the United States today is that of American 
relations with the Soviet Union. The solution of that problem may determine 
whether or not there will be a third World War. Soviet leaders appear to be 
conducting their nation on a course of aggrandizement designed to lead to 
eventual world domination by the U.S.S.R. Their goal, and their policies 
designed to reach it, are in direct conflict with American ideals [….]  
 
The report demonstrated an emerging consensus gravitating towards Kennan’s views. 
U.S. policy should “resist vigorously and successfully any efforts of the U.S.S.R. to 
expand into areas vital to American security.” Like Kennan’s musings, this did not move 
beyond an early expression of the “containment” strategy for Western Europe. Therefore 
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there was no call for offensive political warfare measures designed to undermine 
communist power within the Soviet bloc, indicating that this type of campaign had not 
yet entered official thinking.51 
 
Historian Melvyn Leffler has observed that as 1946 progressed military planners 
increasingly emphasised Soviet capabilities rather than intentions.52 This marked the 
growing acceptance of a bipolar split along Cold War lines. American officials became 
progressively more concerned that Soviet foreign policy harnessed to the strength of the 
Red Army was essentially expansionist and might therefore look to the territorial 
conquest of Western Europe and beyond.53 The military was the first to express an 
interest in political warfare stemming from this anxiety about Soviet aggressive 
tendencies and was stimulated by the crises over Iran and Turkey in 1946.54 Its initial 
exploration of CIG’s capacity to undertake operations was based on broader war 
planning, but this did not amount to a resurgent “maverick operational culture” under a 
“Donovan Tradition” as has recently been contended.55 Instead it was strictly tied into the 
earliest phases of contingency war-planning at the beginning of the Cold War.56  
 
Surveys into the operation of psychological warfare were also initiated in military circles 
in 1946, before any civilian offices showed much interest. These were limited to the 
preparation of plans and studies for the use of psychological warfare “in time of war or 
threat of war as determined by the President.”57 As such these early reports were narrow 
in scope and not directly linked to the infant CIG. Had the State Department been ready 
to consider political warfare measures in peacetime then CIG would possibly have been 
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called upon. But its own planning did not begin until late 1947 and was conducted 
independently of the military-initiated analyses due to its emphasis on covert operations 
as actions short of war rather than as wartime measures.58 Despite the military’s head-
start, these separate State Department proposals quickly overtook its own studies in terms 
of policy recognition and implementation in late 1947 and into 1948.59  
 
The instigation of psychological warfare planning in 1946 originated with Secretary of 
the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of War Robert Patterson. These early Cold 
Warriors were anxious to formulate broad and assertive war plans to counter the Soviet 
Union in the event of a military confrontation. Following an exchange of letters between 
Forrestal and Patterson in March 1946, an ad hoc committee was established to review 
military psychological warfare efforts in World War II. The committee was asked to 
recommend the establishment of a “peacetime military organization” for psychological 
warfare to maintain a “ready-for-mobilization status” as well as to propose a wartime 
military psychological warfare agency.  
 
On 4 June, 1946 Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air John L. Sullivan called for the 
issue to be broadened to examine “the integration of national psychological warfare with 
military plans.” Sullivan argued in a memorandum to SWNCC that “it may be assumed 
that [the] future national psychological warfare effort will continue under non-military 
control, and that integration of the national effort with military plans will be requisite so 
as to assist and not to interfere with those plans.”60 This prompted the creation of an 
interdepartmental ad hoc committee under SWNCC to formulate guidelines which were 
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completed by 10 December, 1946. This report, titled SWNCC 304/1, emphasised the 
importance of psychological warfare as “an essential factor in the achievement of 
national aims and military objectives in time of war, or threat of war as determined by the 
President.” Noting the disorganised nature of U.S. activities in World War II 
SWNCC304/1 also recommended “the immediate establishment of a committee with full-
time representation from appropriate governmental agencies to serve as an agency 
charged with preparation of psychological warfare policies, plans, and studies for 
employment in time of war, or the threat of war.” The envisaged role for a “peacetime 
psychological warfare committee” was limited to the establishment of “definitions, 
responsibilities and functions for “white” and “black” psychological warfare” and the 
development of “Plans to be prepared for use in times of war.”61  
 
Notwithstanding the rapid deterioration of US-Soviet relations, in December 1946 
American officials did not consider themselves at war. President Truman was not ready 
yet to declare the country under the threat of war, although behind the scenes he was 
shifting to a more confrontational position. Howard Jones observes that the enunciation 
of the “Truman Doctrine” to a joint session of Congress in March 1947 “signaled the 
administration’s willingness to engage in the struggle against communism on all fronts- 
social, political, and economic as well as military.”62 Although the Truman Doctrine 
publicly justified all exigencies of intervention, formal authorisation and implementation 
of political warfare came later. Importantly, SWNCC’s restriction of psychological 
warfare planning to wartime applications ensured that these military matters were not 
linked to CIG or to a far-reaching programme of peacetime intervention based on the 
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Truman Doctrine. It was the Group’s estimates, rather than a political warfare capability, 
that enabled it to exert an early influence in Washington.63      
 
Wartime contingency planning for psychological warfare was initiated in a SWNCC 
subcommittee between April and June 1947. This was limited to acknowledging the 
respective jurisdictions of the State Department for “psychological warfare policy 
determination which affects the foreign policy of the United States” and of the armed 
services for “psychological warfare policy determination which affects the national 
security and the conduct of military operations of the United States.” As a result 
coordination between military and non-military branches was suggested to facilitate the 
integration of civilian components into a military organisation in wartime.64 There was 
no simultaneous endeavour to organise a national psychological warfare campaign 
against the Soviet bloc in peacetime.   
 
Therefore, by mid-1947 when Congress passed the National Security Act statutorily 
establishing the CIA, limited planning for psychological warfare in times of war or 
national emergency was gaining momentum. But at this stage the executive branch failed 
to recognise a trans-departmental interest in possible peacetime covert operations (despite 
these studies being conducted by an interdepartmental group) that might have resulted in 
the CIA being designed to take charge prior to the passage of the National Security Act.  
 
The SWNCC proposals were eventually postponed after the passage of the National 
Security Act. The administration became distracted by the State Department’s proposals 
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for overt and covert peacetime psychological warfare leading to a feud over which 
agency should control and run it.65 In due course the NSC placed the peacetime function 
in the CIA. But this was not predated by any explicit links between SWNCC planning 
and the expansion of CIG and its subsequent quest for intelligence legislation. The 
primary liaison between the two groups instead stemmed from SWNCC’s need for 
“National Intelligence” that was provided by CIG.66  
 
Certainly, the Group’s determined pursuit of greater authorities and responsibilities in 
1946, particularly under Vandenberg’s tenure, transformed the fledgling intelligence 
organisation.67 Consequently, the foundations were unintentionally laid for its future 
covert political warfare capability. Long before the external Cold War pressed 
Washington to explore such measures, CIG itself was compelled to seek institutional 





The Pursuit of Intelligence Legislation and Creation of the CIA 
CIG’s pursuit of statutory backing impacted on both the institutional fate of the CIA and 
future decisions over the housing of a political warfare capability. At the time intelligence 
legislation was not linked to expanded offensive functions. The motivation was 
administrative rather than strategic. 
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At the end of his tenure as CIG’s first director in June 1946, Rear Admiral Souers 
submitted a progress report to the NIA setting in motion a process ultimately resulting in 
the creation of the CIA. This later held ramifications regarding the executive branch’s 
ability (through the National Security Council) to legally launch covert political warfare 
operations against foreign powers in peacetime by acting under implicit authorities vested 
by Congress. This legal basis is extremely dubious, in fact, because the beginning of the 
legislative trail reveals that policymakers and congressmen were originally motivated by 
bureaucratic rather than strategic or operational considerations in pursuing statutory 
recognition of the intelligence agency.  
 
Souers was a cautious Director of Central Intelligence. He was fully aware of the 
limitations of his station as prescribed by CIG’s founding directive because he was its 
principal author.68 Nonetheless in his June progress report Souers advocated statutory 
backing to enhance CIG’s weak position within the bureaucracy. Having outlined the 
difficulties encountered by its emasculation to its bureaucratic rivals, Souers 
recommended that the NIA and CIG “should obtain enabling legislation and an 
independent budget as soon as possible.” He informed the Authority that this was 
necessary so that the “urgently needed central intelligence operations may be effectively 
and efficiently conducted” and to gain “the necessary authority and standing to develop, 
support, coordinate and direct an adequate Federal intelligence program for the national 
security.”69 Only then could CIG remove the shackles imposed by the competition.  
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When Vandenberg replaced Souers as director of CIG he too was motivated by 
institutional, non-strategic factors in his quest for intelligence legislation. Vandenberg 
was in fact immediately thrust into managing a crisis. Three days into his post the new 
DCI received a document from CIG’s legal counsel Lawrence Houston describing the 
mandated responsibilities of the director and the organisation. Houston also bleakly 
warned of an administrative crisis facing the service. As presently arranged, he warned, 
“it is purely a coordination function with no substance or authority to act on its own 
responsibility in other than an advisory and directing capacity.” In other words CIG was 
powerless to control or influence budgetary, personnel and supply matters. In essence 
“CIG has no power to expend Government funds.”  
 
Houston also made Vandenberg aware of the existence of “Public Law 358, which in 
brief provides that no funds may be available to any agency or instrumentality which 
remains in existence for more than one year without a specific appropriation from 
Congress during that year.” According to Houston this could mean that “after 22 January 
1947, Departments could not even furnish unvouchered funds to the Director, CIG, and it 
would be questionable whether the Departments could furnish personnel and supplies 
paid for out of vouchered funds.”70 This was clearly serious. Houston’s legal advice 
asserted that under the authority of Truman’s directive, the lawful basis for CIG’s 
existence would expire in just over six months. Its survival as an institution hung in the 
balance because, as Houston later described, CIG was “technically illegal” without the 
formal approval of Congress.71   
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Vandenberg was instantly motivated by Houston and his deputy legal counsel John 
S.Warner to press for legislation. The cause was institutional survival not the expansion 
of capabilities.72 Legislative recognition would strengthen CIG/CIA’s bureaucratic 
standing, assure its future access to appropriations, and obviate the need for 
Congressional endorsement of its existence on an annual basis.73 The process put in train 
by this action ultimately culminated in the creation of the CIA the following summer.  
 
In another quirk of CIA’s origins, CIG’s narrowly focussed intelligence proposals were 
rejected during the drafting process in favour of a more generic authorisation. The 
intelligence proposal from CIG was abandoned by the administration’s legislative 
drafting committee in favour of vaguely-worded authorities to provide flexible rather 
than restricted authority.74 But this related solely to CIG’s ability to conduct espionage 
and counter-espionage. Unforeseen at the time, the broader legislation made it less 
problematic for the National Security Council to legally justify the implementation of 
political warfare later.  
 
The Drafting of an Intelligence Bill 
The process began with the drafting of an intelligence bill by Houston and Warner. This 
document, intended to fulfil CIG’s administrative requirements, was submitted to the 
White House for Clark Clifford to review on 28 June, 1946.75 Meanwhile Vandenberg 
began lobbying the members of the NIA to garner the administration’s support for 
Congressional enactment.76 This first CIG draft called for centralisation of intelligence 
activities but followed the January 1946 founding directive in presenting only a general 
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list of the CIA’s proposed functions and duties. Clifford responded tersely to Vandenberg 
on 12 July, disparaging the hastily written paper for its “unnecessarily repetitious” 
language and failure “to define in clear terms the sense in which the word ‘intelligence’ is 
used.” The latter shortcoming in particular provoked Clifford’s displeasure:  
The failure to distinguish between “intelligence” and “foreign intelligence” 
will raise a serious question in many minds as to whether the real intent of the 
bill is actually the same as that stated in the “Purpose of the Act” [….] I fear 
that this will lead to the suspicion that the “National Intelligence Authority” 
and the “Central Intelligence Agency” will attempt to control, with the 
powers granted to them in this bill, the F.B.I. and other intelligence 
activities.77 
 
Clifford was anxious to clearly define the Agency’s functions. But this stemmed from the 
inevitable misgivings of the departmental intelligence services and the FBI over CIG’s 
legal authorisation, rather than to the strategic ramifications of its broad empowerment.  
In two ways it was ironic that Clifford initially bemoaned CIG’s failure to clearly 
delineate the CIA’s proposed role within the government. Firstly, these were the same 
grounds on which CIG later opposed an alternative legislative proposal put forward by 
the drafting committee headed initially by Clifford himself. This version of the legislation 
lacking a clear definition of the CIA’s functions, and not the CIG paper, was eventually 
carried over into the National Security Act. The later authorities to conduct political 
warfare abroad in peacetime flowed from this generic proposal.  
 
The second irony was that Clifford testified before the Church Committee in the 1970s to 
defend what Congress by then considered to be the failure of the drafters of the National 
Security Act to clearly define the CIA’s future role and duties. The omission of explicit 
functions came back to haunt Clifford when Congress directly linked this deficiency to 
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the executive branch’s worldwide operation of covert political warfare and the Agency’s 
purported abuses of power.78  
 
Momentarily, in mid-1946 CIG and the White House agreed that a clear definition of the 
CIA’s functions should be included in the intelligence provisions of any legislation. Such 
an outcome would have made the later authorisation of political warfare on the basis of 
the National Security Act extremely problematic. On 16 July at a follow up meeting to 
the first CIG draft, Houston and James Lay of CIG met Clifford and another Truman aide 
George Elsey at the White House. Overcoming some initial reticence, the CIG 
representatives managed to secure Clifford and Elsey’s agreement that CIG “must now 
become a legally established, fairly sizable, operating agency.”79  
 
Houston and Warner were told to prepare a second draft explicitly mapping out the CIA’s 
proposed functions and clearly defining the parameters of “intelligence” to avoid any 
bureaucratic frictions.80 It would act as a safeguard to prevent the CIA from increasing its 
sanctioned powers once congressionally founded. The anticipated fear was not of a 
burgeoning foreign political warfare programme, but of the usurpation of the FBI’s 
domestic powers. The State Department also became concerned later, in early 1947, 
when the intelligence provisions were incorporated into the military unification bill.  
Secretary of State George Marshall and members of his staff were anxious that the 
military should not dominate the proposed NSC and CIA, paying no mind to the potential 
ramifications for authorising clandestine foreign intervention.81  
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Therefore the second CIG draft proposal, sent to the White House in December 1946 
included specific language clearly limiting the CIA’s domestic authorities, primarily to 
allay FBI fears. If approved by Congress, this proposal would have severely curtailed the 
administration’s ability to place a political warfare capability in the CIA. However, 
because it explicitly stipulated the CIA’s proposed functions and duties, it also included a 
clause to authorise espionage and counter-espionage operations now being undertaken by 
OSO.  
 
CIG’s intelligence proposal was overtaken by circumstances. At the beginning of 1947 
the intelligence legislation was incorporated into the Truman administration’s flagship 
project to unify the armed services.82 This convergence transformed the intelligence 
provisions that were submitted to Congress. During the chaotic drafting process the 
National Security Act drafting team eventually decided against including detailed and 
specific delineations of the CIA’s functions, duties and budget, much to the chagrin of the 
exasperated CIG leadership.83  
 
The inclusion of specific authorities to conduct secret intelligence, not political warfare, 
caused the commotion. The irony that Clifford’s drafting team was now dropping strict 
regulations having previously chastised DCI Vandenberg was undoubtedly not lost on 
CIG’s leadership. A further irony was that one of the departmental opponents of a 
centralised intelligence agency was now coming round to the concept that CIG/CIA 
should perform espionage and counter-espionage centrally.84 But because unifying the 
armed services was such a divisive issue, the drafting committee was not prepared to 
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include any potentially controversial language within the entire merger bill to go before 
Congress for fear of jeopardising its eventual ratification.  
 
Espionage was deemed to be potentially one such hot potato and was therefore struck 
off.85 The drafters anticipated that sections of Congress would object to the formal 
authorisation of such activities in principle, given that Soviet-phobia had not reached its 
Cold War heights at this stage. It was hoped therefore that entirely leaving this function 
out would negate any unwanted controversy, a strategy that actually almost backfired.86 
For security reasons it was also considered preferable not to publicly advertise which 
agency was responsible for conducting this most secret of responsibilities.87 Instead the 
intelligence sections were designed to retain sufficient interpretative flexibility to provide 
the Agency with the necessary legal authority to conduct espionage and counter-
espionage without an explicit sanction. Indeed, precedents already existed for the 
provision of flexibility in intelligence authorities to protect the interests of security.88   
 
The decision was therefore taken to opt for vaguely-worded authorities and to omit any 
mention of the CIA’s access to unvouchered funds. This was purely a tactical decision 
taken by the drafting committee in early 1947 that had little to do with intelligence 
matters at all. It was certainly not part on any duplicitous conspiracy within the executive 
branch to smuggle through expanded CIA powers under the noses of beguiled legislators 
on Capitol Hill. The priority was simply to gain closure on the long-running and 
acrimonious saga of military unification. The drafters worried that detailed intelligence 
provisions in the unification legislation would precipitate a fresh round of arguments over 
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the roles and missions of the various armed services, an issue still mired in considerable 
controversy.89 More detailed intelligence provisions could be sought at a later date after 
the Department of Defense had been successfully created and the Agency founded on a 
legal basis.90  
 
The Unification of the Armed Services and the Merger Bill 
On 25 January, 1947, the decision to attach CIA provisions to the broader unification bill 
was relayed to CIG’s legislative liaison officer Walter Pforzheimer by Clifford’s 
successor as head of the drafting team Charles Murphy. Pforzheimer was told that it had 
been decided that “all but the barest mention of CIA would be omitted” because “the 
drafting committee thought that the material submitted by CIG was too controversial and 
might hinder the passage of the merger legislation.” There would be no tolerance of 
potentially divisive clauses as potentially embodied within the CIG draft: 
It had been felt by the drafting committee that the substantive portions of the 
proposed CIA draft were too controversial and subject to attack by other 
agencies. It was further felt that the General Authorities were rather 
controversial from a Congressional point of view [….]91  
 
As a result, the draft National Security Act condensed the CIG draft to just 30 lines.92  
 
The salient factor behind the authorisation of loose CIA authorities that later formed the 
basis of the political warfare mandate was political expedience. In early 1947, Truman, 
Leahy, Clifford and Murphy ruled out the pursuit of independent intelligence legislation 
specifically defining (and therefore limiting) the CIA’s proposed role during the current 
session of Congress. Time was insufficient given that Capitol Hill would be 
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concentrating on the unification bill.93 Hence it was also expedient for CIG to tack onto 
the merger bill rather than go without statutory backing for at least another year. 
 
This influenced the way in which the loose CIA authorities were presented to shield the 
provisions from unwanted congressional criticism. With CIG’s blessing the drafting 
committee therefore decided that it would be best to present the loose intelligence 
authorities within the merger bill as an interim arrangement pending a separate CIA 
statute in the future.94 This approach reassured sceptical congressmen that the loose 
authorities contained in the intelligence provisions would not lead to unforeseen 
expanded powers for the CIA. But the congressional debates over the National Security 
Act reveal that concerns on Capitol Hill also revolved around the abuse of domestic 
powers and (to a lesser extent) ethical concerns about conducting espionage. 
Consideration of the potential shift to political warfare was utterly overshadowed 
primarily by the ubiquitous fear of an American Gestapo organisation.95 There was some 
irony in this given that long-standing fears within the executive branch had ensured that 
restrictions on domestic powers had consistently been included in all the proposals for a 
centralised intelligence service dating back to Donovan’s original plan in 1944.96 Such 
was the magnetism of the Gestapo peril that apparently nobody saw the wisdom in 
extending these same limitations on domestic powers to the Agency’s foreign activities. 
 
The principle of flexible interpretation (within acceptable boundaries agreed to in 
congressional committees) was therefore enshrined by Congress when it approved the 
legislation’s broad intelligence provisions. This was confirmed only when it was satisfied 
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that the CIA would perform similar functions and duties currently undertaken by CIG. 
Nonetheless this opened up a potential space for the future authorisation of political 
warfare by the executive branch without the need to directly consult Congress. 
 
The presentation of the intelligence portion of the National Security Act as an interim 
measure pending separate intelligence legislation had a further bearing on the future 
political warfare capability. Unvouchered funding was vital to maintain a shroud of 
secrecy over all aspects of covert foreign activities including espionage and political 
warfare.97 There was broad support for the principle of concealing the Agency’s spending 
power as a security prerequisite long before political warfare was envisaged.98 But 
explicit sanction of concealed appropriation arrangements was also scrubbed from the 
legislation to avoid jeopardising the overall bill.99 Pforzheimer later recalled that 
Murphy, Sherman and Norstadt “thought that the secret funding would open up a can of
worms, and delay unification. We could come up with the housekeeping provisions later 
on.”
 
ces of 100 Although in the short term this left some doubt hanging over the CIA’s sour
funding, more importantly it meant that the door to unvouchered funding, so crucial to 
the employment of a covert political warfare programme, was left wide open. 
 
Congress therefore knowingly condoned flexible interpretations of the CIA’s functions, 
although when the National Security Act was under consideration this related to 
concealing its secret intelligence duties.101 The omission of an explicit authorisation of 
secret intelligence in the congressional record and the statute did not infer that a broader 
political warfare mandate was also being concealed by either the executive or legislative 
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branch. As Richard Helms recalls, the provisions were “deliberately loosely written to 
avoid the dread words “espionage” and “counterintelligence.””102 Knowledge of this tacit 
arrangement was limited to a minority of congressional leaders.103 This was not unusual 
in the running of Congress and in agreements reached between the executive and 
legislative branches. Matters of high secrecy and extreme sensitivity were commonly 
handled on a selective need-to-know basis.104 The obvious need for security was 
heightened by recent public disclosures of the Soviet penetration of western atomic 
secrets.105  
 
The National Security Act was reviewed and debated exhaustively on Capitol Hill for 
five months. Although the unification of the armed services dominated proceedings, the 
intelligence provisions were extensively examined, primarily at committee level.106 
According to Houston, Congress was initially more interested in the CIA’s coordination 
function than its espionage capability, but political warfare did not feature at all.107 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union barely featured during the debates.108 Hence a political 
warfare sanction was neither explicitly included nor excluded within the final intelligence 
provisions approved by Congress establishing the CIA. Congressional acceptance that the 
executive branch would flexibly interpret the Agency’s authorities to facilitate the 
collection of secret intelligence abroad left open the possibility of its later extension to 
political warfare activities. 
 
The National Security Act of 1947 was finally passed by Congress and signed into law by 
Truman aboard the Sacred Cow on 26 July, 1947. While explicit restrictions were placed 
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on the Agency’s domestic powers, the provisions of the intelligence section were 
designed to provide contingent, flexible authority to the NSC in its sanctioning of the 
CIA’s foreign functions and duties. At that time centralised clandestine intelligence 
collection was envisaged, but the same authorities would later provide the administration 
with legal justification to authorise political warfare. This was facilitated by “loophole” 
clauses in the final version of the National Security Act stipulating that “it shall be the 
duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council [….] to perform, 
for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common 
concern that the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently 
accomplished centrally.” The Agency was also authorised “to perform such other 
functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National 




In the 1970s, Clark Clifford denied in testimony to the Church Committee that there had 
been any intention among the drafters of the National Security Act to authorise the 
mobilisation of American peacetime political warfare:   
Because those of us who were assigned to this task and the drafting 
responsibility were dealing with a new subject with practically no precedents, 
it was decided that the Act creating the Central Intelligence Agency should 
contain a “catch-all” clause to provide for unforeseen contingencies. Thus, it 
was written that the CIA should “perform such other functions and duties 
related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security 
Council may from time to time direct.” It was under this clause that, early in 
the operation of the 1947 Act, covert activities were authorized. I recall that 
such activities took place in 1948 and it is even possible that some planning 
took place in late 1947. It was the original concept that covert activities 
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undertaken under the Act were to be carefully limited and controlled. You 
will note that the language of the Act provides that this catch-all clause is 
applicable only in the even that the national security is affected. This was 
considered to be an important limiting and restricting clause.110 
 
Clifford’s desire to give covert action a “venerable lineage” is understandable given the 
furore that erupted over the CIA’s manifold foreign political warfare activities.111 Despite 
the contention by historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones “that covert political action was already 
on the agenda during the CIA’s 1946-47 gestation period,” the weight of evidence 
demonstrates that when the National Security Act was passed both Congress and the 
administration only envisaged the foreign collection of secret intelligence by the 
Agency.112 Yet the inclusion of “catch-all” provisions facilitated the adoption of 
unconventional peacetime capabilities within a matter of months of the National Security 
Act passing into law.  
 
Ironically, the Agency later resisted the responsibility to conduct foreign political warfare 
operations. Its defence against undertaking these covert activities derived from its 
interpretation of the intentions of the drafters and the National Security Act. “We do not 
believe,” Houston advised DCI Hillenkoetter on 25 September, 1947, “that there was any 
thought in the minds of Congress that the Central Intelligence Agency under this 
authority would take positive action for subversion and sabotage.”113  
 
Therefore, when the National Security Act was drafted and approved, it was by no means 
inevitable that the CIA would later become a “cold war department.”114 The convergence 
of deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union with the 
fumbled move towards intelligence legislation accidentally brought this about. Yet by the 
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time that external factors demanded the implementation of subversive countermeasures, 
inadvertently the organisational foundations had already been laid. Bureaucratic tensions 
still held up an immediate orchestration of political warfare through the Agency. But as 
Loch Johnson has colourfully described, the catch-all clauses came to dominate the rest 
of the authorities granted by Congress to the CIA, and the “tail” was soon wagging the 
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HOLDING THE LINE:  
ERP, THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE AND THE 
BUREAUCRATIC STRUGGLE OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL 
WARFARE 
 
The creation of the National Security State ostensibly reorganised the machinery of the 
United States government to allow it to meet the difficult challenges of the post-war 
world. When the National Security Act of 1947 was passed, the Soviet Union was clearly 
emerging as the primary concern for American policymakers. At the time of the 
reorganisation, however, the Truman administration’s national security policy was 
largely undefined and embryonic. Plans for a grand strategy for Western Europe were 
initiated during 1947 based on American contributions to its economic recovery and 
political stabilisation through the launch of the European Recovery Program. Questions 
remained unanswered over where this would leave American policies and objectives for 
the eastern part of the continent, especially as Eastern Europe and Russia were expected 
to reject the American aid proposal. 
 
Despite the soundness of the strategy for Western Europe, Washington was to a large 
extent a prisoner to external factors. Although ERP planners anticipated some sort of a 
backlash from Moscow in the wake of the Marshall Plan’s announcement, the scale of the 
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reaction caught Washington on the back foot. As a result U.S. policy and the machinery 
to implement it were compelled to play catch-up to the dynamic and fluid international 
situation on the ground in Europe. As a result, a long interim period prior to 
congressional ratification of the Marshall Plan placed U.S. interests in Western Europe in 
jeopardy as they came under subversive political attack from indigenous communist 
forces organised and supported by Moscow to oppose ERP.  
 
This ushered in a period of crisis management in Washington. The reality of Cold War 
antagonisms after the phony war of the Truman Doctrine now posed a clear threat to vital 
American interests in the west. France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain all appeared 
vulnerable to varying degrees to the advances of communist political ideology and 
subversive practices. Washington officials at the highest levels responded by calling for 
the development of countermeasures against the communist threat to Western Europe. 
This was a “defensive” counter-response that did not look towards undermining 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe, but simply at “holding the line” in the west.  
 
Tactically, U.S. countermeasures were intended to function as a double edged sword. On 
the one hand they should shore up the morale and resources of the non-communist 
political, cultural and labour organisations in affected countries. Simultaneously, the 
communist left should be undermined and discredited at every available opportunity. To 
do this it was immediately decided that American intervention in Western Europe should 
be kept hidden to minimise any grounds for communist propaganda attacks against the 
United States. They therefore settled on a tactic of covert “psychological warfare” based 
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predominantly on the secret disbursement of anti-communist propaganda and funding to 
pro-western groups.  
 
However, a peacetime psychological warfare campaign could not be immediately 
launched because Washington did not yet have either the machinery or the authorities in 
place to implement these emergency measures. The Agency, recently granted legal 
founding, was the preferred candidate to undertake the campaign, due to its inadvertent 
adaptability that would allow it to incorporate a psychological warfare capability. Despite 
the perceived need to act swiftly to alleviate the grave political threat to its western allies, 
Washington became bogged down in a bureaucratic quagmire as it attempted to organise 
its peacetime psychological warfare capability. The process lasted from the late summer 
when the need for American action was initially identified, until late December when the 
National Security Council was finally able to adopt a compromise directive formally 
authorising psychological warfare operations abroad in peacetime. In the meantime 
diplomats and intelligence officers on the ground attempted to fill the vacuum resulting 
from the bureaucratic struggle back in Washington, through off-the-cuff attempts to 
support pro-western groups and discredit communist movements.  
 
Although the long-anticipated top secret directive NSC 4-A was meant to resolve the 
bureaucratic conflict over the organisation and control of the psychological warfare 
campaign, it actually had the opposite effect. Effectively, residual dissatisfaction with the 
directive meant that it marked the beginning of the turf wars that it was supposed to end. 
In the immediate term the consequences of this were not too serious. Certainly 
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bureaucratic wrangling held up the formal intervention of the CIA mainly to the 
detriment of western confidence in the interim period. But ad hoc measures were 
sufficient as a stop-gap, while the CIA’s objectives were clearly defined and therefore 
when it was finally granted sanction to intervene in Western Europe it was able to do so 
fairly effectively.   
 
Instead, the opening up of bureaucratic divisions in Washington held far more serious 
ramifications in the longer-term. The conflict at the heart of NSC 4-A would persist and 
this undermined the effective organisation and implementation of a broader political 
warfare programme for the Cold War in the coming months and years.   
 
The Marshall Plan and the Cominform  
In July 1947, as Truman was signing the National Security Act into law, European 
statesmen met in Paris to discuss Secretary of State George Marshall’s proposal to inject 
American aid into their ailing economies.1 The embryonic European Recovery Program, 
heralded a shift in U.S. policy of far greater practical significance than the Truman 
Doctrine. The announcement of ERP demonstrated Washington’s firm commitment to 
the preservation of friendly governments in Western Europe and duly became the 
cornerstone of its “containment” policy. ERP’s implementation drew a political line in 
the sand indicating to the Soviet Union the geopolitical parameters of America’s vital 
interests. Not only was it symbolic however, as the Marshall Plan provided a viable 
strategy in practical terms to build up Western Europe. 
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The announcement of ERP was also a watershed because it propelled the United States 
and the Soviet Union towards the Cold War. Although ERP was seen in mainly defensive 
terms by the majority of American planners, Moscow regarded it as a supreme threat to 
its own security. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov’s rejection of ERP at the 
Paris conference in early July and the subsequent reaction to it in the east consigned any 
lingering hopes of a peacetime modus vivendi to history. The Kremlin quickly rallied the 
reluctant Eastern European regimes to reject the American aid programme and 
determined that ERP must be undermined by any available means short of war in the 
west. Meanwhile Russian predominance in the east must be consolidated to shore it off 
against perceived western aggressive designs. Any modicum of cooperation with the west 
was now abandoned and a protective ring of Eastern European buffer states was brought 
under the firm wing of Soviet power.  
 
The consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the establishment of the Soviet 
bloc opened up profound questions about how American foreign policy should deal with 
that situation. But during the autumn and winter of 1947, American priorities lay 
decisively elsewhere. Nine long months would pass before Congress finally approved the 
allocation of ERP funds and the details of the programme could be developed and 
finalised.2  In this period prior to implementation the Marshall Plan was acutely 
vulnerable to communist subversion.  
 
Several members of the State Department including George Kennan and Charles Bohlen 
had correctly anticipated that the Soviets would reject ERP due to the intrusive terms of 
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participation attached to it. They had hoped that Soviet abrogation would negate 
Moscow’s ability to hinder the project’s development and implementation.3 American 
officials perceived a western position of relative weakness compared to the Soviets. 
Therefore Russian non-interference would facilitate the strengthening of American allies 
in Western Europe, simultaneously staving off communist political advances in the 
region. 
 
The overriding feeling among senior Washington officials was that Soviet-directed 
communism posed a direct threat to the west.4 In mid-1947 this “came primarily from 
political intrigues and subversion” that hoped to exploit the spreading economic disarray 
in Western Europe devastated by the recent war.5  Communist political groups now 
threatened to takeover power or increase their political sway in Italy, France, Germany 
and Great Britain through local communist parties.  
 
The priority was therefore to ensure that the United States must “run the show” by 
carefully controlling the political environment to which Marshall aid would be sent.6 The 
driving principle behind the intervention was that “the approach to the political problem 
for the moment must be economic.”7 Washington also hoped to avoid assuming 
responsibility for dividing Europe by addressing the ERP initiative to both Western and 
Eastern Europe.8 As Maier points out, the “political brilliance” of the American initiative 
“was that it forced the onus of any division onto Moscow.”9 If the communist regimes 
rejected the proposal it would appear to the outside world to be their own doing, rather 
than as a result of explicit American exclusion.  
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Even though Washington successfully shifted the onus of responsibility for dividing 
Europe onto Moscow, this only scored propaganda points in the Cold War. What was 
salient was the long-lasting political impact of the division of Europe itself, rather than 
the appearance of culpability on either side. Despite the overall success of ERP in 
rehabilitating the west over the next several years, this undoubted accomplishment 
deserves to be balanced by its contribution to the origins and perpetuation of the Cold 
War. 
 
For, although the Marshall Plan was designed primarily as a defensive initiative to build 
up an American position of strength in the west, Moscow regarded it as an aggressive 
ploy to undermine Soviet influence. As a result, Kennan, Bohlen and others failed to 
anticipate that a Russian rejection of ERP would cause at least as much trouble as its 
participation. The Kremlin rapidly affirmed its overarching political and economic 
control over the Eastern European communist regimes as a direct response to ERP. Not 
only this, Moscow went on the counter-attack and organised resistance to the Marshall 
Plan in Western Europe itself. 
 
The communist grip on Eastern Europe was tightening even before Molotov’s rejection 
of ERP in Paris. Brutal mass arrests of opposition figures and tightening censorship of the 
media in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria went unaffected by American protestations. 
The U.S. lack of influence was signalled by its willingness to ratify peace treaties with 
the offending regimes in 1947 in any case.  
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Therefore the question of an American strategy for Eastern Europe was problematic 
before the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan. Washington’s geopolitical impotence in 
the region was bemoaned by frustrated members of the State Department. The American 
Minister in Hungary Selden Chapin warned Secretary Marshall on 22 July that “unless 
something positive is done immediately, all hope of saving Hungary for the constructive 
part which it might play in a stabilized democratic Europe needs must be abandoned, 
barring unforeseen miracles.” Chapin received some high-level support for his view that 
U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe needed urgent review. On 1 July  the Director of the 
Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews informed Marshall that “Hungarian 
developments have precipitated a situation clearly posing the question whether there are 
effective means, short of war, by which Soviet aggression through infiltration can be 
successfully combated by the forces of democracy.”10  
 
Chapin, Matthews and others were raising a broader and extremely pertinent point. Soviet 
and communist transgressions in the east pressed home the need to develop and 
implement a coherent U.S. strategic approach to the continent as a whole, if its division 
was to be avoided. Instead, Washington chose the easier and safer option to commit 
American energies unilaterally to Western Europe, where it exerted primary influence 
and where its vital interests lay. This decision thereby brushed under the carpet the lack 
of a pan-continental approach.  
 
Despite careful and extensive consideration of the strategic fallout from a Soviet rejection 
of ERP, its architects failed to fully grasp that the key pillars of the project would now be 
 79
vigorously challenged by communist groups in Western Europe. Moscow acted swiftly 
by mobilising European communist parties into the Communist Information Bureau 
(Cominform) over the summer of 1947 to coordinate legal and extra-legal opposition to 
the aid programme.11  
 
The Soviet counter-response to ERP and establishment of the Cominform was the 
decisive factor in the inauguration of a parallel U.S. political warfare programme.12 Over 
the coming years the scope and character of American political warfare evolved, but 
initially it was borne out of the need to protect pro-U.S. groups in Western Europe. The 
Cominform’s organised counter-attack exposed a soft underbelly to the ERP initiative. 
The most threatening aspect was the mobilisation of political activists within the French 
and Italian communist parties. French and Italian communists were all the more inclined 
to resort to extra-legal action when communist politicians were excluded from 
government cabinet positions at American insistence following the initial ERP 
discussions in the summer of 1947. This alienated local communist parties from the 
political mainstream in Western Europe, pushing them closer to the Soviet Union and 
providing greater incentive to act out of ideological rather than national interests.13  
 
The creation of the Cominform resulted in an intensification of subversive activities, 
hostile anti-American ERP propaganda and increases in covert Soviet funding to 
Communist organisations in France, Italy and elsewhere. This was played out through 
grass-roots violence, intimidation and strike action that threatened to cripple the already 
debilitated post-war economies in France and Italy and bring down their centre-right 
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governments. As a result, by early autumn the abiding fear in Washington was not of a 
communist coup in Czechoslovakia or escalating oppression elsewhere in Eastern Europe, 
but that France and Italy might “fall” under the sway of communist regimes before ERP 
aid reached them. Such a scenario would be a massive blow to American prestige, it 
would shatter the confidence of other non-communist movements in Western Europe and 
would jeopardise the entire ERP initiative. Congressional ratification was based on the 
participation of Western Europe’s major players, while the aid programme relied on an 
effective cooperative inter-relationship between the Western European economies.  
 
Washington recognised its inability to influence events on the ground in the participating 
Western European nations. Prior to the arrival of ERP aid and its management by the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the U.S. lacked the machinery to protect 
and advance the flagship ERP programme underpinning its entire strategic approach to 
Europe. The administration therefore looked towards two forms of intervention. On the 
one hand overt measures were undertaken including the provision of interim aid, food 
shipments and the intensification of an official U.S. information programme. It was 
hoped that highly visible donations of economic aid could stave off communist pressures 
through the winter period. In late September emergency funds for an interim aid package 
were therefore requested from Congress to prop up the beleaguered French and Italian 
economies. Without provisional assistance the State Department feared that the fragile 




Gradually officials recognised that overt measures must also be supplemented by the 
extension of clandestine assistance. Originally, the covert psychological warfare 
programme ranged from the production and dissemination of pro-western and anti-
communist propaganda to clandestine funding of non-communist political, social and 
labour organisations. Two primary aims underpinned the hidden intervention. Firstly, the 
indigenous communist activists would be counteracted. Secondly, the populations of 
Western Europe needed to be convinced about the propriety of the Marshall Plan, that it 
was not an American pretext to control the Western European economies as communist 
propaganda maintained. Washington could therefore supplement the official broadcasts 
of the Voice of America (VOA) by covertly organising friendly western elements to 
promulgate America’s benign intentions through local media outlets.15 
 
The Long March to Psychological Warfare Begins 
The incremental shift towards conducting peacetime psychological warfare originated 
with the new Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in the early autumn of 1947.16 
Forrestal had expressed concern about political instability in France and Italy since as 
early as June 1947. He asked Truman during a cabinet luncheon how the U.S. would 
respond to Russian-sponsored communist coups in these countries, to which Truman had 
no answer.17  
 
There are indications that by late summer the problem of political instability, if not the 
means of resolving it, was now a widespread concern inside the Truman administration. 
For instance Charles Bohlen informed Under Secretary Lovett that the “necessity” to 
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“devise some instrumentality to combat this [communist] penetration on its own 
grounds” in Western Europe was “frequently” discussed within the department. Their 
concerns were echoed by the first two special evaluations produced by the newly 
established CIA in September and November 1947. In these estimates Agency analysts 
argued that although open military aggression by the Soviet Union remained highly 
unlikely, Moscow was now deliberately conducting political, economic and 
psychological warfare against American interests in Western Europe.18  
 
Originally the primary mechanism favoured by Forrestal, Lovett, Leahy and others to 
offset the increasingly belligerent communist political agitation was to secretly fund anti-
communist political and labour groups.19 According to Bohlen, the sticking point to 
initiating this device “has always been to obtain such secret funds from Congress.”20 But 
the debate was moved forward by an even more extreme proposal. Forrestal was 
contacted by George Kennan at the State Department in September 1947 with a proposal 
to create a “guerrilla warfare corps” and training school within the military establishment. 
Kennan argued that the administration must “face the fact” that Moscow was advancing 
“in many areas” by “irregular and underground methods.” Contending that “it might be 
essential to our security that we fight fire with fire,” Kennan attached a study prepared by 
two OSS veterans Franklin Lindsay and Charles Thayer laying out their views on the 
basis of a programme of “secret warfare” against the Soviet Union.21  
 
Forrestal attempted to address the two questions of countermeasures and the requisite 
machinery to handle the task in one fell swoop. The Secretary of Defense turned to the 
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fledgling CIA to see whether it might access the unvouchered funds alluded to by Bohlen 
amongst others. Echoing Kennan’s concerns, Forrestal stressed to Hillenkoetter that 
“We’ve got to do something to stop the Russians and their rapid spread around the world. 
Secretary Marshall in the State Department doesn’t want State to do it, and I think he’s 
right. The military can’t do it. Could you take it on?”22 
 
Notwithstanding the Lindsay-Thayer proposal, these first covert measures were needed to 
control the perceived political crisis in Western Europe as an interim effort that 
complimented the goals of “containment” in the west. Former Agency official Harry 
Rositzke asserts that these earliest forms of political warfare “were strictly benign” and 
were solely “designed to strengthen the European political structure.”23 The priority at 
this time was not to turn these clandestine capabilities towards the east and launch a more 
offensive campaign against the Soviet bloc itself, but to address the faltering political 
constitution of the Western European nations. 
 
Forrestal logically turned to the Agency to undertake covert political activities for 
practical reasons.24 In this delicate field the CIA held key advantages over other agencies 
thanks to its institutional evolution and the mechanisms and authorities granted under the 
National Security Act. The jewel in the crown was the Agency’s ability to expend 
unvouchered funds, described by the CIA’s legal counsel Lawrence Houston as the “heart 
and soul” of covert operations.25 The CIA’s unfettered access to unvouchered funds 
allowed its operations to evade normal executive-legislative accountability procedures. 
This meant that the Agency offered a far greater cloak of secrecy to sensitive activities 
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than other organisations whose expenditures were liable to rigorous public scrutiny 
through Congress. There were operational advantages to using the CIA as well. The 
Agency already ran secret intelligence networks in Europe inherited from SSU/CIG and 
had preserved a nucleus of psychological and political warfare expertise. This provided a 
ready base from which to launch psychological and political warfare operations. 26  
 
Despite these organisational advantages, Forrestal’s request immediately hit a snag. The 
scope of activities now under consideration ranged from covert financial support to 
operations including the propagation of “black” propaganda. DCI Hillenkoetter objected 
to taking operational responsibility for such activities, fearful that they would jeopardise 
the Agency’s primary mission recently enshrined by Congress to collect secret 
intelligence. He therefore turned to his legal counsel Lawrence Houston for advice after 
hearing Forrestal’s proposition. 
 
Houston responded on 25 September in Hillenkoetter’s favour that the CIA should not 
take responsibility for the peacetime psychological warfare programme. Houston’s legal 
advice therefore temporarily halted the push for covert intervention in Western Europe. 
Although a “review of the National Security Act reveals two provisions which might be 
construed as authority for CIA to engage in black propaganda” or “S.O. [special 
operations]” it was Houston’s opinion that “either activity would be an unwarranted 
extension of the functions authorized” in the catch-all provisions of the legislation. 
Houston and Hillenkoetter knew very well that the flexibility granted by Sections 102 (d) 
(4) and (5) of the National Security Act related to secret intelligence and counter-
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intelligence according to the intentions of Congress. Houston reminded Hillenkoetter that 
“approval was given to the unvouchered funds requested by the Director of Central 
Intelligence mainly for the specific purposes of conducting clandestine intelligence 
operations outside the United States.” Rejecting Forrestal’s suggestion, he emphasised 
that he did not believe “there was any thought in the minds of Congress that the Central 
Intelligence Agency under this authority would take positive action for subversion and 
sabotage.”27  
 
In an effort to strengthen the Agency’s refutation of responsibility for covert 
psychological-political warfare activities, Houston concluded that the authority to place 
such operations within the CIA was not vested in the executive but in the legislative 
branch. Neither psychological nor political warfare, he declared, “should be undertaken 
by CIA without previously informing Congress and obtaining its approval of the 
functions and the expenditure of funds for those purposes.”28 Houston therefore based his 
rejection of the Agency’s legal authority to conduct psychological-political warfare on 
the congressional intentions behind the CIA’s original legislative mandate. However he 
added a caveat that suggested a way past this obstacle. “If the President or the National 
Security Council directs us to do a certain action, and the Congress funds it, you’ve got 
no problem. Who is there left to object?”29  
 
Hillenkoetter’s own objections were not based on legal considerations but on protecting 
the reputation and professional operation of his organisation. But his agreement with 
Houston that the CIA should not engage in psychological warfare activities, despite their 
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differing reasons, transiently fended off Forrestal’s approaches. In due course these 
rebuttals proved inadequate to fend off the NSC as it became increasingly determined to 
counteract the threat from the extreme left in Europe. 
 
The Convergence of SANACC and Peacetime Psychological Warfare 
By September 1947 the Truman administration was holding high-level discussions on the 
urgent need to intervene covertly in Western Europe. The earliest conversations took 
place within the social networks of the Washington political elite. This did not 
immediately filter down to the working level staffs of the various departments and 
agencies, delaying the initiation of detailed strategic planning. CIA and State Department 
papers produced in September 1947 reflected this, failing to link Italian political and 
economic vulnerability to the peacetime initiation of U.S. psychological warfare.30  
 
It was actually Undersecretary of State Lovett rather than Forrestal who took the lead on 
addressing Italian vulnerability at the NSC’s first meeting on 26 September. In so doing 
Lovett was following up the views expressed at a PPS meeting held the previous day.31 
The Planning Staff discussion centred on the renewed communist pressure being applied 
on De Gasperi’s government by parliamentary means and the possible communist seizure 
of northern Italy after the Allied troop withdrawal due in December.32 PPS, Lovett and 
the first CIA world review paper circulated at the NSC meeting all identified the grave 
danger of economic collapse and ensuing political instability that Italy faced at this 
time.33 Communism was not blamed as the source of Italy’s crisis, but it was branded the 
key threat that aimed to exacerbate and exploit the present economic difficulties. 
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Therefore the NSC members unanimously agreed that the greatest threat to U.S. interests 
in Italy was that economic collapse would bring about the accession to power of the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI). But there was no call yet to launch a psychological 
campaign to assist the pro-American government in Rome, possibly because Houston’s 
legal advice rejecting CIA involvement had been tendered the day before. 
 
The interest in a civilian programme of peacetime psychological warfare now also 
converged with the ongoing interdepartmental discussions regarding its wartime 
organisation. On 24 September, the day before Houston rejected Forrestal’s approach, 
Hillenkoetter sent a memorandum to Sydney Souers, now Executive Secretary of the 
NSC, concerning the SWNCC study on the planning and employment of psychological 
warfare in wartime. Hillenkoetter recommended that the NSC take “immediate steps” to 
establish a “central organisation” that should conduct “vitally needed psychological 
operations” as a result of the Soviet-directed communist threat in Western Europe. 
Hillenkoetter suggested that this new psychological warfare organisation should be 
accessible through interdepartmental representation at the “policy-forming level” under 
NSC “guidance.”34   
 
The timing of Hillenkoetter’s note betrayed his narrow bureaucratic motive to divert the 
administration away from the Agency, rather than a consideration of strategic or national 
interests. Hillenkoetter did not mention any specific role for the CIA in this proposal at 
all. Instead he proposed that a new central agency should operate psychological warfare 
precisely because he hoped to steer the CIA away from this responsibility.  
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Hillenkoetter’s recommendations pre-empted the release of the latest report SWNCC 
304/6 by the reconstituted State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 
(SANACC) Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluation (SSE).35 Six days after the 
Hillenkoetter proposal the SSE report was circulated. SWNCC 304/6 also deferred a firm 
recommendation on the problematic issue of assigning responsibility for wartime 
psychological warfare until the dust had settled from the bureaucratic shake-up following 
passage of the National Security Act. For the moment it cautiously proposed that an 
interdepartmental policy and planning board should be set up under a Director of 
Psychological Warfare.36  
 
Unlike Hillenkoetter’s memorandum, SSE continued to restrict itself to explore the 
matter solely in reference to times of war or the “threat of war.”37 Following the 
completion of SWNCC 304/6 a SANACC Subcommittee intended to undertake a special 
study of “White” programmes as well as “Black” propaganda, sabotage, conspiracy and 
subversion, but this too was still to be strictly wartime-based.38  
 
In contrast, Hillenkoetter suggested that the SANACC-proposed psychological warfare 
organisation should be linked to the Forrestal-led discussions. A new agency should be 
set up to conduct peacetime operations as well. In the current climate of increasing 
Soviet-phobia, this could be done seamlessly without having to contravene SANACC’s 
original charter. Even though the U.S. was not at war with the Soviet Union, a strong case 
could now be made that it was under the threat of war due to heightened tensions and 
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suspicions. This arrangement would buttress Hillenkoetter’s agenda of channelling 
responsibility for psychological warfare away from the CIA.  
 
With this in mind Hillenkoetter approved SWNCC 304/6 on 22 October. The DCI 
accepted that assigning responsibility for the proposed Psychological Warfare Agency 
could be deferred for the present, following calls from the army representative on 
SANACC for closer consideration of the question to avoid any “premature” decisions. 
Nonetheless Hillenkoetter emphasised his personal preference to SANACC that the new 
Psychological Warfare Agency should be made accountable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
tacitly indicating that the CIA had no desire to get involved.39 
 
In early October 1947 Washington received a jolt that propelled the psychological 
warfare debate into the foreground and entwined the divergent strands of wartime and 
peacetime planning. During the first week of October the administration became aware of 
the inaugural meeting of the Cominform convened in Poland two weeks earlier. Although 
communist agitation had intensified in France and Italy and in Eastern Europe since mid-
summer, the reconstitution of the Communist International (Comintern) heralded a 
concerted new effort by Moscow to orchestrate an effective opposition against American 
policies in Western Europe.  
 
The launch of the Cominform sparked a flurry of government communications 
attempting to assess its significance. Many of the American Embassies in Europe 
commented on the aggressive portents of this latest Soviet move.40 At the U.S. Embassy 
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in Paris Ambassador Caffery ensured that Italy did not overshadow the threat he 
perceived to France, sending a stream of cables to Marshall in the weeks following the 
disclosure of the Cominform’s existence.41 In the State Department Kennan warned 
Lovett that the launch of the Cominform and the anti-U.S. propaganda campaign 
amounted to a Soviet “squeeze play” and last-ditch attempt to defeat ERP.42  Bohlen 
agreed with this assessment and warned that Moscow now regarded France and Italy as 
the “chief battleground” over which to fight the recovery project.43 
 
Analysts at the Agency assessed that the establishment of the Cominform probably 
signalled a shift in Soviet tactics that would necessitate an American counter-response. A 
CIA estimate released on 13 October warned that the launch of the Cominform suggested 
an adjustment from the preferred Soviet strategy of parliamentary action to subversive, 
extra-legal measures in Western Europe. The memorandum emphasised that the principal 
threat to France and Italy was covert and political, rather than military in nature. Moscow 
was resorting to subversion and the fostering of revolution to further its interests.  
 
Although this judgement sounded dire, the CIA qualified the threat posed by western-
based communist groups. It was opined that the reversion to subversive tactics would 
undermine the parliamentary success of the French and Italian communist parties. Their 
credibility of fighting for nationalist causes would be compromised by association with 
the overbearing Soviets.44 This would prove irrelevant, however, if as the CIA believed, 
Moscow had instructed French and Italian communists to abandon any hope of a 
parliamentary route to power. Both parties had now been excluded from their 
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governments and the Agency guessed that the Kremlin therefore wanted them to adopt 
far more radical and aggressive measures.45  
 
Interim Measures and the Bureaucratic Quagmire 
Washington’s assessment that the Cominform aimed to undermine ERP before its 
congressional ratification and implementation in Western Europe concentrated American 
minds. Although the parliamentary threat posed by the French and Italian communist 
parties was not entirely discounted, it was now widely assumed that Western European 
communists had shifted from an overt political and legal programme to an underground, 
subversive and revolutionary campaign.46 The overwhelming opinion was that an 
American counter-offensive was urgently required. Despite the pressing strategic need 
for the official sanction of peacetime psychological warfare operations, this was 
completely undercut by divisive bureaucratic factors that held up formal organisation of 
the machinery for several months.  
 
During the long wait for NSC authorisation of an official programme, U.S. diplomatic 
and military representatives in Western Europe including Ambassador Caffery in Paris 
and Dunn in Rome vociferously campaigned in public and behind the scenes in support 
of American and local non-communist interests.47 Small-scale efforts to influence the 
political direction of Western Europe behind the scenes dated back to 1946. At that time 
SSU’s James Angleton had secretly funded De Gasperi’s Christian Democrats in the 
build up to the June 1946 Italian referendum to decide Italy’s future political system. 
Angleton also allegedly established and financed pro-western newspapers in Italy during 
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this period although he later denied this claim.48 The U.S. government had also attempted 
to influence the political outcome of the French and Italian elections of spring 1946 by 
exploiting its economic leverage over their populations with the extension of well-timed 
emergency loans.49 The secret support and channelling of American funds to the non-
communist labour unions in France and Italy commenced in the autumn and winter of 
1947 thanks in large part to the tireless efforts of Jay Lovestone of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) and Irving Brown of the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO).50  
 
Activities were not restricted to France and Italy. For instance, Melvin Lasky also 
attempted to promote pro-American opinion in Germany from late 1947, especially 
among the German intelligentsia. Lasky was aided in this task through his connections to 
Michael Josselson, a member of the Information Control Division (ICD) of the Office of 
Military Government, United States (OMGUS). In October 1947 following the Soviet 
rejection of ERP and the establishment of the Cominform General Lucius Clay instructed 
ICD to promote western values in Germany, especially to counteract the increasingly 
virulent anti-American Soviet propaganda.51  
 
In Washington the shift towards authorising an organised counter-offensive took far 
longer. The process began when SANACC requested expanding the scope of its study to 
include recommendations on peacetime psychological warfare as a result of the 
commotion sparked by the launch of the Cominform. This request was promptly granted, 
reflecting the widespread concerns in American circles over the danger posed to Western 
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Europe. The SANACC representatives agreed with the groundswell of opinion that 
peacetime measures were required without delay to counteract the increasing militancy of 
the communist left. As a result, on 23 October a SANACC meeting was held to appoint 
an ad hoc committee to consider and make recommendations “as a matter of urgency” on 
whether the U.S. should “utilize coordinated psychological measures and what 
organization is required.”52  
 
SANACC’s authorisation to examine the immediate need for peacetime psychological 
warfare was a golden opportunity for an interdepartmental approach to establish the new 
capability, transcending the parochial interests of individual departments and agencies. 
But this arrangement was confounded in due course because the various protagonists 
instead gravitated towards the narrower concerns of their own organisations. SANACC 
was undercut by the inferior rank of its members compared to many of the psychological 
warfare lobbyists that included senior officials like Forrestal, Souers, Hillenkoetter, 
Harriman, Lovett and Kennan. Therefore although SANACC studied peacetime 
psychological warfare, its influence was bypassed as genuine power rested with the 
opinions of the individual departments represented elsewhere at a more senior level.  
 
The SANACC discussions generated interdepartmental tensions instead of resolving 
them, slowing down a final outcome over the organisation of peacetime psychological 
warfare. A process of bureaucratic attrition was set in motion in which, ultimately, the 
weakest actor would be compelled to take on operational responsibility for the campaign. 
It was inevitable, in other words, that Hillenkoetter was fighting a losing battle by the 
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winter. “I shall admit,” he remarked in 1952, “there could not be a great deal of 
opposition when one’s bosses, in this case the NSC, were insistent upon setting it up.”53  
SANACC issued another report on 3 November that bemoaned Washington’s inability to 
counteract the “all-out propaganda campaign” being waged “primarily against the United 
States” by the Soviet Union. SANACC 304/10 warned that the “ultimate objective” of 
Soviet propaganda was “not merely to undermine the prestige of the United States and 
the effectiveness of its national policy.” The threat was more serious as Soviet actions 
were “designed to weaken and divide foreign opinion to a point where effective 
opposition to Soviet aspirations is no longer attainable by political, economic or military 
means.” This could undermine the entire basis of the American agenda in Western 
Europe, and therefore SANACC recommended that Washington must immediately 
“develop and utilize strong and concerted measures designed to produce psychological 
situations and effects favourable to the attainment of U.S. national objectives.”54  
 
SANACC 304/10 did not settle the various differences of opinion over the organisation 
of peacetime psychological warfare. Hillenkoetter and his Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence (DDCI) Brigadier General Edwin Wright approved its recommendation to 
establish a separate Psychological Warfare Agency as this would protect the Agency’s 
interest in secret intelligence. But Executive Secretary of the NSC James Lay advised 
Souers to reject SANACC 304/10’s proposal for another new organisation.55  
At first it appears incongruous that the CIA should resist the operational responsibility for 
psychological warfare to such a degree. After all, CIG had aggressively expanded its 
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functions and duties in order to progress as an independent agency. But the CIA did 
everything in its power to oppose the responsibility for psychological warfare operations.  
 
The reasons behind this were threefold. Firstly the feeling amongst the CIA’s leadership 
was that these activities would jeopardise the security and effectiveness of the Agency’s 
secret intelligence mission and potentially tarnish its reputation. This sense was fortified 
by Houston’s rejection of the role on legal grounds. A third consideration was that the 
Agency had little to gain from undertaking peacetime psychological warfare, whereas it 
had profited from its earlier expansion, particularly into the secret intelligence field. Now 
that the Agency’s status had been secured with statutory backing, it no longer needed to 
chase further functions to enhance its position within the bureaucracy. In fact, 
Hillenkoetter understood that the psychological warfare capability could prove to be a 
poisoned chalice. It was conceivable that taking on this duty could damage its autonomy 
because the departments would be keen to control the direction of such an important 
mission. In other words the Agency would run the operations and take the fall from any 
subsequent fallout from them but would not have the authority to actually direct them. 
 
SANACC had already recognised that the Departments of State and Defense lacked the 
requisite expertise, personnel, training and access to unvouchered funds to conduct 
psychological warfare.56 In late October two proposals now recommended the CIA as the 
best candidate to fulfil the peacetime psychological warfare role. On 24 October Souers 
sent a message to Forrestal, attaching a memorandum from Harriman which he described 
as “a very persuasive and accurate appraisal of the need for psychological warfare 
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operations to counter Soviet-inspired Communist propaganda, particularly in France and 
Italy.” However, the Harriman document (which unfortunately has not been recovered) 
left the problematic “question of appropriate organization somewhat indefinite” 
prompting Souers to make his own suggestions. Overt information activities of the State 
Department should be continued and supported. Significantly, Souers believed they 
should be separated from “covert activities.” These operations should be assigned to the 
CIA “since it already has contacts and communications with appropriate organizations 
and agents in foreign countries.” Furthermore, Souers believed that “sufficient 
unvouchered funds to initiate these activities might be obtained from CIA or the Military 
Establishment.” To establish overt and covert psychological warfare policy and 
coordinate between State and CIA activities, Souers recommended that “a full-time 
interdepartmental board under the chairmanship and supervision of the Department of 
State” should be created with military and CIA representation.57  
 
A second memorandum was forwarded to Truman on 26 October, two days after 
Forrestal received the proposal from Souers. It was prepared by a staff member in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense in light of the Souers proposal. Emphasis was placed 
on the need to wage a broad psychological warfare campaign to counter the anti-
American Soviet propaganda being conducted to great effect in Western Europe. Just as 
Souers had suggested, the campaign to counteract Soviet subversive activities should be 
assigned to the CIA because it was an “agency of the National Security Council” and had 
access to unvouchered funds. Its operations should be directed and coordinated with the 
other activities of the government through an interdepartmental board.58  
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The momentum was building towards housing a peacetime psychological warfare 
capability within the CIA because of the undisputable operational benefits this offered.59 
But the State Department and the National Military Establishment were unable to agree 
on the arrangement, prolonging a final resolution of the matter despite the urgent need to 
launch activities in Europe. Souers and Kennan attempted to bridge the departmental 
divide, holding a luncheon meeting with Forrestal on 31 October to discuss the SANACC 
psychological warfare project.60 Under Kennan’s influence the Secretary of Defense 
formally changed his position four days later.  
 
Despite approving Agency responsibility on 26 October, Forrestal and his three service 
secretaries and the three service chiefs agreed at a War Council meeting on 4 November 
that all overt and covert peacetime psychological warfare activities should be assigned to 
the State Department.61 Although this decision was based on the military’s aversion to 
interfere in civilian peacetime programmes, Kennan had also persuaded Forrestal of the 
merits of this arrangement.62 On the one hand Kennan had had Forrestal’s ear ever since 
the Long Telegram had made such a big impression on him. More importantly, Kennan’s 
personal interest in political warfare soon placed him at the centre of the entire project. 
Within months he displayed absolute determination to facilitate the State Department’s 
control over the programme in direct contrast to the wishes of his boss Secretary of State 
Marshall.    
 
Wright immediately cabled the War Council’s decision to Hillenkoetter that all foreign 
peacetime psychological warfare activities were “a primary function of the State 
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Department” and therefore should take place “under the direct supervision of an Assistant 
Secretary of State.”63 Presumably Hillenkoetter was relieved to hear that the CIA had 
apparently narrowly avoided this unwanted and troublesome assignment.  
 
The Final Phase: Bridging the Bureaucratic Divide 
The hopes of the Agency’s leadership were ultimately dashed, however. Forrestal’s shift 
forced the State Department to take a decisive position in the psychological warfare 
debate. The situation in Europe also demanded a resolution to the bureaucratic impasse. 
At a meeting of the NSC three days after the War Council announcement, Marshall made 
an address to the Cabinet based on a resumé of the world situation that he had asked 
Kennan to compile on 4 November.64 Marshall informed the NSC that the “political 
advance of the communists in Western Europe has been temporarily halted” representing 
a deterioration in the Soviet position. Although superficially this was a positive 
development, the ramifications might not be as two Soviet moves could be expected. 
Firstly, the Kremlin “will probably have to clamp down completely on Czechoslovakia, 
for a relatively free Czechoslovakia could become a threatening salient in Moscow’s 
political position.” This would remove the last modicum of non-communist political 
agency within the Eastern European regimes and final confirmation of the existence of 
two opposing blocs on the continent.  
 
The NSC was more directly concerned by the projected consequences for Western 
Europe of the worsening Soviet position. Again Marshall struck a pessimistic tone, 
despite the apparent success of Western European non-communist groups thus far to 
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confound the political agitation coordinated by the Cominform. The Secretary of State 
warned that as a result of its deteriorating position, Moscow “may very likely order the 
communist parties in France and Italy to resort to virtual civil war as soon as our right to 
have troops in Italy expires.”65 This he feared might also lead to communist guerrillas 
intensifying their efforts against the Monarchist forces in the civil war in nearby 
Greece.66 This echoed Kennan’s own warning to students at the National War College 
that “immediate [Soviet] plans today probably envisage the consolidation of their power 
in Czechoslovakia as soon as possible, and the actual seizure of power by violent means 
in Greece and Italy and France.”67  
 
At a further meeting of the NSC on 14 November the administration determined “to open 
a counterattack upon Soviet propaganda.”68 A consensus already existed prior to this 
meeting that a “counterattack” was necessary.69 But significantly, the State Department 
now asserted its position, meaning that the organisation of the campaign could now 
finally be decided. Thwarting Kennan’s wishes, Marshall opposed the War Council’s 
decision to place responsibility for peacetime psychological warfare in the State 
Department. James Lay recounted that Marshall “was greatly concerned that the 
Secretary of State should not be identified” with such activities.70 His suspicions were 
heightened by the word “warfare” in the title of the latest SANACC report, stimulating an 
instinctive feeling in the old general that such activities should not be controlled by a 
civilian department.  
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Marshall’s stance was not a rejection of State Department control over psychological 
warfare policy. This question was not yet addressed because the NSC discussion was 
based on the latest SANACC report on the organisation of a new Psychological Warfare 
Agency.71 Hence Lovett and Hillenkoetter both attempted to placate Marshall by assuring 
him that “the intent was only to ensure that all psychological activities were coordinated 
with our foreign policy and our information program.” Due to Marshall’s objections the 
NSC deferred a decision on the organisational responsibility for peacetime psychological 
warfare but declared that the Secretary of State would be given “responsibility for general 
coordination of all such activities.”72    
 
At the same meeting the NSC also discussed policy towards Italy. But NSC 1/1, the 
policy paper on Italy subsequently approved by the Council, was addressed in isolation of 
the earlier psychological warfare discussion. Because the debate over peacetime 
psychological warfare was still stuck on the organisational question of who would house 
it, its strategic implementation was not yet assessed. Prepared in the State Department 
prior to the meeting, much of NSC 1/1 referred to U.S. policy in the event of a 
communist seizure of northern Italy or the whole of the country through civil war. 
Secretary Symington dominated the ensuing discussion with questions relating to 
technical military matters such as the advisability of U.S. Air Force training flights over 
Italian territory at that time.73 The paper did not address the parliamentary threat of the 
PCI or the threat to the prospective aid programme posed by communist subversive 
activities.74 However, it did urge Washington to actively “combat Communist 
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propaganda in Italy by an effective U.S. information program and by all other practicable 
means, including the use of unvouchered funds.”75  
 
By mid-November it was clear that the failure to reach a final decision on the 
organisation of the peacetime activities was hampering strategic consideration of its 
implementation. The Department of Defense had completely distanced itself from 
peacetime activities, thwarting Hillenkoetter’s suggestion to SANACC that the military 
take responsibility. The State Department, through Marshall, had also rejected 
operational responsibility for psychological warfare, but Lovett and Kennan made clear 
that it should at least exercise primary influence over psychological warfare policy.  
 
As a result of Marshall’s position it was formally decided to separate operational 
responsibility for overt and covert psychological warfare by assigning these functions to 
different organisations. The NSC charged the State Department with responsibility for 
conducting overt information activities. According to NSC 4 Moscow was “conducting 
an intensive propaganda campaign directed primarily against the US and [was] 
employing coordinated psychological, political and economic measures designed to 
undermine non-Communist elements in all countries.” The NSC asserted that the “present 
world situation requires the immediate strengthening and coordination of all foreign 
information measures of the US Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign 
countries in a direction favourable to the attainment of its objectives and to counteract the 
effects of anti-US propaganda.”76 Although the organisation of U.S. information 
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measures at NSC-level had been anything but “immediate” the State Department now 
formally accepted responsibility for America’s overt informational activities. 
 
Resolving which agency should take responsibility for the separated covert psychological 
warfare campaign proved far more problematic. The departments decided by default 
more than preference that the CIA should conduct covert operations, despite its own 
reluctance. The remaining sticking point concerned the scope and nature of external 
oversight and policy control of the Agency’s peacetime psychological warfare capability. 
While the Agency bowed to the inevitable and accepted its responsibility for covert 
measures it was determined to resist departmental encroachment of its independence. In 
particular Hillenkoetter was determined to retain authority over the activities the Agency 
was charged with conducting.  
 
Deputy Director Wright’s frustration over intrusions on the Agency’s sovereignty boiled 
over when the NSC staff proposed that a special panel of departmental representatives 
should be placed within the CIA to oversee psychological warfare operations. In a 
communiqué to the CIA representative on the NSC staff he lambasted the special panel 
proposal, arguing that external interference would jeopardise the security of the Agency’s 
secret intelligence operations. “To sabotage this principle [of sole CIA responsibility for 
clandestine intelligence]” declared Wright, “can only lead to chaos in this type of 
operation.”77   
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Souers responded swiftly to this gripe to nip in the bud a fresh bureaucratic dispute. 
Three days after Wright’s outburst Souers reassured the Agency that the proposed NME 
panel would not interfere in the day-to-day running of operations once general approval 
had been given. Souers himself supported the concept of a panel but only if it was 
restricted to giving “advice” to the Agency. The NSC, he felt, should be charged with 
authority for the overall direction of psychological warfare policy.78 Hillenkoetter 
accepted the concept of a “special panel,” but on the condition guaranteed by Souers that 
such a board would be strictly advisory-based. 
 
The NSC staff continued to work on a psychological warfare directive and produced a 
draft of NSC 4-A made available to Hillenkoetter on 9 December. The Agency objected 
to its wording, especially the requirement that it must obtain “approval of all policy 
directives and major plans for such operations by a panel to be designated by the National 
Security Council.” The DCI also had to ensure that operations were coordinated “with the 
senior U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in each area which will be directly 
affected by such operations.”79  
 
Hillenkoetter responded six days later in a memorandum to Souers requesting that 
“consideration be given to rewording paragraph 3.b.” relating to the coordination of CIA 
activities with U.S. military and diplomatic representatives. Hillenkoetter suggested 
modification of the offending paragraph to read that the “senior U.S. diplomatic 
representative in each area, and the military commander in each occupied area, will be 
kept informed of psychological operations being conducted in areas under their 
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jurisdiction.” This would, he hoped, both “satisfy the intent of the original wording” and 
provide “greater security to our organized covert operations.”80 Hillenkoetter’s 
suggestion was accepted and assimilated into the final document.  
 
The panel concept that the Agency had agreed to after reassurance from Souers was now 
dropped altogether from NSC 4-A. This was significant as it gave the CIA rather than the 
departments basic policy control over the implementation of peacetime covert 
psychological warfare activities. A legacy of bureaucratic conflict resulted from this 
arrangement because the departments would not accept their loss of authority to the CIA 
which was, after all, the new kid on the block.  
 
Ironically, the decisive intervention resulting in deletion of the advisory panel from the 
final directive was made by the departments and in particular by Secretary of State 
Marshall and Secretary of the Army Royall.81 Secretary Royall believed it was 
unnecessary to have an intermediary panel between the NSC and the DCI. The greatest 
irony, however, was that Marshall cast the deciding blow to the panel concept 
channelling considerable influence over the CIA’s covert psychological warfare 
programme away from the departments. Marshall worried that State representation on the 
panel would compromise the department’s flagship policy, ERP. Exposure of the CIA’s 
responsibility for controversial covert activities could be linked back to the State 
Department if it had formal representation on a guidance panel within the Agency. This 
could tarnish the department’s reputation and undermine the credibility of the recovery 
program. So although NSC 4 charged the Secretary of State to coordinate the 
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department’s overt psychological warfare activities with the covert operations of the CIA, 
Marshall decided that in fulfilling this obligation it was preferable to use less visible 
informal channels. Thus the State Department would be buffered from outward links to 
any “dirty tricks” conducted by the CIA.82  
 
Marshall’s decision conflicted with Kennan’s view, although the PPS director was 
placated by the fact that the Secretary of State expected him to be one of the primary 
informal channels into the CIA’s operations. The conflicting views of Marshall and 
Kennan regarding policy control of covert psychological warfare persisted to the final 
adoption of NSC 4-A. A briefing memorandum circulated on 17 December, the same day 
that Marshall rejected the panel concept, reveals that the State Department and its boss 
staked contrary positions just as the NSC at last approved NSC 4-A. This paper accepted 
the CIA’s operational responsibility for conducting peacetime covert psychological 
warfare “provided that the approval of all policy directives and major plans are obtained 
from a panel to be designated by the Council.” Kennan expected the State Department to 
exert significant influence over the direction of covert operations in peacetime through its 
representation on the CIA panel: 
[…] Mr. Kennan indicates that whereas it is desirable to establish the 
authority for the proposed operations, the Council should be frankly informed 
that before giving our consent to any such activities we would wish to 
consider most carefully the need therefore. Furthermore, we would want to 
examine the situation in all its aspects in case of any suggested operation, and 
to judge each case strictly on its merits.83 
 
Hillenkoetter dreaded this type of set-up that housed operations in the CIA but gave 
control over their direction to external authorities. He realised that it would “be 
practically impossible for the strategists to tell him what they wished him to do without 
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insisting also upon telling him how he should do it.”84 Despite Souers’s reassurances to 
the Agency, departmental feeling below the Secretary level was that “intrusive” control 
over the CIA programme was required. Ironically the only reason why this arrangement 
was not secured under NSC 4-A was because Marshall and Royall intervened against the 
advice of their own departments.  
 
The End of the Beginning: The Adoption of NSC 4-A 
A dramatic flurry of activity in mid-December finally unblocked the bureaucratic 
bottleneck over NSC 4-A’s adoption. The Agency’s concerns over potential 
infringements of its authority were overcome, allowing formal arrangements for the 
organisation of peacetime psychological warfare activities to finally be approved. On 17 
December, the same day that the charter on overt activities was adopted, the top secret 
annex NSC 4-A was quietly approved.85  
 
NSC 4-A charged the CIA with operational responsibility for peacetime covert 
psychological warfare. The Council denounced the anti-American activities conducted by 
the Soviet Union in even more fervent language than it did in NSC 4: 
The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious 
psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist 
groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and 
other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace 
and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. 
Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.86  
 
Paragraph 3 of the directive was shorn of the panel arrangement. Under the amendment, 
the Agency also appeared to be vested with primary authority over covert psychological 
warfare policy: 
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The Director of Central Intelligence is charged with ensuring that such 
psychological operations are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt 
foreign information activities, and that appropriate agencies of the U.S. 
Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military 
representatives in each area), are kept informed of such operations which will 





It therefore appeared that the Agency had emerged victorious from the administrative 
skirmishes over psychological warfare. NSC 4-A ostensibly gave the CIA “a free hand as 
well as full responsibility” for conducting covert psychological warfare in peacetime.88 
This was a Phyric victory for DCI Hillenkoetter who had hoped to avoid any CIA 
responsibility for such activities. But NSC 4-A’s language ostensibly assured the 
Agency’s sovereignty. This was enhanced by the unforeseen bonus that the departmental 
panel concept had been abandoned at the last minute. The only possible loophole 
facilitating departmental intrusion within the directive itself was the provision in NSC 4 
that the Secretary of State should coordinate overt and covert activities. But this was 
balanced with the DCI’s responsibility under NSC 4-A to ensure consistency between 
U.S. overt and covert measures.  
 
With the authorities vested under the National Security Act of 1947 and NSC 4-A, it 
seemed that the CIA was now emerging as the powerful, independent, operations-
oriented organisation originally advocated by Donovan. It was ironic that the greatest 
resistance to this rebirth came from the Agency itself. But Hillenkoetter immediately set 
about undertaking his new responsibilities under NSC 4-A, instructing the head of OSO 
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Donald Galloway to “take immediate steps to prepare a plan for the conduct of covert 
psychological operations, utilizing wherever practicable existing facilities of your office 
and the other offices of this Agency.”89 This instruction was set against the background 
of new reports warning of the concerted Soviet-directed communist campaign of 
“disorders, strikes and sabotage” in France and Italy.90 On the same day that 
Hillenkoetter instructed Galloway to begin immediate preparations a special operations 
group under James Angleton left for Italy to launch the American campaign of covert 
support to non-communist groups in Western Europe.91 
 
Superficially, NSC 4-A also resolved over three months of bureaucratic wrangling within 
the Truman administration over the organisation and direction of peacetime covert 
psychological warfare measures. Although senior government officials had identified the 
urgent need for an American campaign to offset communist subversion in Western 
Europe as early as the summer of 1947, reaching formal agreement over its organisation 
was a divisive and convoluted process. Although NSC 4-A superficially heralded a 
unified arrangement, it remained to be seen whether the departments, and in particular the 
State Department, would accept minimal policy control over psychological warfare once 
planning and implementation of the campaign began. Alternatively the State Department, 
below Secretary Marshall at least, might attempt to exert its control over the direction of 
the programme through informal channels. 
 
There was an inauspicious sign for the Agency that the turf war over the control of 
psychological warfare was going to be exacerbated and not resolved by NSC 4-A.  The 
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State Department’s Policy Planning Staff under George Kennan were beginning to take 
an active interest in the use of unorthodox capabilities in the Cold War. Kennan had been 
preoccupied with the overt aspects of ERP since the summer of 1947. He now received 
one of just three copies of the top secret directive NSC 4-A, indicating an expectation 
within the administration that PPS should exert some influence over peacetime covert 
psychological warfare operations. This proved to be the case, but in so doing the 
implementation of NSC 4-A stimulated fresh disputes over the responsibility and control 

















                                                                                                                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 A copy of the Marshall Plan speech at Harvard University, 5 June, 1947, is available online at: 
http://www.georgecmarshall.org/It/speeches/marshall_plan.cfm 
 
2 Truman signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 on 3 April, 1948, ratifying ERP. 
 
3 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan”, Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1988), 283. 
 
4 Clark Clifford Oral History, HSTL, 213-4, 253-5. 
 
5 Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision: A Memoir (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1990), 48.  
 
6 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London: Hamilton, 1970), 
232.  
 
7 This principle was agreed upon in a PPS staff meeting on 15 May, 1947. See the footnotes to the Kennan 
Memo, 16 May,1947, FRUS, the British Commonwealth; Europe, 1947, Volume III (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 220. 
 
8 See John D. Hickerson Oral History, HSTL. 
 
9 Charles S. Maier, “The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, 
No. 1 (Winter 2005), 172. 
 
10 H Freeman Matthews to the Secretary of State, 1 July, 1947, FRUS, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, 
1947, Volume IV (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 329-33. 
 
11 The inaugural meeting of the Communist Information Bureau convened at Wilizia Gova in Poland on 22-
3 September, 1947. Representatives of the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, 
Poland, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia and Italy attended. 
 
12 Carolyn Eisenberg describes the establishment of the Cominform as the “watershed moment” in post-war 
Europe. By this Eisenberg refers not only to American fears of vulnerability in France and Italy but also to 
the impact on U.S. policy towards Germany and the move away from accepting negotiated deals on 
unification with Moscow at the upcoming London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. See Carolyn 
Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 348-61. Also see Eisenberg, “Rethinking the Division of Germany”, 
Allen Hunter (ed.), Rethinking the Cold War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 51. 
 
13 Caffery to Marshall, 17 October, 1947, FRUS, 1947, III, 778. 
 
14 Kennan, “Situation with Respect to European Recovery Program,” 4 September, 1947, Acting Secretary 
of State Lovett to Truman, 6 September, 1947, and first meeting of the Advisory Steering Committee, 9 
September, 1947, FRUS, 1947, III, 397-405, 410-11 and 470. Also see Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. 
Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950 (Oxford; Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992), 65 and Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War 1945-1950 
(New York; Guildford: Columbia University Press, 1985), 146-9. 
 
15 W. Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union 1945-1956 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999), 40.  
 
 111
                                                                                                                                                 
16 An exact “turning point” is difficult to locate- State Department historians have acknowledged that the 
documentation on psychological and political warfare in this gestation period “is fragmentary and episodic, 
and it appears that many early records no longer exist.”  See the introduction to the section on 
psychological and political warfare in United States Department of State, FRUS, Emergence of the 
Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1996). 
 
Jeffreys-Jones claims that Donovan (now outside of government) initially lobbied Forrestal to bolster 
French anti-Communist trade unions and activists with covert support.  Forrestal then discussed the 
possibility of covert funding in Western Europe for propaganda purposes with Leahy. Rhodri Jeffreys-
Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (London; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 49-52. 
Other historians who also point to Forrestal as the earliest champion of peacetime psychological warfare 
include Sarah-Jane Corke, “George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare,” Journal of Conflict 
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2006), 102-3, Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 259-82, Miscamble, Kennan, 107 and John Ranelagh, 
The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Sevenoaks: Sceptre, 1988), 115. 
 
17 Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries: The Inner History of the Cold War (London: Cassell, 1952), 
274. 
 
18 Lucas, Freedom’s War, 43. 
 
19 According to Harry Rositzke, an OPC/CIA veteran, the “principal challenge to the covert operators in 
concealing official sponsorship of all these actions lay in keeping secret the source of the funds involved.” 
This would be done by “making established foundations available as a conduit for “private” grants and 
subsidies and by establishing dummy foundations [….]” Harry Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations: 
Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 160-1.  
 
20 Bohlen to Lovett, “Unaccounted funds to assist non-Communist forces in Europe,” 6 September, 1947, 
NARA, RG 59, Records of Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, 1942-71, Box 5. Bohlen’s recommendations in 
this memo have unfortunately been censored. 
 
21 Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 311. 
 
22 Forrestal quoted by Lawrence Houston in CSI, The Origin and Development of the CIA, 65. 
 
23 Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations, 186. Another Agency veteran Ray Cline agrees with Rositzke’s 
assessment: “Opinion in 1948 in Washington was that this effort to stabilize Western Europe against the 
threat of Soviet assaults on Italy, France, and Germany would fail unless Soviet support of local 
Communist parties could be exposed and countered.” See Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars: 
Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1977), 97-100.  
 
24 Michael Warner, “The CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination: From NSC 10/2 to NSC 68,” Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1998), 212. 
 
25 United States Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I, Final Report of the Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1976), 494. 
 
26 On this point also see Anna Karalekas, “History of the Central Intelligence Agency”, William Leary (ed.), 




                                                                                                                                                 
27 William Colby substantiates this view in his memoirs that under the statutory charter establishing the 
Agency, its sanction to carry out of “services of common concern” was “understood to be a euphemism for 
espionage and counterintelligence.” Colby asserts that “Truman had not taken up this suggestion [by 
Donovan to authorise “subversive operations abroad”] in setting up the CIG, nor was it now included in the 
CIA’s charter. American intelligence was launched instead toward a quiet future.” William Colby and Peter 
Forbath, Honourable Men: My Life in the CIA (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 70-1. 
 
28 Houston to Hillenkoetter, “CIA Authority to Perform Propaganda and Commando Type Functions,” 25 
September, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 241. 
 
29 See Walter Pforzheimer interview in D. H. Berger, “The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy 
Tool: An Analysis of Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951,” 
(Federation of American Scientists) available online at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/berger.htm. 
 
30 PPS/8, “United States Policy in the Event of the Establishment of Communist Power in Greece,” 18 
September, 1947, PPS/9, “Possible Action by the U.S. to Assist the Italian Government in the Event of 
Communist Seizure of North Italy and the Establishment of an Italian Communist “Government” in that 
Area,” 24 September, 1947, Anna Kasten Nelson (ed.), The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 
Volume I, 1947-1949 (New York: Garland, 1983), 91-107. Also see CIA 1 “Review of the World Situation 
as it Relates to the Security of the United States,” 26 September, 1947, Truman Papers, PSF, Box 176, 
HSTL. A draft copy of this review, dated 12 September, 1947, can be found in Truman Papers, NSC, Box 4, 
HSTL. 
 
31 Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries: The Inner History of the Cold War (London: Cassell, 1952), 
309-10. 
 
32 PPS Minutes, 25 September, 1947, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1947-1953, Box 32, 
NARA.  
 
33 CIA 1 “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,” 26 September, 
1947, Truman Papers, PSF, Box 176, HSTL. 
 
34 Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950 (London; 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 253-4. 
 
35 The group was originally called the Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare (PWC) but was renamed 
SSE on 5 June, 1947.  
 
36 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 252-3. 
 
37 H. W. Mosely (State’s representative on SANACC and its chairman) to Marshall, 6 October, 1947, RG 
59, SWNCC Case Files LM 54 Roll 26, NARA, Mosely to Lovett, 15 October 1947, FRUS, Emergence of 
the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 242.  
 
38 Subcommittee memo to SWNCC, “Psychological Warfare,” (undated), RG 59, SWNCC Case Files LM 
54 Roll 26, NARA. 
 
39 Hillenkoetter to SANACC, 22 October, 1947, and Pixtou Memo, undated, transmitted 20 October, 1947, 
FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Documents 244 & 243.  
 
40 Caffery (Paris) to State, 5 October, 1947, Cannon (Belgrade) to State, 6 October, 1947 and Griffis 
(Warsaw) to State, 7 October, 1947, RG 218, Leahy Chairman’s File, Box 19, NARA.  
 
 113
                                                                                                                                                 
41 See for example three cables sent from Caffery to Marshall dated 17 and 30 October and 3 November, 
1947, in FRUS, 1947, III, 778, 795-7 and 797-8. 
 
42 Kennan to Lovett, 6 October, 1947, RG 59, PPS, Box 8, NARA. 
 
43 Bohlen draft memo “Preliminary analysis of announcement of revival of Eur Comintern,” 7 October, 
1947, RG 59, Bohlen Records, Box 7, NARA. 
 
44 ORE 21/1 “Probable Soviet Reactions to a US Aid Program for Italy,” 5 August, 1947, posited that 
communist resort to sabotage and subversion would be counter-productive to their cause and would only be 
used if a legal accession to power appeared futile. Truman Papers, PSF, Box 214, HSTL. CIA 2 “Review of 
the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,” 14 November, 1947, reiterated that 
the communist adoption of these tactics continued to hurt its parliamentary chances. Truman Papers, PSF, 
Box 176, HSTL. 
 
45 CIA Special Evaluation No. 21 “Implications of the new Communist Information Bureau,” 13 October, 
1947, Truman Papers, NSC, Box 4, HSTL. A draft of this memo was forwarded by Hillenkoetter to 
Truman on 10 October, 1947. RG 218 Leahy Chairman’s File, Box 20, NARA.  
 
46 CIA Special Evaluation No 22 “Deterioration of the Communist Political Position in Western Europe,” 7 
November, 1947, Truman Papers, NSC, Box 4, HSTL.  
 
47 Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2001), 31-2, FRUS, 1947, III, 933-5. 
 
48 Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961 (New Haven; London: Yale 
University Press, 1987), 380-1. 
 
49 Pollard, Economic Security, 73. 
 
50 For example see Trevor Barnes, “The Secret Cold War: The C.I.A. and American Foreign Policy in 
Europe, 1946-1956,” The Historical Journal, Part I, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1981), 413, Tom Braden, “I’m 
Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral’,” The Saturday Evening Post (20 May, 1967). 
 
51 Giles Scott-Smith, “The ‘Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century’ Festival and the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom: Origins and Consolidation 1947-52,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 
2000), 123. 
 
52 SANACC memo, 24 October, 1947, RG 59, SWNCC Case Files LM 54 Roll 26, NARA. 
 
53 Hillenkoetter was referring specifically to the creation of OPC in 1948 to conduct the expanded political 
warfare campaign but the point was the same that resistance was futile when the fledgling CIA was 
sandwiched between two government heavyweights. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 253-4. 
 
54 SANACC 304/10 “Psychological Warfare,” 3 November, 1947, RG 59, SWNCC Case Files LM 54 Roll 
26, NARA. 
 
55 Lay to Souers, 3 November, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, 
Document 246. Also see Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 255. 
 
56 Mosely (State’s representative and chairman of SANACC) to Lovett, 15 October, 1947, FRUS, 
Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 242. 
 
57 Souers to Forrestal, 24 October, 1947, ibid., Document 245. 
 114
                                                                                                                                                 
58 Ohly to Truman, 26 October, 1947, RG 59, SWNCC Case Files LM 54 Roll 26, NARA. 
 
59 William Donovan, now returned to his civilian career in law, unsurprisingly also endorsed the CIA 
engaging in “the field of Black operations” during consultations with Deputy Director Edwin Wright. 
Wright to Hillenkoetter, 4 November, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-
1950, Document 247. 
 
60 Kennan to Lovett, 31 October, 1947, RG 59, PPS, Box 33, NARA. 
 
61 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 256. 
 
62 At a meeting of the NSC ten days later Secretary Royall, speaking also on behalf of Forrestal and 
Symington informed the Cabinet that it was their view that the NME should not “have a part in those 
[peacetime psychological warfare] activities.” Meeting of the NSC, 14 November, 1947, FRUS, Emergence 
of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 250. 
 
63 Wright to Hillenkoetter, 4 November, 1947, ibid., Document 248. 
 
64 PPS/13, “Resumė of World Situation,” 6 November, 1947, Nelson, PPS Papers I, 129-136.  
 
65 For Marshall’s comments to the NSC, based on PPS/13, see the footnotes to the printed copy of PPS/13 
contained in FRUS, General; The United Nations, 1947, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1973), 770-1. 
 
66 Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 326-8. 
 
67 George Kennan, “What is Policy?” 18 December, 1947, Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz (eds.), 
Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College 1946-47 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991), 295-318. 
 
68 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 248. 
 
69 Wright to Hillenkoetter, 4 November, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-
1950, Document 247. 
 
70 Lucas, Freedom’s War, 47. 
 
71 SANACC 304/11 “Psychological Warfare,” 7 November, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence 
Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 249. 
 
72 Meeting of the NSC, 14 November, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-
1950, Document  250. 
 
73 Minutes of the Meeting of the NSC, 14 November, 1947, Truman Papers, PSF, Box 176, HSTL. 
 
74 These issues would not be the subject of a NSC policy paper until the adoption of NSC 1/3 “Position of 
the United States With Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the 
Government by Legal Means,” 8 March, 1948 (approved by the NSC on 12 March), available in FRUS, 
Western Europe, 1948, Volume III, 775-9.  
 
75 NSC 1/1 “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” 14 November, 1947, Truman Papers, 
PSF, Box 176, HSTL. An abridged version of this paper is available in FRUS, 1947, III, 724-6. 
 
76 NSC 4 “Coordination of Foreign Information Measures,” 17 December, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the 
Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 252. 
 115
                                                                                                                                                 
77 Wright to Chief of the Interagency Coordinating and Planning Staff, CIA, Childs, 2 December, 1947, 
ibid., Document 251. 
 
78 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 259. 
 
79 Souers to the Members of the NSC, 9 December, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence 
Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 253. 
 
80 Hillenkoetter to Souers, 15 December, 1947, ibid., Document 254. 
 
81 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 260, Souers to the NSC, 16 December, 1947, FRUS, 
Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 255. 
 
82 See Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 260-1. 
 
83 Department of State Briefing Memorandum, 17 December, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence 
Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 256. 
 
84 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 250. 
 
85 Symbolically, Congress also passed the Foreign Aid Act of 1947 on 17 December. This secured interim 
aid for the beleaguered economies of Western Europe, representing approval on the same day of the two 
key strategies devised by Washington to stave off the communist challenge until ERP funds could be 
poured into the region. 
 
86 NSC 4-A, “Psychological Operations,” 17 December, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence 
Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 257. 
 
87 Souers to Hillenkoetter, 17 December, 1947, ibid., Document 257. 
 
88 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, 261. 
 
89 Hillenkoetter to Galloway, 22 December, 1947, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 
1945-1950, Document 258. 
 
90 CIA 3 “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States,” 17 December, 
1947, Truman Papers, PSF, Box 176, HSTL. 
 




COLD WARS IN EUROPE AND WASHINGTON: 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFLICT AND THE 
INAUGURATION OF POLITICAL WARFARE 
 
The adoption of NSC 4-A in December 1947 was intended to end an acrimonious 
bureaucratic struggle overshadowing the development of peacetime political warfare 
since mid-1947. Pre-adoption differences between the CIA and the Departments of State 
and Defense were gradually ameliorated over several months by a process of bureaucratic 
attrition. A final resolution over the organisation of a psychological warfare capability 
was demanded by the deteriorating political stability of Western Europe and the need for 
American intervention through unorthodox and hidden methods.  
 
NSC 4-A did not therefore resolve the fundamental disagreements between the 
institutions with a stake in covert operations over the control and responsibility for them. 
There could be no such mediation of these divergent agendas post-adoption as planning 
and implementation of the covert psychological warfare programme began. For this 
reason, as soon as the Special Procedures Group within the CIA initiated covert activities 
in Europe as mandated under NSC 4-A, the bureaucratic feud over control of these 
activities was rejuvenated.  
 
 117
Four rival groups emerged as prominent political warfare lobbyists. The Department of 
State, the CIA, the Intelligence Survey Group (ISG) and the Armed Services held 
disparate views on the proper organisation and direction of the secret intervention 
programme. As a result, the divisions and conflicts within the administration during the 
evolution from NSC 4-A to the adoption of a new directive NSC 10/2 in June 1948 
eclipsed the previous disputes over psychological warfare. This left considerable doubt 
over whether the Agency would retain its hard-fought advantage over the departments in 
terms of its control over covert operations.  
 
The dispute was exacerbated by the conceptualisation of a new programme within the 
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. After the ratification of ERP by Congress and 
the initiation of the Marshall Plan Western Europe’s political stability appeared more 
secure. This led Kennan’s PPS to consider the inauguration of a campaign controlled by 
the State Department and directed not only at Western Europe but at the entire continent 
to promote American interests and undermine the ruling communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe under heavy Soviet influence.  
 
The new project, coined political warfare, incorporated the elements of SPG’s current 
activities under a broader and more dynamic conceptualisation of American approaches 
to the Cold War. This entailed an infringement of the CIA’s jurisdiction as authorised by 
NSC 4-A, inevitably resulting in a further clash between the two institutions that again 
delayed the formal organisation of a political warfare campaign. Of far greater 
importance, the failure to overcome bureaucratic differences significantly affected the 
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way in which the political warfare capability was finally organised and mobilised under 
NSC 10/2. The profound clash of bureaucratic agencies over the organisation of political 
warfare overshadowed strategic considerations of its employment. Parochial institutional 
concerns took precedence over broader national strategic planning. This left a lasting 
organisational and strategic legacy that influenced the political warfare campaign waged 
by the Office of Policy Coordination from late 1948 onwards.  
 
SPG and the Initiation of Covert Psychological Warfare  
Under the mandate of NSC 4-A the CIA established the Special Procedures Group (SPG) 
within the Office of Special Operations to conduct peacetime covert psychological 
warfare operations. Although policymakers had felt that the need for covert intervention 
to safeguard the American position and contain Soviet expansionism in Western Europe 
during the autumn and winter of 1947, events on the ground seemed to have stabilised by 
the turn of the year. This was reflected by SPG’s somewhat slow activation. It was not 
until February 1948 that the new office organised itself.  
 
Eventually the impetus for action did not emanate directly from the situation in Western 
Europe but from the communist takeover of the Czech government in February and 
March 1948. The Czech coup made a profound impression upon senior American 
officials like Secretary of Defense James Forrestal who believed it presaged a new 
boldness in Soviet behaviour. Seen in light of the impending elections to be held in Italy 
in two months time, Washington needed to intervene to stem the communist tide and 
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ensure that western allies in Western Europe were bolstered through material and 
psychological support.  
 
This was the message passed on to DCI Hillenkoetter by Forrestal at a meeting on 12 
February 1948.1 This spurred the Agency into life with Thomas Cassady’s appointment 
to head SPG later that month.2 Cassady immediately requested that his superior, 
Assistant Director for Special Operations (ADSO) Colonel Donald H. Galloway (soon 
succeeded by Major General William Wyman), inform all CIA stations in Europe and th
Middle East of the CIA’s authority to conduct covert psychological warfare operation







the next month Cassady and SPG laid the administrative and operational foundations for 
the new office. The task was completed with the implementation of OSO Directive No. 
18/5 on 29 March formally activating SPG.4 At this time Hillenkoetter advised Galloway
on the “Additional functions of [the] Office of Special Operations.” Cassady’s group was 
to engage in covert psychological operations outside the United States in an effort t
“undermine the strength of foreign instrumentalities […] engaged in activities inimical to 
the United States” and support American foreign policy by taking measures to favourably 
influence foreign public opinion.  
 
Therefore SPG was launched with a fairly broad operational charter. Two salient 
restrictions were levied on its activities. It was required under NSC 4-A to coordinate 
with the Departments of State and Defense to ensure consistency with overt foreign and 
information policy. It must also undertake “covert psychological operations” which in 
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practice encompassed “all measures of information and persuasion short of physical in 
which the originating role of the United States Government will always be kept 
concealed.” American responsibility for SPG’s activities, in other words, must remain 
hidden.5 
 
Under Cassady SPG immediately initiated “black” propaganda operations in Western 
Europe. These first actions largely involved the clandestine instigation of information 
drives to win over public opinion in the western occupation zones in Germany. Angleton 
and his colleagues also busily organised covert propaganda and funding projects in 
France, Italy and other recipient countries of the pending Marshall aid.6 SPG quickly 
exceeded the role envisaged for it prior to the adoption of NSC 4-A by commencing a 
small-scale infiltration programme of propaganda inside the Soviet bloc itself. This was 
done through radio broadcasts from a transmitter in West Germany and by dropping 
leaflets delivered overhead via weather balloons.  
 
In undertaking these early psychological warfare activities in Western Europe and against 
the Soviet bloc the CIA leadership was careful to liaise with the departments and acquire 
their approval of them.7 Hillenkoetter attempted to create the conditions for a working 
relationship by emphasising to Galloway and Cassady that SPG should only undertake 
operations that “are fully consistent with the foreign policy and objectives of the United 
States Government.”8 Instead the State Department was initially reticent to interfere with 
the Agency’s psychological warfare projects. Undersecretary of State Lovett attempted to 
distance the State Department from operational collusion with SPG. When he was 
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informed of PROJECT UMPIRE and the plans to beam propaganda across the German 
occupation zones into the Soviet bloc, Cassady was informed by  John Paton Davies of 
the Policy Planning Staff that Lovett had given the “green light” to go ahead and 
implement the plan, but that the undersecretary “wanted to know very little about our 
project.” Davies explained that “State wanted to be appraised of our progress and 
proposed operations in order that they would not conflict with State’s policies,” but 
wanted no closer involvement.9  
 
Therefore in March 1948 the Department of State was still content to maintain a limited 
oversight role over SPG’s covert psychological warfare activities. Lovett echoed 
Marshall’s insistence that there was no need for a formal chain of command from State to 
the CIA that would implicate the department in its activities. The department wanted no 
part in operations, either in the planning or implementation phase, except insofar as being 
kept “appraised” of their “progress.” Marshall and Lovett’s preference to distance the 
State Department from SPG would soon be tested with attitudes one level below them 
within the department. The potential source of friction was Kennan’s Policy Planning 
Staff. PPS was given responsibility by Marshall to liaise with SPG and therefore had an 
ambiguous level of policy control over the new operations unit. Such was the level of 
secrecy that the geographic desks, on the other hand, did not have security clearance to 
access NSC 4-A and were therefore largely peripheral in the development of the new 




The Cold War in Europe, Italy and the Historical Narrative 
The launch of SPG coincided with an upsurge of American anxiety concerning the 
political deterioration of Europe. The communist takeover of the Prague Government 
under Klement Gottwald late in February 1948 had been anticipated by the Policy 
Planning Staff several months previously as a defensive Soviet consolidation of Eastern 
Europe.11 But the Czech coup was followed by Governor Clay’s alarmist telegram from 
Berlin in early March prior to the first, limited Soviet blockade of the city beginning early 
in April. These events precipitated the renowned “war scare” in Washington. Many 
American officials now subscribed to the view that the balance of power in continental 
Europe was tipping in Moscow’s favour.  
 
Although he had expected the Czechs to be brought into line, Kennan was affected by the 
rapid turn of events. He sent Marshall a cable from Manila that underlined the gravity 
with which he regarded the unfolding situation: 
“[…] the savage abruptness and cynical unconcern for appearances of [the] 
recent action in Czechoslovakia leads me to feel that [the] Kremlin leaders 
must be driven by [a] sense of extreme urgency. They [are] probably realizing 
that they are basically over-extended in eastern Europe and that unless they 
can break [the] unity of western Europe and disturb [the] ERP pattern it will 
be difficult for them to hold on in eastern and central Europe [….] If this 
analysis is correct, then there is indeed a real and new element of danger in 
[the] present situation, and we must be prepared for all eventualities.”12 
 
The perception of an intensified Soviet threat to Western Europe expressed in Kennan’s 
cable was felt throughout the Truman administration and indeed by western governments 
in Europe. This caused a heightened sense of vulnerability across the western bloc that 
precipitated several key foreign policy measures that came to define the early Cold War. 
The salient consequence was the gradual acceptance in Washington of the need to 
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militarise its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. During 1948 the United States 
accelerated its plans to formalise an unprecedented peacetime military alliance with 
Western Europe as well as to proceed with plans to integrate an independent West 
German state within a Western European bloc.13 
 
The revived sense of crisis prompted the NSC to identify Italy as the most vulnerable 
Western European nation that might fall victim to communist encroachment. In light of 
the upcoming Italian elections, in the midst of the crisis the U.S. acknowledged that the 
PCI could even accomplish a takeover of power by peaceful, legal means. Such a “loss” 
was symbolically and politically unthinkable for the Truman administration, not only for 
its international standing but also because it was almost midway through a presidential 
election year.  
 
Kennan was alarmed by the political impact of a communist victory in the Italian 
elections on the allies of the De Gasperi government throughout the rest of Western 
Europe. These groups might be discouraged from opposing communist advances should 
Italy succumb. Kennan even contemplated “whether it would not be preferable for [the] 
Italian Government to outlaw [the] Communist Party and take strong action against it 
before [the] elections.” This, he argued, “might well be preferable to a bloodless election 
victory, unopposed by ourselves, which would give the Communists the entire peninsula 
at one coup and send waves of panic to all surrounding areas.”14 
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Although Kennan’s alarmist proposal was not acted upon, Director of the Office of 
European Affairs John D. Hickerson raised the general problem of how Washington 
could “effectively assist, apart from ERP, in stopping further expansion of the area of 
Communist dictatorship in Europe.” For Hickerson the current problem did not involve 
overt military attack but “internal fifth-column aggression supported by the threat of 
external force, on the Czech model.”15 Hickerson was not privy to SPG’s clandestine 
capability and he therefore only recommended a range of overt measures to stiffen 
Western Europe’s backbone.  
 
Washington subsequently adopted NSC 1/3 to organise and implement an array of 
measures specifically to support the Italian non-communist electoral campaign and 
undermine the extreme left. The NSC advocated a range of overt and covert measures 
aimed at undermining communist politicians to prevent them from gaining a majority of 
the popular vote that would facilitate its participation in the future Italian 
administration.16 
 
The traditional historical narrative holds that the Italian elections of April 1948 were 
regarded as the successful test-case of American peacetime covert psychological warfare 
by Washington.17 The perception of the success of covert intervention following De 
Gasperi’s electoral victory on April 18 over the socialist Popular Democratic Front (PDF) 
was therefore a decisive factor in the shift from NSC 4-A to NSC 10/2.18 This narrative 
implies that there was a connection between the Truman administration’s perception of 
success in the Italian campaign and a consensus to expand the political warfare capability 
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beyond the parameters of the Italian test-case. Spurred on by the crises in Prague and 
Berlin, the Truman administration developed more aggressive measures short of war to 
contain communist expansion in Western Europe as well as to undermine the Soviet bloc 
itself. Thus the NSC authorised the dramatic expansion of the CIA’s covert capability 
from psychological warfare to include political, economic and paramilitary warfare in 
mid-June 1948.  
 
This conventional interpretation tends to imply that the Italian case provided continuity 
between the development of NSC 4-A and NSC 10/2. But such a neat narrative overlooks 
several important considerations. For instance, the conventional account overemphasises 
the scale and importance of the American covert psychological warfare intervention in 
the build-up to the Italian elections. Evidence suggests that the CIA’s involvement in 
Italy was fairly limited. Overall SPG spent between $10-20 million on anti-communist 
propaganda and financing operations prior to the April elections.19 Although this was a 
considerable sum that set a precedent for future covert interventions, it was expended in 
an unsystematic ad hoc manner that undermined the effectiveness of the venture. 
Therefore, although some Truman administration officials were impressed by the 
potential of covert operations, SPG’s role in the Italian case was not the primary 
showcase.  
 
Washington certainly extrapolated from its intervention in Italy in early 1948 the ultimate 
victory of De Gasperi’s Christian Democrats. But American “success” in Italy was 
primarily linked to its overt intervention. Official and semi-official measures by the 
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Department of State, the American Embassy in Rome and private initiative were far 
better funded. They were also more sophisticated and effective than Angleton’s scatter-
gun approach with SPG.20  
 
American intervention primarily flowed from the recommendations of NSC 1/3 as well as 
from the inventiveness of proactive figures like the American Ambassador in Rome 
James C. Dunn. The most conspicuous but also the most influential activities included 
American wheat shipments to Italy, an Italian-American letter-writing campaign 
encouraging Italian family members to vote non-communist, speeches by Marshall and 
Truman clarifying that future ERP aid would be cut off in the event of a PDF victory, and 
a one hour radio broadcast featuring Hollywood celebrities.  
 
This is not to denigrate the covert role during the campaign. Angleton and his SPG 
colleagues busied themselves clandestinely bribing local officials, paying off newspaper 
editors and co-opting labour unions for the pro-western cause.21 But funding for these 
covert activities was not secured until relatively late in the campaign, suggesting that 
SPG played a relatively minor and belated role. In early April 1948, two weeks before the 
elections were held, Hillenkoetter went before House and Senate subcommittees seeking 
the Congressional appropriation of secret funds for the CIA to divert to pro-American 
interest groups in Italy.22 By this stage overt efforts to bolster the non-communist cause 
were in full swing, indicating that this was more of an influential factor on the outcome 
of the elections.23  
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The revival of the debate in Washington over psychological-political warfare coincided 
with the aftermath of the Italian elections. This has encouraged their association in 
historical accounts. But bureaucratic factors involving the emergence of disparate lobby 
groups were the primary cause behind the shift towards NSC 10/2. These political 
warfare interest groups were not predominantly motivated by the Italian case per se. 
 
It is also important to emphasise the discontinuity between the psychological warfare 
charter under NSC 4-A and the political warfare programme under NSC 10/2. The 
motivation behind SPG activities in Italy and elsewhere in the first half of 1948 was 
primarily “defensive.” This complimented a containment framework of preventing 
communist encroachments in Western Europe to protect the incipient ERP. By contrast, 
the programme inaugurated under NSC 10/2 involved more offensive methods and 
objectives. This included an emerging PPS initiative to utilise the thousands of displaced 
émigrés from the Soviet bloc in operations to further American interests and undermine 
Soviet influence in its own backyard. Unlike the limited psychological warfare charter of 
NSC 4-A, NSC 10/2 marks the first official conceptualisation of American actions 
outside the “containment” framework, although no strategic clarification was included in 
the political warfare directive. 
 
The shift from the “defensive” objectives under NSC 4-A to a more aggressive agenda 
under NSC 10/2 was complex, involving intricate and fluid bureaucratic dynamics that 
had little direct connection to the Italian election “test-case.” The notion that the 
perception of SPG’s success convinced Washington to expand the capability is therefore 
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inaccurate and it fails to demonstrate the ebbs and flows of the convoluted discourse over 
NSC 10/2. It was the product of a major bureaucratic clash between at least four different 
policy-level actors.  
 
The traditional view tends to emphasise George Kennan’s role to explain the shift to NSC 
10/2, or beyond this to his Policy Planning Staff.24 Kennan and PPS were indeed pivotal 
in the process and exerted enormous influence over the course of the debates. 
Nevertheless there is a danger that focussing on Kennan underestimates the significance 
of several distinct lobby cliques during the process of reformulating covert operations 
between January and June 1948, of which the Planning Staff was but one. Four groups in 
particular jostled for pre-eminence, each with their own agenda and conflicting proposals 
for a psychological-political warfare capability.  
 
As a consequence, the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and Allen Dulles’s 
Intelligence Survey Group (ISG) each made distinctive and mutually exclusive 
recommendations on the organisation and range of covert political warfare operations. 
Both the military and the CIA advocated “psychological warfare.” The former called for 
the organisation of wartime mobilisation while the latter was primarily interested in its 
peacetime role. The external ISG, set up to review the intelligence services in January 
1948, supported broadening the range of peacetime covert operational capabilities as did 
the State Department’s PPS. Both groups favoured sanctioning activities beyond 
“psychological warfare” to include political, economic and even paramilitary warfare in 
both peace and wartime. But PPS and ISG brought different proposals on how to organise 
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and implement the broader capability to the negotiating table. The chief spokesmen for 
these groups, Kennan and Dulles, did not share identical views regarding the scope, 
character and administration of the proposed new activities.  
 
The Debate Begins over the Organisation of Political Warfare  
The administrative development of NSC 10/2 originated in January 1948 when the 
Armed Services resumed the SANACC investigations into wartime psychological 
warfare. SANACC had been sidetracked in the latter part of 1947 by the convergence of 
interest in peacetime psychological warfare considerations that eventually produced the 
NSC 4 series. The military resurrected its efforts to prepare for wartime psychological 
warfare and this seemed timely given the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations since the 
last SANACC report had been prepared.  
 
Thus after several revisions, on 8 January SANACC approved the principles contained in 
SWNCC 304/6 and transmitted it to the JCS for consideration the following day. Over 
the next seven weeks the Joint Subsidiary Plans Committee (JSPC) surveyed the opinions 
of the three branches of the military services, completing its report on 5 April. Although 
it was impossible to reach a consensus, the paper entitled JCS 1735/4 concluded that the 
proposed Psychological Warfare Organization envisaged in SWNCC 304/6 should be 
established “as soon as practicable” under the NSC. The scope and activities of the new 
office should be restricted in peacetime to planning and coordination.25 Because SWNCC 
304/6 had not specifically provided for an actual agency to prepare for wartime activities, 
the JCS report recommended that SANACC amend it to provide this. With SANACC’s 
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endorsement, the revised proposal SANACC 304/14 was forwarded to Souers and onto 
the NSC members on 7 April. This paper proposed that a Psychological Warfare 
Organisation should be established under the NSC and that its immediate peacetime 
scope and activities should be limited to that of a “working nucleus” solely for planning 
and coordination.26   
 
The State Department absolutely opposed the creation of a new and independent 
psychological warfare office. The source of this opposition was not PPS but the office of 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, George V. Allen, who was responsible 
under NSC 4 for directing Washington’s overt psychological warfare campaign. Days 
before the release of SANACC 304/14, Allen and a colleague, Donald C. Stone, lobbied 
Lovett (Acting Secretary of State in Marshall’s absence) to ensure that the department 
block any move by the Armed Services to establish a new psychological warfare office at 
the upcoming meeting of the NSC scheduled for 2 April. Urging Lovett to “go slow on 
any positive commitments,” Allen and Stone argued that psychological warfare was “in 
essence a political activity” and should therefore not be conducted by the military except 
in wartime. They further argued that under NSC 4 these responsibilities had been placed 
in the State Department and should remain there, while any arising War Department 
claims that State had been “lax” in undertaking its commitments were “exaggerated to 
say the least.”27  
 
In essence the State Department feared that the military was moving into State’s rightful 
jurisdiction, despite clear restrictions limiting the SANACC initiative to planning for a 
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wartime operational capability. At the next Council meeting Lovett nipped any progress 
on the matter in the bud by reading out Allen’s memorandum from two days earlier. “No 
new psychological warfare authorization should be set up now,” Lovett declared, 
“because in peacetime the State Department should control this activity, as provided in 
NSC 4.”28 The matter was sabotaged by the State Department, pre-empting the release of 
SANACC 304/14 with an unequivocal rejection of whatever might be proposed. Due to 
the conflicting views at State and the JCS, the matter was subsequently transmitted to the 
NSC Staff to resolve. At this point the matter of wartime psychological warfare planning 
converged with debates over peacetime covert psychological-political warfare. The 
Armed Services were once more frustrated in their attempts to initiate planning for 
wartime psychological warfare through the creation of a specialist organisation. The issue 
was again deferred in order to concentrate on organising the peacetime capability.   
 
PPS and the Origins of Peacetime Political Warfare 
A State Department proposal on the “inauguration of organized political warfare” for 
peacetime was completed a few weeks after the clash over wartime psychological warfare 
preparations.29 This project originated with PPS which was taking an increasing interest 
in SPG’s activities. The Planning Staff held common purpose with Allen’s determination 
to retain authority for peacetime activities in the State Department. This partly explained 
the motivation behind the new proposal because the Planning Staff felt that the State 
Department should rightfully control the psychological warfare activities mandated to the 
CIA under NSC 4-A.  
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On the one hand the issue of State Department authority over peacetime policy 
implementation was a matter of principle. In February 1948 Kennan wrote a paper in 
which he criticised the department’s loss of administrative control over the 
implementation of ERP. The lessons from this were equally applicable to the political 
warfare project. “Our experience,” Kennan counselled, “has demonstrated that not only 
are new agencies of little value in executing policies which go beyond the vision and the 
educational horizon of their own personnel, but that they actually develop a momentum 
of their own which in the final analysis, tends to shape- rather than to serve- the national 
policy.”30 The State Department likewise resented encroachments on its policymaking 
prerogative. The Planning Staff and the geographic sections bristled when an NSC Staff 
paper, drafted at the urging of Secretary of Defense Forrestal, attempted to clarify the 
policies and objectives of the United States in light of “Soviet-Directed World 
Communism.”31  
 
Kennan had been contemplating “what measures the democratic states have at their 
disposal for resisting totalitarian pressure and the extent to which these measures can be 
successful” at least since his rise to prominence inside government with the Long 
Telegram. In September 1946 he lectured at the National War College on the need to 
employ a full range of psychological, economic and political resources in combination 
with “a preponderance” of “political, economic and moral strength” to achieve American 
goals in the post-war period. “We must work out a general plan of what the United States 
wants in this world,” Kennan argued, “and pursue that plan with all the measures at our 
disposal [….]”32  
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By 1947 Kennan was consistently demanding that the “inherent expansive tendencies” of 
the Soviet system “must be firmly contained at all times by counter-pressure” applied by 
the west.33 But this conception was still basically “defensive” and oriented towards 
Western Europe. This conceptual gap over how to deal with the Soviet bloc was not filled 
by his famous Foreign Affairs article of July 1947, a shortcoming that Kennan himself 
recognised alongside his failure to distinguish between the political and military 
containment of communism.34 Over the course of 1947 Kennan started to examine the 
fragmented American approach towards Europe by considering what could be done in the 
east. In May he claimed that “Russia’s own position contains many weaknesses and many 
dangers” while in the “Russian-occupied areas- the satellite areas of Eastern and Central 
Europe- there are also dangers and weaknesses for the Soviet position.” However, at this 
stage Kennan was pessimistic about modifying Soviet power, declaring that Russia 
“should be able eventually to ride out her [economic] difficulties.” Moreover, in Eastern 
Europe he believed that “there is not much we can usefully do, except to reiterate our 
position and to continue our public pressure for removal of Russian forces and for greater 
concessions to national independence and popular government.”35 
 
By late 1947 Kennan’s views were evolving as he began to call for a more assertive U.S. 
approach towards foreign policy. External strategic considerations, particularly Kennan’s 
desire to provide a broader strategic basis for U.S. policy encompassing the Soviet bloc, 
were undoubtedly at the root of the emerging PPS political warfare agenda. In December 
he lamented the inadequacy of American instruments for peacetime employment. “We 
are dealing here in the political field,” he declared, “and I can only say that the weapons 
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we have for conducing this type of operation, short of war, are pathetically weak and 
rudimentary.”36 Kennan made these remarks the day after NSC 4-A had been approved 
authorising an American peacetime psychological warfare capability. His negativity 
probably reflected his disappointment that Secretary of State Marshall had abrogated the 
State Department’s control over the new capability at the final hour. 
 
In early May 1948 Kennan and the Planning Staff now made its move to ensure that it 
controlled a new look political warfare capability. PPS recommended that responsibility 
for the operation of its proposed political warfare projects should be assigned to a 
separate “directorate” finding “cover” outside the department. This would preserve the 
protective shield of plausible deniability so important to Marshall and Lovett in relation 
to the operation of covert activities. Unlike the present arrangement under NSC 4-A, the 
State Department (in other words PPS) should exert primary policy control over 
peacetime political warfare plans and operations, facilitated by watchful departmental 
supervisors. The authority and responsibility for peacetime covert political warfare 
became the central bone of contention in the build-up to NSC 10/2. 
 
PPS had been considering the development of a more progressive, flexible and 
coordinated foreign policy since early 1948, although these analyses did not initially 
impede on the formal and working arrangements with SPG under NSC 4-A. The Planning 
Staff, and in particular John Paton Davies, George Butler and George Kennan (having 
returned to his office on 19 April following his official trip to Japan and subsequent 
illness) came to believe that political warfare should become an integral but selective 
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component of a more dynamic and better-coordinated foreign policy.37 For his part 
Kennan had been stung by criticism of his Foreign Affairs article. He looked towards 
political warfare operations in part as a remedy for the shortcomings exposed in that 
piece.38 Covert operations should be employed to protect American allies in Western 
Europe, while also counteracting and undermining communist activities and regimes 
across both sides of the continental divide. Kennan had long argued that the primary 
Soviet threat to Western Europe was political in nature, a view shared by analysts in the 
CIA.39 Thus, initiating politically-directed measures covertly guided by Washington 
would address some of Washington’s tactical deficiencies long bemoaned by Kennan.40 
 
One aspect of the PPS political warfare concept was explored by Davies as early as mid-
February 1948. In a document entitled PPS/22 “Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet 
Union in U.S. National Interest,” Davies discussed Washington’s current failure to 
mobilise the “talents” of the Soviet bloc refugee community of up to 700,000 émigrés. 
This mass of people could be put to use both as a source of intelligence on the Soviet 
Union and in U.S. “politico-psychological operations.” At this stage Davies was happy 
for the project to be an inter-departmental venture, recommending that SANACC look 
into whether “the mass of refugees from the Soviet world [can] be effectively utilized in 
Europe and Asia to further U.S. interests in the current struggle and whatever may 
eventuate therefrom?”41  
 
SANACC referred the matter over to the NSC Staff where PPS 22 gathered dust for three 
weeks, prompting PPS deputy head George Butler to request that the issue be again 
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considered by SANACC. On 9 March Butler asked the State Department member on 
SANACC, Frank Wisner, to consider whether inter-departmental committees could 
“begin an exploration of the specific problems raised in the paper.” Butler urged that PPS 
considered it a “matter of some urgency” but that, despite this, it “will probably be some 
time before the paper clears through the NSC” as other papers were higher up on the 
Council’s agenda.42 
 
A freshly revised version of the study, now titled PPS 22/1, was subsequently submitted 
for Lovett’s approval on 11 March before being transmitted to SANACC, the State 
Department’s Office of Intelligence and Research (OIR) and the CIA for them to study. 
Drawing on the ideas of the earlier draft, PPS 22/1 placed particular importance on the 
potentiality of defections from the elite strata of the Soviet world to act as a demoralising 
and divisive factor against the Kremlin that would enhance U.S. “national interests.” 
Emphasis on the internal impact of defections reflected Agency scepticism regarding the 
value of intelligence gleaned from Soviet bloc refugees.43 But it was also an important 
conceptual advance, questioning how Washington could not only strengthen its own 
position and that of its allies in Western Europe, but also potentially undermine the power 
and influence of the ruling communist regimes of the Soviet bloc. PPS 22/1 surmised that 
this could potentially be achieved through fostering the defection of senior communist 
figures. This might aggravate “all-pervasive distrust and suspicion” behind the iron 
curtain, thereby multiplying “denunciations” and “repressive measures.” Such an 
implosive “chain of events” would not only demoralise the Soviet world, but would also 
have a “stifling effect” on Soviet capabilities and productive efficiency.44  
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By May 1948 the SANACC committees had concluded their studies and compiled a 
report. SANACC proposed a programme named “Bloodstone” to mobilise “native anti-
communist elements” who had “shown extreme fortitude in the face of Communist 
menace.” Bloodstone involved gathering the mass of presumably anti-communist Eastern 
European refugees into front organisations such as student, farmer, labour and women’s 
groups, mirroring the tactics employed by the Cominform. Such action was required to 
fill the gaps in the American ranks of specialised personnel with expertise in the target 
Soviet bloc nations, a deficiency highlighted by the PPS 22 series.45  
 
Bloodstone argued that émigrés possessed the “‘know how’ to counter communist 
propaganda” and “techniques to obtain control of mass movements.” They were also, 
apparently, experts in copying the ability refined by communists to manipulate “Socialist, 
trade union, intellectual, moderate right wing groups and others.” Wisner accordingly 
requested $5 million in laundered money for “secret disbursement” to get the covert 
operation underway. Recognising that SANACC held no operational capacity he also 
proposed the creation of “an entirely new propaganda agency within this Government.”46 
Wisner doubted, along with others, whether Hillenkoetter’s office would have the ability 
or the inclination to undertake the new SANACC project. 
 
The PPS concept of clandestine U.S. sponsorship of foreign émigré organisations was 
endorsed by the administration in 1949 and became one of the most important operations 
run between PPS and the Office of Policy Coordination under Wisner’s command. 
Kennan, Davies and Robert Joyce believed that these nationalist organisations, if 
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properly supported and managed by the United States, would be the perfect vehicles for 
delivering a powerful antidote to Soviet power in Eastern Europe. The establishment of 
the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) in April 1949 was closely coordinated 
between the State Department and OPC. Ostensibly it was a private organisation 
consisting of philanthropic American citizens. But OPC substantially supplemented its 
overt sponsorship by private institutions like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations with 
CIA funds covertly funneled into NCFE. OPC immediately began to recruit and organise 
émigrés from the Displaced Persons (DP) camps in Europe to work in the numerous 
nationalist councils under NCFE that soon sprang up in the United States.  
 
The most famous and effective of the émigré organisations established under NCFE was 
Radio Free Europe (RFE). With headquarters established near Munich it made its first 
shortwave broadcast to Czechoslovakia on 4 June, 1950 and was soon transmitting anti-
communist propaganda to the satellite bloc countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.  A sister organisation Radio Liberty (RL) was created 
in 1951 by the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia to 
compliment RFE’s activities by broadcasting anti-Soviet propaganda into the Soviet 
Union itself.  
 
OPC’s chief Frank Wisner was a keen proponent of this branch of the political warfare 
programme, famously describing it as the “Mighty Wurlitzer.”47 The psychological 
warfare campaign in fact received widespread support within the Truman administration. 
Washington believed that it could coordinate and direct the messages being relayed by 
 139
Soviet bloc exiles and refugees back to their countrymen by secretly funding and 
supplying guidelines to RFE and RL.  
 
Close supervision and policy direction of the radio station by OPC officers in liaison with 
the State Department in Washington was organised at a meeting in early May, 1950. 
Robert Joyce would “on the policy level, act as the Department’s cut out” with RFE. The 
State Department should prepare “regular policy guidance for the American supervisory 
personnel” to RFE and this would then be used by them “as the basic terms of reference.” 
It would also remain “open to any positive ideas” offered by the State Department. 
Meanwhile to ensure that there was “no deviation form overall policy” it was decided that 
“a man at the working desk level” would be responsible for closely regulating the content 
of RFE broadcasts. He would have access to translations of recordings upon request. In 
return the State Department would make available a “spicy percentage” of material 
“culled from official sources” for RFE to broadcast although the vast bulk of material 
would be gleaned from unclassified underground sources.48   
 
Despite the establishment of coordination mechanisms, ambiguity over U.S. strategic 
objectives in the Soviet bloc complicated the parameters of broadcasting content. As 
Harry Rositzke observes, the ambivalence in American aims for RFE/RL was able to 
persist well beyond the 1950s. Writing three decades later, Rositzke contended that while 
there was “official acceptance of the status quo,” unofficial encouragement of resistance 
and the ultimate hope of liberation “has survived to this day.”49   
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The PPS-CIA Feud 
In April 1948 PPS stepped up its consideration of the role that political warfare could 
play in Washington’s overall foreign policy, coinciding with congressional ratification of 
ERP and the prospect that Western Europe’s political stability would be secured. The first 
PPS papers related to specific projects rather than broader strategic objectives. A 
proposal drawn up on 2 April to establish “freedom committees” covertly linked to the 
United States government was disseminated around the State Department by the Planning 
Staff. The proposition did not instantly win over departmental colleagues. Having read 
through the PPS proposal, on 7 April the Deputy Director of the Office of European 
Affairs Llewellyn E. Thompson informed Butler that sponsoring such committees was 
inadvisable as it could potentially harm and embarrass the U.S. government. Thompson 
did not dismiss the subject out of hand, agreeing with PPS that an “unofficial or private 
organization” covertly linked to Washington “would be very useful.” But for Thompson 
the priority was to set up “an official body, either in this Department or on an 
interdepartmental basis” that would “keep us accurately informed of the activities and 
views of foreign nationality groups in this country.”50 At a staff meeting two days later 
PPS discussed the draft proposal in light of the departmental response to it, deciding that 
“further study was needed” on the issue.51 Despite the rather lukewarm reception it 
received, the proposal was eventually incorporated into the political warfare programme 
drawn up by PPS at the end of April. 
 
The increasing attention paid by the Planning Staff to the political warfare question 
coincided with the crescendo of American intervention in the Italian elections. This was 
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not because PPS was intimately involved in the State Department’s overt intervention, 
nor because the Staff was particularly enthused by SPG’s covert psychological warfare 
activities. Instead PPS was aghast at the way SPG handed over large sums of money to 
anti-communist groups during the election campaign with little if any ability to supervise 
how the funds were spent.52 Its interest in the covert psychological warfare intervention 
in Italy was based on its negative assessment of SPG’s performance and the need for 
tighter guidance from the State Department. Cassady and SPG were operating “too 
freely” for the liking of PPS, indicating a lack of adequate machinery to coordinate the 
covert and overt measures designed to favourably influence the outcome of the 
elections.53 For its part the CIA began to feel besieged from several sides. On 26 April it 
“survived” a report by the NSC consultants investigating its performance of the NSC 4-A 
mandate. Hillenkoetter was nonetheless damned with faint praise by his State Department 
counterpart George Allen in the study.54  
 
In his capacity as a member of ISG, Allen Dulles now stepped into the breach, although 
there was no stipulation to consider political warfare in the original charter dating back to 
January.55 On 30 April, the same day that PPS completed the first draft of its influential 
political warfare proposal, Kennan, Davies and Villard met Dulles and his staff member 
Robert Blum (from Forrestal’s office). Dulles was fully briefed on the Planning Staff’s 
political warfare proposal.56 As a result of this meeting Dulles decided that ISG should 
put forward its own recommendations regarding the proper administration and operation 
of covert activities. Dulles did not fully agree with the PPS proposal and hoped that, as a 
recognised expert in this field, he might exercise some timely influence on the ensuing 
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debates within the Truman administration over the control and implementation of 
peacetime political warfare. 
 
As ISG entered the fray PPS began to show its hand. One of its primary objectives was to 
wrest the authority for psychological warfare from the Agency. Concerned by SPG’s 
performance and its independence from the State Department (despite the CIA’s efforts 
to maintain liaison links) the Planning Staff attempted to bring these operations under its 
close control. Over two days in late April the State Department reviewed SPG’s 
propaganda project codenamed ULTIMATE being conducted out of Germany. Kennan 
took the opportunity to flex some administrative muscle and called for the termination of 
the “incitive” activities during the delicate period of the first Soviet blockade of Berlin. 
This marked the Planning Staff’s first step towards overhauling the SPG capability in 
order to draw such operations under the State Department’s control and integrate them 
into its own political warfare programme.57  
 
Cassady in turn resented outside meddling into his operational affairs. He therefore 
referred the dispute to his superiors in the Agency. The SPG chief argued that much of 
the propaganda produced by the Department of State during the Italian elections had been 
far more provocative than his ULTIMATE material. The CIA leadership was sympathetic 
to its own and ordered the beleaguered Cassady “to ignore State in the matter” and 
proceed with the campaign. Hillenkoetter was exasperated because on the one hand he 
was being criticised by George Allen for not concentrating his efforts on anti-communist 
democratic forces, while on the other hand PPS was attempting to circumscribe his 
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operations against the Soviet bloc. Nonetheless he acted cautiously, recognising the 
precariousness of falling foul of the State Department. Accordingly he advised that 
general operational information continue to be submitted to State.58 This would serve as 
insurance in any referral of the dispute to the NSC. Superficially at least, the Agency 
would maintain its liaison no matter how awkward the Planning Staff became.  
 
Cassady simultaneously acknowledged on the record the Agency’s responsibility to 
include the State Department in its psychological warfare planning. At the beginning of 
May he affirmed that “close and continuing policy liaison must be maintained between 
SPG and the proper foreign policy authority of the U.S. Government.” Moreover, for its 
“day-to-day activities,” Cassady recommended that “SPG rely on the Department of State 
as the primary outside source for policy direction and guidance.” The SPG chief also 
extended an olive branch to the State Department, proposing that “a high ranking staff 
officer attached to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs” should be 
appointed as a “Liaison Officer” to ensure continuous coordination between the two 
organisations.  
 
However Cassady also emphasised his view, based on NSC 4-A, that SPG should not 
“reveal to the Department of State operational methods and techniques, or other classified 
operational details, involved in the conduct of black propaganda activities.” Exchanges of 
information should involve “the broad, general character of SPG programs and the 
general capabilities of SPG,” rather than “specific operational details as to how, by whom 
and specifically where and through what channels SPG activities will be conducted.” The 
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principles of preserving secrecy and plausible denial, according to Cassady, demanded 
this limitation on departmental access to specific operational details.59 This was a 
compromise gesture of sorts, and it echoed the views of Marshall and Lovett on the need 
to separate the State Department from direct operational involvement. But this did not 
disguise Cassady’s real message. SPG was not going to be easily intimidated into 
submission by the machinations of Kennan’s Planning Staff. 
 
PPS concerns about the “freewheeling” SPG operations were amplified by the CIA’s 
decision to overrule Kennan’s veto of the ULTIMATE project. With that example in 
mind Kennan, Davies and Villard informed Dulles at their meeting on 30 April that 
political warfare should not be conducted independently of foreign policy.60 This 
indicated PPS’s determination to draw in the SPG activities under its control. To 
reinforce this, the Planning Staff was ready to disseminate its political warfare proposal 
to the wider administration. Its approval would require the revision of NSC 4-A. Having 
learned from the lukewarm departmental response to the “freedom committee” proposal, 
PPS gathered the department’s top brass to a meeting on 3 May to forge a unified 
departmental agreement on the political warfare programme before taking it before the 
wider executive.61 The ULTIMATE dispute was just a shot across the CIA’s bows. The 
real battle for control of a new programme was about to commence. 
 
The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare 
On 4 May the PPS proposal for the “inauguration of organized political warfare” was 
finally completed. This action-oriented manifesto was far more than simply a tactical 
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bureaucratic manoeuvre to reverse the administrative arrangements sanctified by NSC 4-
A. The 4 May proposal revealed the Staff’s vision of an extensive but streamlined 
programme of well-coordinated overt and covert operations to wage the Cold War.  
PPS proposed that the range of operations be quite radically expanded from the NSC 4-A 
mandate. This still included the type of propaganda being undertaken by SPG. But 
operations should be broadened to include political, economic and even paramilitary 
warfare operations. Peacetime political warfare was defined by the report in the broadest 
possible terms as: 
[…] the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to 
achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They 
range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP), 
and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of 
“friendly” foreign governments, “black” psychological warfare and even 




PPS again suggested the establishment of “freedom committees,” now described as 
“Liberation Committees.” The proposal went beyond this to recommend the sanction of 
émigrés organised in the “Liberation Committees” to perform “Underground Activities 
behind the Iron Curtain” involving the covert supply of U.S. “guidance and funds” to 
“resistance movements” in the Soviet bloc.62 The paper also endorsed supporting 
“Indigenous Anti-Communist Elements in Threatened Countries of the Free World” as 
was undertaken during the Italian elections as well as “Preventative Direct Action in Free 
Countries.” The scope of these operations was much wider than SPG’s mandate under 
NSC 4-A, demonstrating that PPS envisaged a far more proactive approach to the Cold 
War and the Soviet bloc. The memorandum also emphasised that formal arrangements 
for controlling the “two major types of political warfare-one overt and the other covert” 
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would also differ from the NSC 4-A set-up. Both overt and covert operations should be 
“directed and coordinated by the Department of State” rather than cede authority over the 
latter to an external agency.  
 
Therefore, two fundamental principles were at the heart of the political warfare proposal. 
Firstly, the range of overt and covert operations in the U.S. peacetime armoury should be 
expanded by the NSC to better deal with new problems of foreign policy brought on by 
the Cold War. This included operations targeting the Soviet bloc although no strategic 
framework defining the parameters and objectives of such activities was also included. 
Secondly, PPS called for close State Department control over political warfare planning 
and implementation to facilitate its effective coordination and integration with other 
components of foreign policy.63 Thus a proxy “directorate” consisting of representatives 
from the departments should be created to direct political warfare operations. The 
proposed new “Director” would exert “complete authority over covert political warfare 
operations conducted by this Government.” In peacetime, the prerogative would rest with 
the State Department, in wartime it would switch to the Pentagon. 
   
The “inauguration of organized political warfare” proposal was therefore not simply a 
call to escalate the covert (as well as overt) measures to wage the Cold War. Although 
PPS advocated expanding the range of activities authorised by the NSC, it did not call for 
an increase in their volume. In fact it was proposed that the new “directorate” should be 
small, indicating that the employment of political warfare operations would be extremely 
selective. The new Director of the political warfare directorate would only initially need 
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“a staff of 4 officers designated by the Department of State and 4 officers designated by 
the Secretary of National Defense.” This would better ensure the unified mobilisation of 
all the peacetime resources available to the United States: 
It would seem that the time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political 
warfare operations directorate within the Government. If we are to engage in such 
operations, they must be under unified direction. One man must be boss. And he 
must, as those responsible for the overt phases of political warfare, answerable to the 
Secretary of State, who directs the whole in coordination.    
 
SPG’s performance during the Italian elections was singled out by the Planning Staff as a 
demonstration of why the current set-up needed fixing. PPS wanted to ensure that 
effective policymaking and operational machinery would be in place to deal with any 
similar crises, barely disguising its criticism of SPG’s conduct in Italy: 
Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history 
and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin’s political warfare, we 
cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We 
cannot afford in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into 




There are different interpretations explaining the emergence of the terms “psychological” 
and “political” warfare. On the one hand it is suggested that the two terms are 
interchangeable. The CIA continued to refer to “psychological warfare” but PPS switched 
to the term “political warfare” to emphasise its rightful authority over operations within 
the political domain. The use of the term “political warfare” was a semantic sleight of 
hand to bolster the case for taking control of the CIA’s operations.65 On the other hand, it 
is argued that the varying terms drew an important distinction between different types of 
activities envisaged by the Agency and PPS. According to this interpretation the terms 
“psychological” and “political” warfare are not therefore interchangeable but reflect the 
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divergent agendas of these offices. SPG’s “psychological” attempts to influence foreign 
public opinion were far more limited in scope and geographic application than the 
expansive PPS proposal for “political” interventions in hostile as well as friendly foreign 
nations.66  
 
Certainly PPS and the CIA deployed language to emphasise their respective opinions and 
authorities. But a review of the debates leading up to the approval of NSC 10/2 
demonstrates that the latter explanation is more accurate. This period marked a 
bureaucratic collision between the CIA and PPS over the Agency’s continued authority to 
conduct the limited campaign under NSC 4-A and the Planning Staff’s attempt to 
overtake it with its own programme of broader scope. In fact PPS regarded 
“psychological warfare” as just one single element within the much larger “political” 
warfare spectrum.  
 
Administrative Differences Widen-The Director of Special Studies 
The battle lines were swiftly drawn between the various protagonists once the PPS 
memorandum had been disseminated within the administration. On May 5 a “Draft 
Proposed NSC Directive” was drawn up by the NSC Staff recommending the 
establishment of “the position of Director of Special Studies” under the Council. Drawing 
on the recommendations of the PPS memorandum, the proposed Director of Special 
Studies would be “nominated by the Secretary of State and appointed by the NSC,” and 
would “have initially a full time staff of four representatives” assigned from the 
departments and the CIA. It would be the Director’s responsibility to “arrange for the 
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preparation, by his own staff or other agencies as appropriate, of plans for covert 
operations.” He would also be required to “review all such plans, and if he approves them 
to arrange for their execution by appropriate agencies” and to “review the execution of 
such operations to insure that they are being conducted in accordance with approved 
plans [….]” Acknowledging the attempts by the military to address wartime preparations 
with the SANACC papers, the Director should also organise “the development of a 
program for the conduct of covert operations in time of war or national emergency to 
include such matters as organization, training, equipment and logistical support.” Most 
importantly, the Director must make certain that all “such covert activities are consistent 
with US foreign policies and overt activities.”67 PPS felt strongly that the CIA’s 
leadership had neglected this responsibility during its implementation of psychological 
warfare operations.  
 
Hillenkoetter responded decisively to the Director of Special Studies memorandum, in 
contrast to his maligned historical reputation.68 The fortitude of his reaction signified the 
threat posed by the proposed directive to the Agency’s assigned authority and 
responsibilities under NSC 4-A. “If it appears desirable, in the interest of national 
security, to designate an individual responsible for the planning and coordination of 
psychological warfare activities,” Hillenkoetter informed Souers, then “this Agency feels 
the individual should be the present chief of current activities in that field.” In other 
words Cassady should retain his job and his role. Hillenkoetter argued that the “existing 
operation and its liaison with the Department of State is handicapped only by the absence 
of a State Department officer having authority to represent the Department in regard to 
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over-all policies.” The Agency had clearly been prudent in attempting to liaise with the 
State Department, despite PPS annoyance over ULTIMATE. This “insurance” allowed 
Hillenkoetter to portray the Agency as the rational protagonist in the dispute with PPS.  
 
In his closing remarks to Souers, Hillenkoetter argued that if the existing arrangement 
needed to be dramatically altered then the NSC should “[d]ivorce the existing covert 
psychological operations from the control and operation of CIA by the rescission of NSC 
4-A and place it under the control and operation of a new Agency. Security in the 
conduct of this sensitive operation cannot be maintained except through control by one 
Agency.”69 Hillenkoetter consistently championed this fundamental principle over the 
coming weeks. The authority for covert operations should not be separated from the 
responsibility. Of course it was a basic administrative necessity to control the operations 
being undertaken by the Agency. But there were other advantages to pursuing this line of 
argument. The State Department’s leadership was loath to assume full responsibility for 
covert operations although PPS was attempting to assert the department’s authority over 
them. Therefore, if the principle of unified control and responsibility for political warfare 
gained currency within the administration this would drive a wedge between PPS on the 
one hand and Marshall and Lovett on the other. The principle of combined authority and 
responsibility might also draw wider support within the administration and rally crucial 
allies in its bureaucratic struggle with the more influential Planning Staff.70   
    
Hillenkoetter reemphasised the Agency’s rejection of the Director of Special Studies 
proposal in a second memorandum to Souers sent the following day. As the NSC Staff 
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were due to reconsider the paper in light of his objections he unequivocally criticised its 
recommendations as “a dangerous duplication of existing assigned functions.” He 
referred to several failings of the proposed directive including its inference of “the 
necessity for a rescission o NSC 4-A and the reestablishment of covert psychological 
functions under an Agency other than CIA.” This would represent “a step toward placing 
secret intelligence and Special Operations […] under separate agencies.” He also 
appealed for the rejection of the draft directive on the grounds that “the present 
operations under NSC 4-A be not jeopardized.” Disruption of the existing programme 
was unnecessary because “this Agency, acting under NSC 4-A, has made considerable 
strides in the subject field, has obligated itself to a considerable expenditure of funds for 
equipment, transportation, and experienced personnel, and has made firm commitments 
for clandestine operations outside the United States for a long period of time.” There 
should be no deference to the whims of PPS because “[i]nterference with this activity 
infers a disruption of current activities and the possibility of serious breaks in security.”71      
 
The NSC Staff met on 7 May and three days later produced another draft directive based 
on the 5 May memorandum but revised in light of Hillenkoetter’s objections. The 
amended directive was then transmitted to the NSC members and the CIA, where it once 
again received differing reactions. The new directive did not stray too far from the 
previous version, proposing that a Director of Special Studies be appointed as an 
intermediary between the CIA and the NSC. The Director would have an advisory board 
at his disposal to provide greater interagency coordination of policies and operations, and 
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as a forum to reconcile any differing departmental views that might from time to time 
emerge.72   
 
The PPS response to this directive was largely positive. Kennan commended its merits to 
Marshall and Lovett in a communiqué on 11 May, describing the proposed directive as an 
“important matter.” According to Kennan the proposal “is based largely on and adheres 
to the fundamental principles” of the PPS paper on the “inauguration of organized 
political warfare.” Since Bohlen, Allen and the four geographical offices “either gave 
affirmative approval or indicated no objection” the PPS chief felt the NSC Staff paper 
also had their tacit approval. Kennan emphasised to Marshall and Lovett that there was a 
“certain urgency” required of the Department of State in responding to this paper because 
the “deadline we are working against is […] the imminent adjournment of Congress.” 
The executive branch must act swiftly to orchestrate the bureaucratic arrangements for 
the new Director of Special Studies and his advisory board so that the funds required to 
initiate the PPS political warfare project could be secured before the congressional 
summer recess.73 Bureaucratic, rather than strategic factors called for haste. 
 
In contrast, the CIA’s reaction to the 10 May draft directive starkly revealed the gulf 
between its views and those of the State Department. The Agency was now unmistakably 
on the defensive, trying to protect its institutional integrity from the bureaucratic 
encroachments of PPS. On the same day that Kennan was drumming up support from his 
superiors in the State Department for the new proposal, Hillenkoetter once again firmly 
transmitted his objections to Souers at the NSC.74  The DCI reminded Souers that the 
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CIA “has several times, during the discussion phases of this proposed directive, placed 
itself on record as opposed to the plan on which the proposed directive is based.” The 
main reason behind the Agency’s disapproval, Hillenkoetter reiterated, was that the 
“proposed directive, if enacted, will establish a staff function providing for AUTHORITY 
in a delicate field of operation- without the RESPONSIBILITY.” In other words, control 
of the new programme would be transferred to departmental representatives while a 
separate organisation would be responsible solely for conducing operations. Rather than 
undermine the present arrangement, the “Agency again strongly urges that the provision 
of NSC 4-A, as written, be continued without change.” Moreover, in a nod to the military 
frustrations over the deferral of wartime preparations, Hillenkoetter suggested to Souers 
that if the NSC or the JCS felt that such planning was needed “in the covert psychological 
warfare field, then we again suggest that advance planning be made the responsibility of 
the facility currently in operation.”  
 
Hillenkoetter barely acknowledged the PPS position in his objections to Souers, 
implicitly emphasising his view that their agenda was illegitimate and disruptive. He 
continued to refer to “Psychological Operations” indicating that he did not accept the 
need for broadened “political warfare” measures. On the other hand, JCS concerns over 
wartime preparations could be reasonably catered for without impinging on the Agency’s 
integrity or the NSC 4-A charter. Hillenkoetter was conciliatory at the end of his message 
to Souers, reassuring him that “if the National Security Council approves this draft of 
May 10 1948, the Central Intelligence Agency, of course, will cooperate to the best of its 
ability in an endeavour to make a going concern of the proposed Special Studies 
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organization.”75 Hillenkoetter wanted to convey the impression that the Agency was 
behaving with equanimity, while the same could not be said of the Policy Planning Staff.   
 
NSC 10 
The NSC Staff disseminated another revised draft two days later that attempted to bridge 
the PPS-CIA divide. The draft report, now entitled NSC 10 “Director of Special Studies” 
still favoured the PPS approach. But PPS were not having things entirely their own way, 
partly because NSC 10 was also influenced by the views of the JCS as expressed in 
SANACC 304/14. This included the suggestion to establish a “Psychological Warfare 
Organization” that would be limited in peacetime to a “working nucleus for planning and 
coordination.”  
 
State successfully rebuffed this challenge through its representative on the NSC Staff. 
Consequently, NSC 10 did not recommend creating a separate organisation as advocated 
by the JCS. Taking into account the “similarity of operational methods involved in covert 
operations and covert intelligence activities,” the NSC Staff instead proposed that CIA 
was the “appropriate agency to conduct such operations.” A further “victory” for the 
department was the recommendation that CIA propaganda activities and “other covert 
operations” should be conducted under the arrangement and approval of the Director of 
Special Studies. This would effectively remove the full authority of the DCI under NSC 
4-A for such measures.  
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NSC 10 reflected the NSC Staff’s attempts to broach a compromise between three 
disparate viewpoints within the bureaucracy. Inevitably, in so doing the proposal 
ultimately pleased no one. PPS had more reason to approve NSC 10 than the Agency 
because it borrowed much of its phraseology from the PPS political warfare proposal and 
included the broader range of actions proposed by Kennan’s office. This included “any 
covert activities related to propaganda; preventative direct action, including sabotage, 
anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, 
including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee 
liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened 
countries of the free world.” Furthermore, the condition that “if uncovered the US 
Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them” should appease the 
concerns of Marshall and Lovett, thus nullifying Hillenkoetter’s efforts to drive a wedge 
between the department’s leadership and PPS.  
 
The broad range of operations endorsed under NSC 10 was influenced not only by PPS 
but by the military representatives on the NSC Staff. The inclusion of wartime 
capabilities including paramilitary and guerrilla warfare techniques did not originate with 
PPS and stretched to the limit its concept of supporting underground resistance 
movements in the Soviet bloc in times of peace. Hillenkoetter felt this was going too far 
and informed the NSC members at the Council meeting on 20 May that “the Director of 
Special Studies could not properly conduct sabotage and counter-sabotage.”76  
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The inclusion of an interpretation of “political warfare” that included paramilitary 
activities was extremely significant in later sanctifying a broad operational mandate to 
OPC in peacetime. NSC 10 failed to distinguish between peacetime and wartime 
operations, even though guerrilla warfare measures were not envisaged for peacetime 
implementation at this stage. The lack of a clear distinction between “political” and 
“paramilitary” operations persisted in the redrafts of NSC 10. The failure to clarify the 
intended separation of peacetime and wartime measures was directly related to the NSC 
Staff’s attempts to mediate the divergent desires of State, the CIA and the military. The 
NSC Staff adopted an umbrella approach whereby the interests of each group were 
placed side by side in one directive. This tactic to overcome parochial differences 
facilitated the enactment of a broad capability, creating the risk that aggressive and 
provocative paramilitary measures beyond the intended scope could be activated in 
peacetime.77 
 
Allen Dulles and the ISG’s Interim Report 
As the battle lines hardened between PPS and the CIA, Allen Dulles intervened in the 
debate with the submission of an interim ISG report on the issue to the NSC on 13 
May.78 Dulles had met PPS members two weeks previously and was also kept inform
of departmental views by James Lay and Robert Blum.
ed 
y 79 However, Dulles was in no wa
bound to the Planning Staff proposal. Dulles was a specialist in the covert political 
warfare field having accrued the reputation and acumen for special operations expertise 
during the war. He therefore held strong and qualified opinions of his own about the 
organisation of peacetime covert warfare activities. Despite his contact with PPS, it was 
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by no means inevitable that ISG’s administrative recommendations would favour the 
State Department or impinge on the CIA’s authority.80 In fact, Dulles was more likely to 
advocate a powerful centralised intelligence agency rather than a decentralised 
arrangement ceding authority to the State Department. This, of course, would go far 
beyond Hillenkoetter’s limited vision of the CIA’s role, and Dulles may well have had 
one eye on replacing Hillenkoetter should Thomas Dewey win the upcoming November 
1948 presidential elections. If this transpired then Dulles had a vested interest in the 
emergence of a strong, independent intelligence agency, not one emasculated by the State 
Department.81  
 
The ISG’s “interim” recommendations to the NSC were actually ambiguous and 
therefore failed to perfectly suit either PPS or the CIA. The Dulles report declared that 
the Director of Special Studies must be granted responsibility and authority for covert 
political warfare. Commenting on the provisions of NSC 10, the ISG stated that although 
a “central planning and coordinating staff, as proposed in the new plan, is essential,” it 
should be stressed that “the centralized control of operations is equally important.” It was 
a “delicate field” and therefore “actual control” as well as responsibility should be vested 
in the Director “who should be in intimate touch not only with plans and policies but also 
with the details of the operations.” 
 
This view tallied with Hillenkoetter’s position, rather than State’s, revisiting whether to 
separate or combine the responsibility and authority for covert operations. The Planning 
Staff scheme to exert authority over political warfare without assuming direct operational 
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responsibility was anathema to Dulles. He disapproved of the arrangements in NSC 10 
because “these types of operations can [not] be “farmed” out to various existing agencies 
of the Government without jeopardizing their effectiveness and involving serious security 
risks.” The Director of Special Studies must have supreme control over operations 
alongside his organisation’s responsibility. Separating the authority of the Director from 
the responsibility of the organisation was inadvisable particularly as it could result in 
“several unrelated and uncorrelated clandestine operations” being conducted “in such 
sensitive areas as those behind the Iron Curtain.” The survey group report also counselled 
that secret intelligence and covert operations should be integrated into one agency as each 
field benefited from coordination with the other. “Secret operations, particularly through 
support of resistance groups,” the paper observed, “provide one of the most important 
sources of secret intelligence, and the information gained from secret intelligence must 
immediately be put to use in guiding and directing secret operations.”  
 
Although the ISG paper superficially supported Hillenkoetter’s principles regarding the 
correct administration arrangements, it did not specify which organisation should be 
granted the full authority and responsibility for covert political warfare. Moreover, Dulles 
sided with PPS in advocating the expansion of the political warfare capability from its 
present form. He failed to unequivocally espouse the Agency because of lingering doubts 
over the incumbent leadership. This might also have been a reflection of Hillenkoetter’s 
own doubts about the advisability of undertaking such a broad and controversial range of 
actions during times of peace.  
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Dulles nonetheless championed the principle that these functions must be integrated 
within one organisation, contrary to the PPS view.82 This in fact introduced a new threat 
to the Agency. If the NSC implemented Dulles’s recommendation to combine covert 
political warfare and secret intelligence in one organisation but at the same time doubted 
the Agency’s ability to fulfil these functions, there was a real danger that the CIA might 
be emasculated not only of its psychological warfare capability but also its secret 
intelligence duties. This was a fundamental threat to the Agency’s operational role that 
could substantially diminish its value and status within the executive branch.  
 
The ISG report did not deliver the knock-out blow because Dulles left open whether the 
Agency should be assigned both functions or whether its secret intelligence capability 
should be removed and placed in a new organisation along with covert political warfare. 
This was the NSC’s decision to make, but the survey group would be “glad to submit a 
report on this subject” if requested by the Council.83  
 
PPS was first to respond to the ISG report. On 19 May Kennan wrote to Lovett and 
Marshall in a further attempt to obtain their support, offering to “explain it personally to 
you, if you wish.” PPS took stock of the ISG report and was considerably influenced by 
its recommendations. Kennan attempted to tie the PPS position closer to it and use the 
report to his advantage by exploiting Dulles’s reputation for political warfare expertise. 
Kennan informed Marshall and Lovett that “Dulles hits the organizational problem head 
on” by proposing that secret intelligence and covert operations should either be placed 
under a Director of Special Studies separate from the CIA or with both functions assigned 
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to the authority of the Agency. “Organizationally,” Kennan argued, placing the new 
director under the CIA would be the “ideal solution,” both “for cover and intelligence 
reasons.” But PPS had been stung by the CIA’s defiance and was determined that it 
would not be granted authority over its own political warfare project. Because of this 
Kennan urged his superiors that “in respect both to personalities and organization” it 
would be better at this point “to let the CIA sleeping dog lie.” For the moment “a separate 
organization” should be created “which might at a later date be incorporated in CIA.”  
 
Kennan advised Marshall and Lovett that the “implications” of the two alternative 
arrangements suggested by the ISG “are so far-reaching that I think they should be 
discussed by you and Mr. Forrestal rather than in the lower levels of the NSC.” However, 
unlike Dulles who left the question open, Kennan attempted to head off any preference 
that Marshall and Lovett might hold for unifying secret intelligence and covert political 
warfare within the CIA. Kennan recommended the alternative course of placing secret 
intelligence alongside political warfare in a separate organisation. As a final parting shot, 
Kennan suggested that if Marshall, Lovett and Forrestal did not favour the creation of 
another new agency then they should either invite Dulles to “replace Hillenkoetter as 
Director of CIA, with covert operations under him,” or authorise him to “assume 
directorship of covert operations and secret intelligence under Hillenkoetter.”84   
 
Kennan gave his recommendations to Marshall and Lovett one day before the NSC 
members were due to discuss NSC 10 in an attempt to align the PPS and ISG proposals 
before a ruling was made by the Council. The ISG report and NSC 10 were both placed 
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before the Council for discussion on 20 May. But at the meeting Lovett informed the 
other members that he “had not had time to match up the subject report with the 
comments of the Dulles survey group.” He consequently requested “further time to study 
this matter.” Despite professing ignorance on the matter, Lovett felt sufficiently informed 
to oppose Secretary Royall’s suggestion that the Agency conduct the proposed 
programme of expanded operations to avoid creating a Director of Special Studies and 
the “duplication” of the CIA’s work. Lovett explained that he was “afraid that if CIA 
undertook to conduct these covert operations, the Congress might be afraid that it was 
becoming a Gestapo.” This was a curious reason that did not satisfactorily explain why 
State should oppose the CIA’s authority over political warfare, although it is unclear 
whether Lovett was being disingenuous or was genuinely out of touch with the political 
warfare dispute. Whatever his motivation, Lovett towed the PPS line, informing the NSC 
that the State Department objected to Agency authority.  
 
Lovett also attempted to fend off JCS encroachments on State’s peacetime jurisdiction. 
The Council would shortly receive the views of the JCS on the political warfare question. 
Lovett urged that “it must be remembered that we are not talking about wartime activities 
but rather about activities to be conducted at the present time.” The problem for his 
department was that “the covert operations were of a type which the State Department 
could not conduct.”85 It was increasingly awkward to balance its two primary concerns. 
On the one hand PPS wanted to prevent rival offices from controlling the direction of its 
political warfare programme and assert its own authority over these operations. But this 
was problematic because of the department’s intrinsic aversion to accruing operational 
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responsibility. The resolution, from this perspective, was to arrange for responsibility to 
be placed in an external organisation over which it could exercise direct authority. 
The Council was obliged to defer the matter for further consideration given the divergent 
and complex arguments of the main protagonists. This decision to delay reaching a 
conclusion exasperated PPS and forced it to modify its priorities. Unlike the Agency, 
which was simply defending its existing authorities, the Planning Staff were working 
against the deadline of the congressional break. Faced with the prospect of stalemate in 
the NSC, PPS took the decision to pursue a compromise arrangement so that 
congressional funding could be secured.  
 
With a new strategy in place, Butler appealed to Lovett over the next few days that “early 
action” by the NSC was “desirable” because “NSC 10 constitutes a very important 
proposal.” He would be happy to brief Lovett on the matter, as Kennan would be 
occupied with official speech-writing duties.86 In fact this matter was important enough 
to Kennan who also managed to find time to write to Lovett. In his effort to press home 
the importance of the issue, Kennan struggled to mask his frustration: 
We are concerned here in the Staff about the political warfare question. If the 
Executive Branch does not act soon to firm up its ideas as to what should be 
done along these lines, the possibility of getting secret funds out of Congress 
for covert operations will be lost. If this is not done now, it will mean that this 
Government has given up hope of conducting effective political warfare 
activities for the duration of this administration.   
 
The Planning Staff’s priority had clearly shifted in the space of a few days from securing 
optimal administrative arrangements for political warfare to meeting the congressional 
deadline for financing the programme. Once a formal agreement had been adopted and 
funds approved by Congress, then the department could broker de facto arrangements to 
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control the new programme. With considerable bitterness Kennan advised Lovett that if 
“nothing is done along the lines recommended in NSC 10,” then the department should 
“press for the abrogation of NSC 4-A, which is not working out well.”87    
 
Hillenkoetter’s Compromise Proposal 
The Agency had far more to lose from the political warfare dispute than the State 
Department, despite Kennan’s angst. Therefore on 24 May Hillenkoetter attempted to 
navigate the difficult bureaucratic terrain, forwarding a compromise proposal of his own 
to the NSC. The DCI was optimistic that this proposal could “overcome almost all of the 
objections raised, and I believe it would be in consonance with the Dulles-Jackson-
Correa paper and would satisfy the State Department’s demands for a directing hand in 
what forms of propaganda are to be used and what underground resistance movements 
are to be supported.” He also believed that his plan “would be in consonance with NSC 
4-A and would answer the objections of the Secretary of the Army regarding the 
establishment of a new Agency and regarding making the National Security Council an 
operating body” while also receiving the “warm support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” and 
remaining in accordance with “the intent of Congress.” This was an ambitious statement 
of intention. Although Hillenkoetter hoped to transcend the increasingly acrimonious 
split within the bureaucracy, he continued to underestimate the Planning Staff’s 
determination not to negotiate with the Agency.  
 
Hillenkoeter suggested that peacetime operations should still be conducted by the CIA as 
mandated under NSC 4-A, with the addition of “a high level liaison officer for covert 
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operations” assigned from the State Department. “This officer,” Hillenkoetter suggested, 
“should be of sufficient stature to have the authority to pass on the forms of propaganda 
to be employed and to tell the Central Intelligence Agency that it is the policy of the 
United State to support such-and-such an underground or resistance movement and to 
deny such support to another underground or resistance movement.” It was, according to 
Hillenkoetter, the “lack of any such liaison with authority” that had “really caused the 
present discussions.” In reality the provision of a high-level departmental liaison officer 
would not assuage PPS and indicated that Hillenkoetter did not comprehend its 
overarching determination to control covert operations.  
 
Unlike NSC 10, Hillenkoetter’s proposal explicitly divided covert political warfare 
between wartime and peacetime measures. In so doing, Hillenkoetter accepted that the 
current SPG operations under NSC 4-A would be expanded although it would remain 
primarily a psychological warfare campaign. Peacetime operations, he suggested, would 
“involve black propaganda, including morale subversion, assistance to underground 
movements, and support of resistance movements.”  
 
Hillenkoetter defined all other measures as “positive operations” that “it is very obvious 
that the United States would not perform except in relation to war or when war was so 
close that it was felt it could not be avoided.” These activities would include “sabotage, 
anti-sabotage, demolition, subversion against hostile states, guerrilla support, and 
evacuation.” Separating peacetime and wartime operations, Hillenkoetter argued, was 
“logical” because “it is very difficult to believe that we would send in parties to 
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accomplish physical destruction in any phase of a “cold” war.” In order to meet the 
concerns of the JCS as expressed through the SANACC 304 series, “planning” for 
wartime operations should begin immediately “by a committee under the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, with members from the Armed Services and the Central Intelligence Agency.” To 
placate State Department fears of military encroachment on its peacetime policies, 
Hillenkoetter noted that it should “be emphasized that only “planning” is to be done now 
for this second group of operations.” In the event of war the organisation within the CIA 
conducting covert operations “should be lifted bodily” from it and placed under the 
JCS.88 
 
The Lovett-Forrestal-Dulles Meeting: An Alternative to NSC 10 
Hillenkoetter had attempted to mediate the dispute between the Agency and PPS, but this 
effort was flawed because it failed to recognise that the State Department was determined 
not to allow the status quo under NSC 4-A to continue. Furthermore, Hillenkoetter 
misjudged the serious doubts that many within the administration held regarding his 
personal leadership attributes. It was, of course, not possible for him to allay these 
concerns through this proposal.  
 
Several days later a crucial meeting convened in Secretary Forrestal’s office at the 
Pentagon in which an alternative arrangement was suggested from which the basic shape 
of the final political warfare directive was taken. Forrestal, Lovett, Dulles, Blum, 
Hillenkoetter and General Gruenther for the JCS were in attendance. In the first part of 
the meeting Hillenkoetter reviewed his compromise proposal, emphasising that 
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operations should be divided between peacetime and wartime activities. The CIA should 
conduct the former but not the latter. General Gruenther then summarised the JCS 
attitude towards the peacetime organisation of political warfare. The JCS favoured the 
CIA conducting secret intelligence and covert operations “in principle,” although they 
“had questions as to CIA’s ability to handle this task.” To assuage their concerns, 
Gruenther asked Hillenkoetter if the Agency would accept having an advisory panel 
established alongside the authority to conduct covert operations. Hillenkoetter accepted a 
panel arrangement, but added that his concept of “advice” was not that of “management.” 
This remark was surely directed towards the State Department more than to the JCS. 89 
 
Hillenkoetter was excluded from the rest of the Pentagon meeting in which the details of 
an alternative to NSC 10 and Hillenkoetter’s compromise proposal were discussed. The 
agreement thrashed out by Lovett and Forrestal, with Dulles in attendance, was actually 
the least preferable of the three alternatives Kennan had suggested to Lovett and Marshall 
nine days earlier. Lovett and Forrestal concluded that responsibility for “both secret 
intelligence and secret operations should be assigned to CIA.” However, several 
provisions would ensure that the authority for the new operations did not rest with the 
DCI. Firstly, Lovett and Forrestal agreed that Galloway should be replaced. The current 
head of OSO was loyal to Hillenkoetter, not the departments. Under the new settlement 
his position would assume responsibility for both espionage and for political warfare, so 
presumably it was envisaged that Galloway’s replacement would be affiliated to the 
departments rather than the CIA.  
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In a further blow to the Agency, it was also agreed that the new political warfare and 
secret intelligence organisation “should have considerable autonomy within CIA, and its 
head should be authorized to appeal directly to the National Security Council in case of 
differences arising between him and the Director of Central Intelligence.” The man that 
PPS had in mind for the new position was Allen Dulles. He was present at the meeting 
and was offered the job there and then, even though no formal Council directive had yet 
been approved. Dulles did not quite stick to the script and was reluctant to commit his 
services to the present administration when the position he really coveted, Hillenkoetter’s 
directorship, might well become available after the upcoming presidential elections. 
 
Although the Agency was totally cut out of the Lovett-Forrestal deal, the agreement 
indicated PPS’s willingness now to compromise to an extent. On the surface this 
arrangement gave the CIA responsibility and partial authority for covert political warfare 
while allowing it to retain its secret intelligence capability. In practice the political 
warfare organisation would be housed within the CIA, but it would be independent of it 
and headed by Marshall’s man, not Hillenkoetter’s.  
 
The Special Services Unit  
The decision reached at the Lovett-Forrestal-Dulles meeting to bypass Hillenkoetter’s 
proposal with another alternative to NSC 10 was confirmed when Souers submitted that 
plan to the Council on 2 June. The new proposal, entitled the “Establishment of a Special 
Services Unit in the Central Intelligence Agency,” declared that it “seems desirable, for 
legal, as well as operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert political 
 168
activities, but to place the responsibility for this work within the legal structure of the 
Central Intelligence Agency and closely relate it to secret intelligence.” The legal 
authority of the executive branch to authorise CIA psychological warfare operations 
under NSC 4-A was provided by the National Security Act of 1947. As discussed in 
previous chapters, Capitol Hill had not intentionally authorised this capability in its 
approval of the intelligence provisions in the unification legislation. Nonetheless, the 
flexibility that implicitly provided for secret intelligence had already imparted sufficient 
legal authority to mobilise psychological warfare. By extension it would also justify 
political warfare.  
 
The Agency accepted the logic of assigning it with covert political warfare alongside its 
secret intelligence mission as long as it maintained the authority granted to it under NSC 
4-A to control operations. But the “Special Services Unit” proposal did not provide full 
authority for political warfare to the DCI and also recommended withdrawing 
Hillenkoetter’s control over the Agency’s espionage functions. The chief of the new unit, 
who would be selected from outside the Agency and appointed by the NSC, would have 
“access” to and receive “policy guidance” from the departments rather than the CIA. The 
new office would enjoy “a considerable measure of autonomy within CIA.” In other 
words the Agency would provide cover to shield the political warfare organisation from 
prying eyes but would not exercise direct authority over its personnel or operations.  
 
The new proposal gave two reasons for extricating the Agency’s authority over covert 
political warfare and secret intelligence. Firstly, according to the paper, doubt existed “as 
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to whether CIA is presently so constituted that it can effectively handle this problem 
which is so different from CIA’s primary task of coordinating intelligence activities and 
correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to the national security.” Secondly, there 
was also the “fear lest covert operations develop in a manner inconsistent with our 
foreign and military policies.” Given that the Agency had been competently running 
secret intelligence since July 1946, the real motivation behind the new proposal was to 
wrest the authority provided by NSC 4-A for current and future operations from the 
Agency and place it within the departments.90 To ensure that departmental wishes were 
observed, PPS recommended to Marshall and Lovett that the NSC directive to formalise 
the Lovett-Forrestal deal should be drawn up “in the first instance by a representative to 
be designated by the Secretary and one to be designated by Mr. Forrestal.”91  
 
The Council met on 3 June and the ensuing discussion indicated that the Lovett-Forrestal 
proposal had now overtaken NSC 10. Lovett hoped that it constituted “a possible method 
of meeting the problem to enable the Council to move rapidly in getting the necessary 
[congressional] funds.” But significant differences still stood in the way of its adoption. 
Unsurprisingly Hillenkoetter felt aggrieved by the new plan because it clearly 
undermined the Agency’s present authority.  
 
Hillenkoetter issued a firm rebuttal at the Council meeting, contesting each offending 
provision individually. He defended the Agency against the Lovett-Forrestal paper’s 
“principal objection” that questioned whether the CIA “could handle this job.” The DCI 
retorted that “no protest or doubts had been expressed up to the present.” He opposed 
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changing the current chain of command between himself and Galloway’s office, pointing 
out that OSO was “practically autonomous” already. He also contested the right of the 
chief of the new organisation to appeal over the views of the DCI directly to the NSC. 
This procedure was, in Hillenkoetter’s view, “totally wrong,” and he won firm support 
from Secretary Royall and Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) 
Arthur M. Hill on this point. Royall expressed having “no faith in the proposed right of 
appeal,” because “if you gave a man responsibility, you should give him the full authority 
to run it.” Hillenkoetter referred to the authority of the DCI under NSC 4-A as the 
precedent for him to give the chief of the new unit the “necessary policy guidance.” He 
also defended his current head of SPG, Cassady, although he probably did not realise that 
Galloway’s position was also under threat. Cassady had been highly recommended by 
William Donovan and David Bruce from their wartime service together in OSS. The DCI 
therefore failed to “see the need to put in another man.”  
 
The position taken by Lovett and Forrestal at the meeting constituted an important 
procedural shift from NSC 4-A. Their suggested alterations threatened to strip the 
Agency of direct authority over its operating arm. Hillenkoetter inevitably bristled at this 
attack on the Agency. Lovett and Forrestal did not answer each of the DCI’s objections in 
turn. Instead they spoke in general terms about the proposed new operations as “a 
specialized extra curricular activity” that should be separated, along with secret 
intelligence and psychological warfare, from the Agency’s “coordinating and evaluating 
functions.” Lovett continued to press for a semi-autonomous office within CIA with a 
“direct channel to State for policy guidance.” Such an arrangement would enable the 
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department to direct political warfare while avoiding “any part in the conduct of the 
covert operations.”  
 
As the lengthy and rather bitter meeting lurched towards stalemate, Hillenkoetter 
seemingly won an important concession from Lovett. The undersecretary was aware that 
“if funds are to be obtained, the NSC must move quickly,” and therefore proposed 
deleting the offending “right of appeal” provision. Instead of this, “all authority would be 
vested in the head of CIA.” A departmental “advisory panel” would be established 
modelled on the IAC “which could report directly to the NSC if they disagreed with 
Admiral Hillenkoetter.” With agreement reached on this principle, Lovett’s suggestion 
was accepted by the Council that NSC 10 should be referred back to the NSC Staff. A 
substitute paper would be prepared reflecting their discussion and incorporating “the 
views of Secretary Royall and Admiral Hillenkoetter.”92   
 
Hillenkoetter successfully defended the principle of Agency authority over the new 
“Special Services Unit” at the Council meeting on 3 June. But this would count for 
nothing unless it was unequivocally written into the provisions of the new directive to 
prevent the departments from riding roughshod over its authority. Even this would not 
necessarily avert departmental attempts to exert de facto authority over Agency 
operations once the new directive had been approved. 
 
The NSC Staff produced a memorandum outlining the “Principles Tentatively Approved 
by the National Security Council” the following day. For the Agency, it inauspiciously 
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signalled that the new draft directive would favour departmental interests over Agency 
objections. The “new special services unit to be created in CIA” was to have 
responsibility for both “secret intelligence and secret operations” but it would still enjoy 
“a considerable measure of autonomy” from the Agency. Galloway and Cassady would 
still be replaced although their “highly qualified” successor might now be “recruited from 
inside or outside the present ranks of CIA” rather than definitively coming from the 
departments. This was a minor concession because the nomination would be approved by 
the NSC that was dominated by the departments and not the CIA. Emphasis was placed 
on the departments’ right to full “access” to the new unit in order to provide it with 
“policy guidance.” This implicitly chipped away at the DCI’s authority to provide such 
guidance.93 
 
From the Office of Special Services to the Office of Special Projects  
On 7 June the Council Secretariat’s Office distributed a draft directive to the principals 
based on Hillenkoetter’s proposal plus a few revisions. Although this paper incorporated 
the expansive definition of “covert operations” favoured by the departments (and failed to 
separate peacetime and wartime measures as previously proposed by Hillenkoetter) its 
administrative provisions were satisfactory to the DCI. Hillenkoetter was willing to 
accept an expanded operational role for the Agency, as he had been the previous winter in 
the build up to NSC 4-A. The factors that conditioned his acceptance of the new directive, 
therefore, were not strategic but administrative in nature. He remained adamant that the 
Agency must retain authority over any operations it was given responsibility to undertake.  
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The 7 June draft directive assigned this authority to the DCI. The latest paper borrowed 
much of its language from NSC 4-A and the Lovett-Forrestal proposal. Unlike the 4 June 
summary, it generally assuaged the concerns of the Agency in terms of the new 
administrative set-up. For legal and operational reasons secret intelligence and political 
warfare would be placed within a “new Office of Special Services” within the CIA, but 
“overall control” would be assigned to the DCI, not the departments. The new political 
warfare office would still have “a considerable measure of autonomy within the Central 
Intelligence Agency,” but this provision was established “for security reasons” rather 
than to surreptitiously channel the DCI’s authority to the departments. Instead of external 
control, a departmental “Operations Advisory Committee” would be established to 
“assist” rather than direct the DCI “in discharging [his] responsibilities.” Galloway and 
Cassady would still be replaced, but the new chief could be recruited from within or 
outside the CIA and would be nominated by the DCI rather than the departments. His 
choice would still be subject to the Council’s final approval.94  
 
Inevitably, a satisfactory arrangement for the CIA was simultaneously anathema to PPS. 
Kennan immediately informed Lovett that the new directive was unacceptable. In 
Kennan’s opinion this project “emanates largely from the initiative” of the Planning Staff 
and therefore the proposed political warfare campaign “must be done under the intimate 
direction and control of this Department.” The new draft directive “does not appear to us 
to meet this need.” If the State Department could not overcome Agency opposition to its 
rightful authority, then the “heavy decision” must be taken to “withdraw this paper 
entirely and to give up at this time the idea of attempting to conduct political warfare.” 
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The recalcitrant Agency should also be put in its place with the “cancellation of NSC 4, 
which is not operating satisfactorily.”95  
 
Despite Kennan’s melodramatic reaction to the latest draft directive, an opportunity for 
PPS to outmanoeuvre the CIA presented itself almost immediately. Just as the 7 June 
paper was being disseminated, the NSC Staff met to revise the directive based on the 
previous NSC paper opposed by the Agency. According to one CIA historian the 
intervention of the NSC Staff meant that there “was little chance that Hillenkoetter’s 
reservations for the Director and the Agency would be retained as he submitted them.” 
The Agency was now effectively excluded from the drafting process. The initial revision 
produced by the NSC Staff was referred to the NSC Consultants representing a real 
advantage for the Planning Staff. Foremost of the NSC Consultants was Kennan himself, 
whereas the Agency was not represented during this phase of the drafting process.96  
 
Several revisions were made to the latest version by the NSC Consultants, making it 
“intolerable” to the Agency. The Secretary of State rather than the DCI would nominate 
the head of the new unit, now renamed the “Office of Special Projects,” so long as this 
choice was “acceptable” to the DCI and approved by the Council. The language of the 
revised draft directive was also ambiguous in asserting the DCI’s authority over the new 
organisation.97  
 
Under the full weight of departmental pressure to accept this unsatisfactory arrangement, 
Hillenkoetter continued to stand his ground. On 9 June he addressed two letters to the 
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Council Secretariat and Council members. Exasperated by the latest twist, he informed 
Souers and Lay that “since State evidently will not go along with CIA operating this 
political warfare thing in any sane or sound manner” the department should run it and “let 
it have no connection at all with us.” Hillenkoetter believed that combining departmental 
control and responsibility seemed to be the only way to broach the bureaucratic impasse 
that had hampered a workable arrangement ever since the drafting of NSC 4-A: 
It seems to me that this is the only thing that will satisfy State in any way and 
rather than try to keep a makeshift in running order, subject to countless 
restrictions which can only lead to continued bickering and argument, I think 




Ironically, in the space of 24 hours Kennan and Hillenkoetter both suggested that a 
resolution was impossible due to the other’s stubborn resistance. Despite this, neither side 
formally recommended terminating the directive. Kennan’s internal communiqué to 
Lovett was immediately rescinded when he realised that he could unilaterally influence 
the draft in his capacity as an NSC Consultant. Hillenkoetter, in turn, made his own plea 
privately to Souers and Lay at the Council Secretariat to recognise the irrationality of 
departmental behaviour. This was borne out of aggravation rather than a serious call to 
scrap the CIA’s involvement in political warfare. The DCI wrote the letter privately to 
Souers and Lay “for your own information,” explaining that it “need not be forwarded” 
with the letter addressed to the Council members.  
 
Hillenkoetter’s second letter to the Council indicated that he was still willing to fight for 
Agency control over political warfare. This letter omitted his infuriated recommendation 
to withdraw Agency involvement altogether. Instead he once again laid out the CIA’s 
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objections to the latest draft proposal that was “considered much weaker and less 
satisfactory” than the previous draft. Hillenkoetter remained combative, concluding that 
“either the National Security Council has confidence in the operation of the Office of 
Special Projects by the Central Intelligence Agency or it has not.” Hillenkoetter therefore 
laid down two straightforward alternatives. “If such confidence exists,” he argued, then 
the CIA “should be directed to operate the new office subject to a general declaration of 
policy by the National Security Council.” On the other hand if doubt existed over the 
CIA’s ability to control political warfare then it “should not be expected or directed to 
operate the Office of Special Operations in any manner.” This was effectively an 
ultimatum to the NSC. Either give full authority and responsibility for political warfare to 
the DCI or remove all Agency connections to the new programme.98 
 
The draft directive was yet again referred back to the NSC Consultants in light of 
Hilenkoetter’s latest criticisms. Hillenkoetter expected the imminent removal of the 
DCI’s operational authority and therefore directed Cassady to wrap up all “irrevocable” 
SPG commitments and not commence any new operations.99 The administrative dispute 
was now directly disrupting Washington’s covert psychological warfare operations.  
 
Over the next week a compromise draft was finally moulded incorporating features 
acceptable to the departments and the Agency. In his capacity as an NSC Consultant 
Kennan was intimately involved in this work. Faced by tenacious Agency resistance 
Kennan backed down, opting to compromise over the directive itself for the greater cause 
of procuring congressional funds to facilitate the initiation of political warfare projects. 
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This was a pragmatic, tactical decision to defer establishing the State Department’s 
primacy over political warfare until after a directive had been approved by the NSC. It 
was not a capitulation to the Agency’s viewpoint, suggesting that their differences would 
persist after the adoption of a political warfare directive. 
 
On 14 June the “10-2 Panel” was established, formalising that a representative for the 
Secretary of State (Kennan) and the Secretary of Defence (Joseph McNarney) would 
provide the new Office of Special Projects (OSP) with policy guidance.100 Souers 
distributed the new directive, NSC 10/1, to the NSC members the next day before its 
consideration at the Council meeting scheduled for 17 June. The new version maintained 
that “responsibility” for “covert operations” should be assigned to the newly created OSP 
and placed “within the structure of the Central Intelligence Agency.” The authority of the 
DCI was maintained with the stipulation that the “Chief of the Office of Special Projects 
shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence.” However, ambiguity still 
existed as to the extent of the DCI’s authority over OSP for two reasons. Firstly, it was 
considered essential that OSP “shall operate independently of other components” of the 
Agency. As well as this, the provisions for the “Operations Advisory Committee” (the 
“10-2 Panel”) were substantially beefed up, muddling the chain of command from the 
OSP chief to the DCI and the departmental representatives. As mandated by NSC 10/1 
the departmental committee was to “furnish authoritative policy guidance on covert 
operations” to the DCI and to “assist in the preparation of all plans for such 
operations.”101   
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The Final Phase- The Redrafting of NSC 10/1 
On 16 June Kennan transmitted his begrudging approval of NSC 10/1 to his departmental 
superiors. Although it was not perfect, in Kennan’s eyes the draft should be accepted as it 
was “probably the best arrangement we can get at this time” to ensure that “some funds 
be obtained from Congress this year for minor activities of this nature.” Before 
reluctantly endorsing NSC 10/1 Kennan tetchily expressed his doubts that “this 
arrangement will meet the more important needs of this Government for the conduct of 
political warfare.” The draft directive “draws too sharp a distinction between operations 
and planning” and is “too remote from the conduct of foreign policy.” His real gripe was 
that PPS had failed to assert de jure authority over political warfare. 
 
The Secretary of State was charged with appointing the new head of OSP, but Kennan 
also bemoaned the fact that “we will not be likely to find a suitable person to head it.”102 
He continued to blame the CIA for the failure, as he saw it, to organise appropriate 
administrative arrangements for political warfare operations. Kennan claimed that the 
Agency’s obstinacy had caused the “suitable person,” namely his first-choice candidate 
for the position Allen Dulles, to reject the offer to head the new political warfare 
organisation. Kennan was erroneous in suggesting this, of course, because Dulles was 
working to his own agenda. In truth Kennan’s remarks were borne out of frustration.  
 
The pivotal NSC meeting was held on 17 June where agreement over NSC 10/1 was 
reached. The terms of the final provisions swung once again in favour of the Agency. 
During the course of the discussion it was decided that paragraph 3d of NSC 10/1 
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establishing the departmental Operations Advisory Committee should be deleted from the 
final text. This was a significant step towards confirming the DCI’s de jure authority over 
covert political warfare. The departmental representatives on the committee had been 
afforded broad powers to plan operations and supply policy guidance under the 
provisions in NSC 10/1. Hillenkoetter recognised that this could provide the departments 
with a direct channel to the NSC that would undermine his authority should 
disagreements develop between them.  
 
The recommendation to drop the committee mechanism came not from Hillenkoetter but 
the military in a manner reminiscent of the final drafting phase of NSC 4-A when 
Secretary of State Marshall had voluntarily ceded this arrangement. At the meeting on 17 
June Secretary Royall of the Army and Air Force Secretary Symington forcefully argued 
against any military responsibility for peacetime operations, negating the need for 
military representation on an Operations Advisory Committee. Royall asserted that 
provision for it in NSC 10/1 “should be stricken from the paper and a general paragraph 
substituted therefore.” As the committee concept was dependant on joint departmental 
representation it became obsolete without military participation. Souers and Lovett both 
protested at the military’s position, with the undersecretary arguing that “we would only 
be kidding ourselves if we think that either the political or military agencies can be 
relieved of the responsibility.” Lovett and Souers both favoured the committee concept to 
safeguard departmental coordination and oversight of political warfare alongside the 
CIA’s control. Lovett understood that military participation on the committee would be 
nominal in peacetime, but without token military representation the State Department 
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would be denied its own channel into OSP. Despite his best efforts Royall and Symington 
could not be brought round and the Operations Advisory Committee concept was duly 
scrapped.103  
 
Hillenkoetter had seemingly won a major battle in absentia. The deletion of the 
Operations Advisory Committee swung the balance of power back in the DCI’s favour.  
It was ironic that in the end a significant element of the long-running CIA-PPS dispute 
was resolved without the involvement of either chief protagonist, Kennan or 
Hillenkoetter.  
 
An Uneasy Compromise: Approval of NSC 10/2 
In its final form the directive resembled an uneasy compromise between the CIA and the 
Planning Staff. Their different viewpoints had not been successfully mediated making it 
inevitable that administrative problems would persist when it came to implementing the 
directive. For the Agency the main danger was that PPS would bypass the administrative 
provisions giving it control over political warfare, by “reinterpreting” them when it came 
to determining the working arrangements for planning and guiding operations. The 
Planning Staff, for its part, had accepted that it must bide its time before it could assert its 
primary influence over the direction of the new political warfare programme.  
 
The final directive was approved and disseminated by the Council Secretariat on 18 June 
as NSC 10/2. The directive embodied a balance struck between PPS’s wishes, the 
recommendations of ISG, and the CIA’s objections, while also incorporating some 
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elements of the JCS proposals for wartime organisation. Richard Helms was fairly 
scathing in his assessment of the process: 
This lame compromise between establishing yet another secret organization 
and giving CIA full responsibility for covert action seemed to have been most 
heavily influenced by the reluctance of the State and Defense Departments to 
give the upstart CIA any more responsibility than it already had.104 
 
The hodgepodge effort to appease all for the sake of acceptance resulted in NSC 10/2 
leaving ambiguous the administrative arrangements it was meant to clarify.105 
Considerable doubt remained as to how the de jure provisions would be interpreted and 
implemented de facto, given that the final directive failed to resolve the main sources of 
tension. This was brushed under the carpet so that the political warfare programme could 
at least be initiated.  
 
NSC 10/2 recycled much of the language from NSC 4-A, which it now superseded. The 
new directive asserted that “taking cognizance of the vicious covert activities of the 
USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and 
activities of the United States and other Western powers,” it was essential “in the 
interests of world peace and US national security” that “the overt foreign activities of the 
US Government must be supplemented by covert operations.” The paper stated that for 
“operational reasons,” given the Agency’s secret intelligence expertise, a new 
organisation should not be created to undertake these activities. Instead, “responsibility” 
for peacetime covert political warfare operations would be placed “within the structure of 
the Central Intelligence Agency.” For reasons of “security” and “flexibility” the new 
“Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central 
Intelligence Agency.”106 Souers apparently approved of OSP’s “special position” to 
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ensure that it was not “hampered by other components of the Agency.” Hillenkoetter took 
a more cynical view shaped by the unpleasant experience of the protracted feud with PPS. 
He anticipated that the departments would “take advantage” of the DCI’s “incomplete 
powers,” to intrude on his authority. A convoluted procedure for nominating the head of 
the new office was indicative of the desperate balancing act that NSC 10/2 attempted to 
perform between the departments and the CIA. The new OSP chief would be “nominated 
by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved 
by the National Security Council.”107 
 
Although some ambiguous provisions appeared to suit departmental interests, language 
within NSC 10/2 also ostensibly strengthened the DCI’s position. For instance, secret 
intelligence and covert political warfare were explicitly placed “under the over-all control 
of the Director of Central Intelligence.” This was a crucial victory for the Agency for two 
reasons. Firstly, the CIA’s future as an operating agency was assured, and proposals to 
remove its secret intelligence capability- questioned by the ISG and advocated by both 
Forrestal and PPS- had been repelled. Secondly, the DCI was assigned de jure authority 
for the new expanded covert political warfare operations. Again, efforts to separate 
responsibility for political warfare from the authority had been successfully repulsed. But 
because this remained a central PPS objective it remained to be seen whether the State 




The Operations Advisory Committee was replaced with a general provision making it the 
DCI’s responsibility to ensure that “covert operations are planned and conducted in a 
manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities.” The 
DCI was responsible for ensuring that the CIA’s operations were compatible with general 
policy “through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary 
of Defense.”108 This provided the military with the diminished peacetime role advocated 
by Royall and Symington. However, clashes of opinion between the departmental 
representatives and the DCI would still be referred to the NSC where departmental 
influence overshadowed that of the Agency. There was an immediate inauspicious signal 
for the Agency that PPS would not accept a diminished role when Kennan was appointed 
as the Secretary of State’s representative for political warfare in August.109   
 
Not only was a question mark left over the administrative legacy of NSC 10/2. Residual 
operational ambiguity was created by the language in NSC 10/2 because peacetime and 
wartime measures were not clearly demarcated. Covert political warfare was defined 
expansively, without any distinction made between peacetime and wartime measures: 
As used in this directive, “covert operations” are understood to be all 
activities […] which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against 
hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or 
groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government 
responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if 
uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for 
them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related 
to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventative direct action, including 
sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion 
against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance 
movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of 




This was a legacy of the persistent failure to address JCS concerns, expressed through the 
SANACC 304 series, regarding the creation of a wartime Psychological Warfare 
Organisation.111 As a result, wartime “covert” measures were stitched into the directive 
alongside peacetime political warfare measures without any explicit differentiation 
between the two types of activity.  
 
A fundamental flaw was written into the directive that seems to have not received the 
attention it deserved at the time. NSC10/2 stipulated that the Truman administration must 
be able to “plausibly disclaim” a connection to the breathtaking range of offensive 
activities that had now been officially sanctioned. In other words these operations must 
remain covert. As Helms observes, it “seems impossible that the paramilitary activity 
authorized in the OPC charter could be carried out in a manner that could plausibly be 
denied by the President, but I do not recall any serious challenges to this instruction at the 
time.”112 The principle of plausible deniability, rooted in Marshall’s anxieties about 
tarnishing the official image of U.S. foreign policy, was not only ludicrous in relation to 
certain conspicuous operations. It would also be a restricting factor on the scale and 
effectiveness of the future U.S. political warfare campaign against the Soviet bloc, 
fundamentally undermining the feasibility of the programme. “Covert” operations would 
necessarily have to remain sufficiently small-scale to retain their cover. Limited actions 
of this type proved to be totally ineffective against the formidable secret police systems 




The shift from NSC 4-A to NSC 10/2 constituted a lengthy, divisive process of attrition 
that ultimately resulted in paralysis within the Truman administration. The delay in 
adopting NSC 10/2 was not caused by strategic or operational considerations but by the 
fragmented administrative interests and agendas of disparate groups within Washington’s 
national security apparatus. Organisational authority and responsibility over the proposed 
new programme lay at the heart of this, undercutting a considered and detailed debate on 
the strategic basis for the operations themselves.  
 
Despite several acrimonious months involving manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre, 
particularly between PPS and the CIA, both sides were eventually compelled to accept 
compromises that balanced their standpoints in the final directive. But the disparate views 
of each side were not reconciled by NSC 10/2. PPS ultimately recognised the 
effectiveness of the CIA’s defences personified by Hillenkoetter’s fortitude in the face of 
overwhelming departmental adversity. But NSC 10/2 did not mark an outright 
bureaucratic victory for the Agency. PPS shifted tactics, sacrificing an unsatisfactory 
“interim” arrangement under the directive for the sake of initiating its political warfare 
programme. Once the Office of Special Projects was up and running, the department 
would be able to pull rank and assert greater direct influence on operations. The Planning 
Staff understood fully-well that it possessed a Trojan Horse capable of overcoming the 
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-4- 
THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA: 
THE PURSUIT OF A SOVIET BLOC POLICY,  
TITOISM, AND PROGRAM A 
 
By the summer of 1948 the Truman administration had developed a strategic approach 
for Western Europe based on contributing to its economic recovery and political stability. 
Tied into American efforts to overcome Europe’s problems was the deterioration of its 
relations with the Soviet Union. Initially Washington heavily prioritised the development 
of strategic approaches to facilitate the political and economic stabilisation of Western 
Europe. This reflected the geopolitical importance American policymakers placed on the 
region. The failure to address U.S. policies towards Europe as a whole, encompassing the 
east as well as the west, on the one hand signaled that in geopolitical terms Washington 
regarded Eastern Europe as relatively insignificant. It also reflected the limits of 
American power, as the consolidation of Russian and communist predominance in 
Eastern Europe severely curtailed the American ability to influence the region.  
 
U.S. officials were increasingly assured of the effectiveness of linking economic recovery 
to political reconstruction by mid-1948. Dean Acheson recollected that “When I returned 
to office the surrounding gloom had deepened, or remained impenetrable in most areas, 
but in one at least, Western Europe, the Marshall Plan had brought the dawn of a 
revivification unparalleled in modern history.”1 After congressional ratification in April, 
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ERP aid was delivered and administered over the next four years under the auspices of 
the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). The central aim was to rehabilitate the 
economies, political institutions and self-confidence of the governments and populations 
in Western Europe. The Truman administration also encouraged the post-war 
rapprochement of France and Germany towards this end. The creation of an independent 
West German state at the heart of the continent’s economy became a central pillar of 
West European policy.  
 
These policies were supplemented in Western Europe from late 1947 with a series of 
overt and covert psychological warfare measures to deal with the perceived threat of 
insidious communist influence. Particular emphasis was placed on France, Italy and the 
Western occupation zones in Germany and a new capability was eventually authorised by 
the NSC in December 1947. The operations subsequently undertaken by SPG were 
essentially defensive stop-gap measures organised to compliment the overall aims of 
“containment.”  
 
During 1948 and 1949, the United States looked to further strengthen the momentum of 
its Western European strategy beyond political and economic reconstruction. Washington 
at first supported and then advanced the military rearmament of the Western European 
nations, taking initial form in European capitals as the Brussels Pact. Catalysed by the 
Soviet blockade of Berlin beginning in the summer of 1948, Western European military 
reconstruction was linked to the United States with the commencement of the 
Washington security talks between July and September. This ultimately led to the North 
 196
Atlantic Treaty being adopted in April 1949, with congressional approval of the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act later in October. 
 
However, Washington’s strategic approach to Western Europe was not extended to 
Eastern Europe and the USSR. As of June 1948, the Truman administration had not 
formulated a strategy to give coherence to its dealings with the Soviet bloc nations. 
Beyond general and ideologically-charged rhetoric intermittently vocalising American 
aspirations for the region, no formal detailed policy aims had been defined. This exposed 
Washington’s failure to develop a unified European policy during 1947. The American 
approach towards the west had not been linked to Eastern Europe. As a result, the relative 
success of its “containment” action stimulated a parallel defensive response in the east. 
Acheson was justifiably proud of the American programme for Western European 
recovery, but in his memoirs he recognised the ramifications of this policy in the broader 
European context: 
Four years of increasingly purposeful effort had brought the beginnings of 
recovery in Western Europe, but at the same time had intensified Soviet 
control of Eastern Europe and produced dangerous action further west, of 
which the most ominous was the blockade of Berlin.2 
 
The consolidation of Soviet and communist control over the eastern bloc confirmed the 
existence of semi-permanent rival spheres and the inception of the Cold War. 
 
Although no specific strategy was developed, some small-scale propaganda operations 
were launched by SPG targeting the Eastern European communist regimes in the first 
half of 1948. Notwithstanding the launching of these operations, general American aims 
for the region were still not clarified at senior policy levels. The primary reason for this 
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was that emphasis had fallen on Western European containment. With progress there 
seemingly assured, some American policymakers started to turn their eyes eastwards. Yet 
they were immediately faced by the reality that Washington exercised little geopolitical 
influence in the region. Due to this, the State Department and the White House largely 
conducted diplomacy with the Soviet bloc countries in an ad hoc non-strategic manner, 
particularly through the ill-fated forum of the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings 
(CFM). No detailed attention was paid towards a pan-European or Eastern European 
strategy to the same degree as Western European initiatives like ERP and the North 
Atlantic Treaty.  
 
From mid-1948 sections of the administration, especially within the State Department, 
gradually attempted to fill this strategic gap by developing policies towards Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. However, the formulation of a coherent strategic approach 
towards the Soviet bloc was made problematic by the onset of the Cold War and the lack 
of an established unified approach towards Europe. This undermined the basic effort to 
define U.S. strategic aims and methodologies in Eastern Europe prior to the outbreak of 
the Korean War in June 1950. 
 
The Debates over Soviet Bloc Policy in 1948 
In June 1948 the Office of Special Projects, soon renamed the Office of Policy 
Coordination, was created by NSC directive and an expansive covert political warfare 
capability was sanctioned for peacetime use. Despite the adoption of NSC 10/2, OPC’s 
founding mission lacked clarity. The directive authorised unconventional measures but it 
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did not delineate OPC’s objectives. Cold War activists believed they had been authorised 
“to turn loose among the chickens as many foxes as we could possibly get way with,” but 
no parameters were simultaneously established to fence in, organise and control the 
venture.3  
 
In fact in mid-1948 the Truman administration did not possess a formal policy position 
towards the Soviet Union. The first policy statement of this type was produced five 
months after NSC 10/2 was adopted in November 1948. This meant that OPC lacked 
guidelines to define its strategic objectives from the outset. The institutional feud that had 
raged in the build-up to the expansion of the political warfare capability had completely 
overshadowed the fundamental question of its strategic implementation.  
 
The rhetoric in NSC 10/2 citing the “vicious covert activities” of the Soviet bloc was 
similar in tone to a policy statement drawn up by the NSC Staff in March 1948.4 This 
paper, NSC 7, argued that the United States must “take the lead in organizing a world-
wide counter-offensive aimed at mobilizing and strengthening our own and anti-
communist forces in the non-Soviet world, and at undermining the strength of the 
communist forces in the Soviet world.” The NSC Staff recommended two particular 
methods to take the “counter-offensive” to the Soviet bloc. The United States should 
intensify “the present anti-communist foreign information program” and also “develop, 
and at the appropriate time carry out, a coordinated program to support underground 
resistance movements in countries behind the iron curtain, including the USSR.” 
Although these were extremely important and provocative suggestions, NSC 7 did not 
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divulge the scope and nature of the proposed American support of resistance movements 
nor when the “appropriate time” for these provocative operations might be.5  
 
Despite similarities in language, the development of NSC 10/2 was not linked to NSC 7. 
The NSC Staff paper was never formally adopted by the Council and quickly faded. The 
NSC Staff carried little weight in the bureaucracy and was unable to push the report 
through to the upper echelons for approval. Policymakers were focused on challenging 
the subversive and legal assertion of communist influence in Western Europe. Nobody 
within the cabinet, the Planning Staff, or elsewhere took up the issues raised by NSC 7 at 
the time. The policy paper eventually foundered on opposition from the State Department 
over the contention that the production of policy statements was its sole prerogative.6  
 
Questions over general U.S. foreign policy were also raised during the course of the 
dispute over NSC 10/2, although NSC 7 was not revisited. The timing was coincidental 
and the ensuing policy debate was not linked to the creation of OPC. The impetus to 
clarify U.S. policies originated with Secretary of Defense Forrestal, but was borne out of 
functional and not strategic concerns. In May 1948 Secretary Forrestal sought to justify 
the military budget for Fiscal Year 1950 through a statement of American policy needs 
and objectives. His call for a policy review was set against the backdrop of Truman’s 
attempts to slash federal spending, including the imposition of a defense budget ceiling of 
$15 billion.7 The emergent crisis in Berlin opened up the possibility for Forrestal to 
invigorate his budgetary claims and press the administration to accept more costly 
military expenditures than those currently stipulated by the White House: 
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[…] it is important that a comprehensive statement of national policy be 
prepared, particularly as it relates to Soviet Russia, and that this statement 
specify and evaluate the risks, state our objectives, and outline the measures 
to be followed in achieving them. For the reasons I have given, such a 
statement is needed to guide the National Military Establishment in 
determining the level and character of armament which it should seek and, I 
believe, to assist the President in determining the proportion of our resources 
which should be dedicated to military purposes.8   
 
Writing to Truman in July, Forrestal explained that “the preparation of realistic budget 
estimates and final decisions concerning the size of the national budget, and its relative 
emphasis on different projects, should be founded on such an evaluation.”9 By submitting 
NSC 20 Forrestal hoped that the Department of State would define U.S. peacetime 
objectives in a way that supported the military’s call for higher strength levels. 
 
A policy review was prompted by Forrestal between mid-late 1948. But this opportunity 
was not used by the proponents of political warfare to tie OPC into the broader evaluation 
of American policy, despite the vacuum in the administration’s European strategy 
towards Eastern Europe. Secretary of State Marshall ordered the Policy Planning Staff to 
respond to Forrestal’s request. The Planning Staff had been established by Marshall a 
year earlier for just this sort of role, according to future Secretary of State Dean Acheson: 
[…] to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the 
operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough 
ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be 
done to meet or anticipate them. In doing this the staff should also do 
something else- constantly reappraise what was being done. General Marshall 
was acutely aware that policies acquired their own momentum and went on 
after the reasons that inspired them had ceased. 
 
Acheson asserted that under George Kennan and Paul Nitze “the staff was of inestimable 
value as the stimulator, and often deviser, of the most basic policies.”10 Not only was 
PPS the principal source of government policies. As one of the key actors in the 
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development of the political warfare programme under NSC 10/2, Kennan and the 
Planning Staff were at the time advocating “the maneuvering of Russian power back into 
the Russian border” through the coordinated mobilisation of measures short of war.11  
 
PPS therefore missed an opportunity to explicitly link these activities to a strategic 
framework encompassing Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc. The failure to define a 
strategic framework for political warfare activities was all the more glaring because PPS 
was the primary proponent of the expanded covert capability. Rather than seize the 
opportunity to carve out a dynamic European strategy Kennan dragged his heels. This 
runs contrary to the common historical depiction of Kennan as a vigorous formulator of 
Soviet bloc strategies.  
 
Instead Kennan focused on issues raised specifically by the Secretary of Defense, 
although he had little time for Forrestal’s agenda to justify a larger military budget by 
commandeering State Department support. Kennan instinctively opposed having to 
resolve abstract issues including whether the U.S. should prepare for an anticipated peak 
period of danger or for a longer term and more permanent state of readiness in relation to 
the Kremlin. He argued that the over-reliance on policy papers particularly by military 
planners was unwelcome as it risked generating strategic retrenchment and inflexibility. 
He complained to Marshall and Lovett that it was difficult to express the fluidity of the 
international situation and to reduce complexities into “either/or” scenarios in basic 
policy estimates.12 Although this was not necessarily disingenuous, Kennan’s 
endorsement of a “relative” and “flexible” approach to Cold War policymaking was a 
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smokescreen masking the need to resolve American objectives and the realistic 
employment of capabilities towards the Soviet bloc.  
 
Historians run the risk of being overly critical as a result of the advantage of hindsight. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that American policy towards the Soviet bloc in the late 1940s 
was lacking on two levels. Firstly, a cogent “grand strategy” for the Cold War was 
needed to frame the overall logic of U.S. policies- a common strategic thread to delineate 
U.S. Cold War aims and to unify and integrate the various policy components. A unified 
grand strategy also needed to be linked to the more practical requirements of the 
implementing agencies. Therefore below the level of “grand strategy” realistic objectives 
should have been identified, alongside clear demarcations of the limits of operational 
mandates, the specific range of methods to be employed and the strategic premise 
justifying their application in the field. 
 
This dual approach was basically lacking from the NSC 20 series developed in 1948. On 
23 June Kennan submitted a report that responded to Forrestal’s request but fell well 
short of filling the gaping hole in the U.S. strategic approach to the Soviet bloc.13 PPS/33 
addressed itself to the limited points specifically raised by the Secretary of Defense, but 
circumvented the strategic vacuum towards the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, PPS/33 also 
failed to satisfy Forrestal. The Planning Staff accurately downplayed the likelihood of 
armed Soviet action, pointing to Moscow’s preference for political action and military 
intimidation to pursue its foreign policy objectives. American military strength should be 
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therefore be maintained, the paper argued, but only as a secondary factor to bolster the 
American diplomatic position vis-à-vis the Kremlin.  
 
Forrestal was crestfallen that PPS/33 did not explicitly support the need for expanding, 
not slashing, defense appropriations in the face of the “worsening” world situation.14 
Frustratingly for the Secretary of Defense, the report was “tantalizingly ambivalent” 
regarding military requirements.15 Yet because PPS/33 did not put the budgetary issue to 
bed the Pentagon continued to press for policy clarification. This in turn kept the issue of 
Soviet bloc policy in the foreground, despite immediate attention being diverted to the 
Soviet blockade of Berlin that summer.  Two months later Kennan reluctantly produced 
another report, designated PPS/38, dealing with broader policy questions.16 This paper 
promoted two general goals in relation to Moscow. U.S. policy should aim to reduce 
Moscow’s power and influence to unthreatening levels as well as to bring about a basic 
change in the Russian theory and practice of international relations.17  
 
These objectives were reminiscent of Kennan’s Foreign Affairs article published a year 
earlier: 
It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and 
alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement 
and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States 
has in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy 
must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation 
and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way 
to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the 
break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. 18 
 
Kennan later downplayed the significance of the Foreign Affairs article, describing how 
he had “so light-heartedly brought [it] to expression, hacking away at my typewriter there 
 204
in the northwest corner of the War College building in December 1946.”19 But PPS/38 
and subsequent policy papers took up a similar theme. In peacetime Washington should 
“encourage and promote by means short of war the gradual retraction of undue Russian 
power and influence” from Eastern Europe. Fostering “institutions of federalism” within 
the Soviet Union “would permit a revival of the national life of the Baltic peoples.” 
Washington should concurrently seek ways to “explode the myth” of Soviet propaganda 
through US informational activities and “create situations which will compel the Soviet 
Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present 
concepts [….]”  
 
PPS/38 argued that these aims could be pursued without “the fundamental emphasis of 
our policy” resting on the “preparation for an armed conflict” or “to bring about the 
overthrow of the Soviet Government.” America’s moral right to promote the 
disintegration of the illegitimate projection of Soviet power in Europe was brashly 
asserted. But how to pursue this aim was left ambiguous beyond a general statement of 
intent to place strain on the Soviet-satellite relationship and gradually maneuver Russian 
political and military influence out of Eastern Europe with the aid of indigenous 
nationalist forces. While PPS/38 warned against pushing Moscow onto the defensive by 
engaging its prestige or legitimate interests, it shed no light on a positive strategic 
approach to achieve the aims put forward in the document.20 
 
Circulated under the NSC 20 series, PPS/33 and PPS/38 generated considerable 
discussion within the administration.21 Yet no one in Washington linked its political 
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objectives in peacetime to the newly created OPC to guide its planning for covert 
operations behind the iron curtain. Instead the revised draft of PPS/33 and PPS/38 
produced by the NSC Staff on 28 September emphasised Soviet military rather than 
political objectives and Soviet capabilities rather than the limiting factors upon them.22 
This marked the emphasis placed by the military representatives on the NSC Staff on the 
perceived military threat to Western Europe. It therefore failed to address how broader 
American political ends would realistically be met in times of peace. This issue was 
essentially subsumed by Forrestal’s budgetary concerns in subsequent discussions in 
which questions relating to American military strength levels and the military’s 
peacetime role dominated.  
 
Nonetheless PPS/38, now designated NSC 20/1, provided an opportunity to define 
America’s strategy towards the Soviet bloc because it broadened the scope of the debate 
by positing general American aims for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for the first 
time. An Advanced Study Group (ASG) ran the rule over the policy paper and in October 
1948 gave a damning appraisal. The ASG “opposed strongly” the adoption of the NSC 20 
series and declared it “dangerous in the extreme.” The study group warned that “careless 
implementation” of such a hard-line policy “might well create situations which the USSR 
would consider grounds for war.” Furthermore, “the key policies are phrased in language 
which is subject to misinterpretation and which does not provide adequate guidance.” 
This was particularly true of the central objective to reduce Soviet power and influence. 
ASG concluded emphatically that the administration should not “accept this policy.” The 
NSC 20 series “should never be reduced to approved written policy” as it “is morally and 
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legally [from the UN point of view] wrong.” The present paper should be destroyed and a 
“more careful” policy statement developed.23 
 
Despite this setback, a series of inter-departmental consultants meetings were held to 
discuss the NSC 20 series papers giving Kennan and the Planning Staff the chance to 
justify their attempt to broaden policy to encompass the Soviet bloc. At a Joint 
Orientation Conference meeting in Forrestal’s office on 8 November, Kennan explained 
that beyond the Western European strategy now in place, “in a tentative and preliminary 
way, we have tried to create conditions unfavorable to the maintenance of Soviet power 
in Eastern Europe.” Paraphrasing the aspirations expressed in NSC 20/1, Kennan claimed 
that the US was attempting “to put the maximum strain” on the Soviet structure of power 
and Soviet-satellite relationships and “to encourage in every way the spirit of 
independence and freedom among the eastern European peoples.” According to Kennan 
it was hoped that “we would be able to maneuver the Russians gradually back out of 
eastern Europe behind the new borders of the Soviet Union” without needing to resort “to 
the weapon of war.”  
 
Kennan stressed at this meeting that America’s developing strategy towards the Soviet 
bloc was not “a purely negative policy, which precluded any forward action and therefore 
failed to envisage any real solution of Europe’s problems” as had “often been alleged.” 
Washington needed to exercise some “discretion” because it had diplomatic relations 
with several Eastern European nations and for this reason it “had to go easy on this phase 
of U.S. policy in our official and semi-official statements.” The United States “cannot be 
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too explicit in public statements about the breakup of Soviet power in eastern Europe 
without putting ourselves in the position of calling in effect for the overthrow of these 
governments.” This would be disadvantageous as it “would play directly into the hands of 
the communist propaganda machine all over the world.” 
 
Explicit public statements propounding the overthrow of the Soviet regime would 
certainly have been foolhardy and undermined Washington’s international credibility. 
But this reasoning was a red herring because the Truman administration did not 
definitively admit privately that its policy was to overthrow communist regimes. 
Washington did not explicitly commit to the mobilisation of revolutionary measures to 
“rollback” Soviet power, but neither did it definitively reject such methods. Instead it 
settled for an aspirational middle course that pursued generalised ambiguous objectives in 
the Cold War. Although this fence-sitting was not necessarily surprising as it deferred the 
need to make tough decisions, it left policy and objectives vague and indecisive. 
 
The concession to a middle course undercut a coordinated, trans-departmental 
programme of operations to stimulate the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe and the disintegration of Soviet regional power. Instead, American policy-
makers, of whom Kennan was most culpable, performed a sleight of hand by allowing 
policy to waver between “revolution” and “evolution.” Instead the decision was fudged 
with the recommendation that Washington should engage in indirect methods in pursuit 
of these objectives: 
Actually, it would be not only undesirable but also unnecessary for us to 
stress publicly, as a direct aim of U.S. policy, the overthrow of the communist 
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governments in eastern Europe. For it is not an objective which we propose to 
achieve by any direct action on the part of this Government. It has been our 
conviction that if economic recovery could be brought about and confidence 
restored in western Europe [… this] would be bound in the end to have a 
disintegrating and eroding effect on the communist world. In this case, we 
think there is a good chance that the gradual breakdown of communist power 
in eastern Europe would occur.24    
 
This evaded the question of what specific measures the United States should employ to 
foster “independence.” NSC 10/2 had formally authorised a breathtaking range of 
activities, but this capability was not squared with strategic guidelines at the policy level.  
Therefore the methodology for fulfilling American aspirations remained moot when the 
NSC Staff released Washington’s first promulgation of a “grand strategy” towards the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War.  
 
The Adoption of NSC 20/4 
Approved on 23 November, 1948, NSC 20/4 was a significant statement of American 
intentions towards the Soviet bloc in the early Cold War.25 But its immediate impact on 
operations was relatively minor because it failed to bridge general policy with specific 
measures.26 Its importance principally emanates from its status as the first major 
“blueprint” of the Cold War produced by the U.S. government. Washington attempted to 
address the imbalance in its strategic thinking towards Europe by belatedly seeking to 
define its objectives towards the Soviet Union. Nonetheless NSC 20/4 contained major 
weaknesses carried over from its drafts, resulting in it failing to provide a coherent 
strategy that linked American capabilities to realistic objectives.  
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Two principal goals were delineated in NSC 20/4 that had been carried over from 
PPS/38. The United States would aim to “reduce the power and influence of the USSR to 
limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and 
stability of the world family of nations.” It would also attempt to “bring about a basic 
change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to 
conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN charter.”  NSC 20/4 did not 
integrate these policy goals with a programme of operations to be undertaken by 
implementing agencies. In place of this, vague and aspirational declarations urged the 
United States to “encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power 
and influence […] and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of 
the USSR.” According to the directive, US policy was to support the revival of 
nationalism behind the iron curtain, to counter the “myth” propagated by communist 
propaganda and to “create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to 
recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts [….]” 
The means to this end was not clarified by the report. 
 
OPC was not specifically tied into the list of broad measures that would purportedly 
accomplish U.S. objectives. Instead NSC 20/4 provided a general statement of American 
aspirations and measures under which specific operations by OPC and other government 
agencies could later develop. Measures included the development of “military readiness” 
to act as a “deterrent to Soviet aggression,” the improvement of U.S. “internal security” 
to guard against “the dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage,” and the 
strengthening of economic policies and American relations with non-Soviet nations.  
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Most intriguingly, Washington would place “the maximum strain on the Soviet structure 
of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite 
countries.” This hinted at more aggressive operations without explaining what they would 
entail. Yet apart from this latter action, the list of measures was totally inadequate to 
achieve the goals stated in NSC 20/4. Not only were they too broad to be of practical 
operational use, but they did not seem to relate directly to the fundamental offensive 
objectives implicit in NSC 20/4 to bring about the retraction of Soviet power. On the 
contrary, they appeared to revisit the more defensive methods applied to Western Europe 
to contain communist expansion beyond the Soviet bloc.  
 
NSC 20/4 therefore evaded the central question of how Washington could accomplish the 
declared policy goal of retracting Soviet power from Eastern Europe. As a result a 
strategic vacuum persisted. In broad terms the directive answered what the United States 
hoped to achieve in relation to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But a residual 
ambiguity pervaded the strategic basis of how this could be done.  
 
The failure to define a coherent strategy was rooted in a fundamental dilemma for 
American policymakers in the Cold War. This emanated from a caveat in NSC 20/4 that 
the U.S. “should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war 
[….]” The insurmountable challenge that was exposed but not resolved by NSC 20/4 was 
that the United States aspired to bring about Eastern Europe’s independence and modify 
Russian policies without resorting to a shooting war. In the late 1940s Soviet geopolitical 
power clearly made this unrealistic, but the strategic contradiction of promoting the 
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peaceful retraction of Soviet/communist power in Eastern Europe endured at the heart of 
American policy. 
 
NSC 20/4’s usefulness to OPC was extremely limited. The directive did not adequately 
stipulate a set of operations or specific operational objectives to guide and limit its 
activities. This was despite OPC making preparations by November to conduct “covert” 
activities behind the iron curtain in consultation with the departments. Instead NSC 20/4 
presented a broad set of objectives that rationalised the ideological consensus forged 
within the administration by late 1948. Following the communist takeover in Prague and 
the beginning of the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the vast majority of officials agreed with 
the hypothesis of inherent Soviet-communist political expansionism. According to this 
mindset Russian power must ultimately be pushed back from Eastern Europe and the 
Kremlin’s international practices modified to standards deemed acceptable and non-
threatening by Washington. NSC 20/4 adhered to this notion, providing American 
policymakers with an ideological boost in the face of geopolitical impotence by 
formalising the long-term promise of reducing Soviet power. This did not amount to a 
coherent Soviet bloc strategy that delineated specific methods to retract Soviet power 
while resolving Washington’s inadequate capabilities to influence the region.27  
 
Two initiatives were developed during 1948 and 1949 that went beyond the “grand 
strategy” approach. In response to external factors these policies provided the opportunity 
to resolve the strategic basis of American policy through a pragmatic approach. At the 
centre of this, Kennan and the Planning Staff began to grapple with methods and 
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strategies to challenge Russia and achieve American policy objectives by methods short 
of war. “What I wanted to get across to those people,” he later argued, “was that war was 
inevitable only if we let all of Europe go by default [….] They were prepared to leave off 
at the point where real diplomacy should have begun.”28 The formulation of a new 
Yugoslav policy and the development of a plan to reach a settlement on Germany marked 
efforts to deal with specific strategic issues by dynamic and peaceful means.  
 
Germany, Program A and the Ramifications for the Cold War  
The initiative known as “Program A” explored ways in which the United States could 
loosen Soviet military and political control over Eastern Europe through a diplomatic 
settlement on the status of Germany. Although it never received significant support 
outside Kennan’s Planning Staff, the concept behind Program A was linked to other 
initiatives adopted by the Truman administration in an effort to achieve its Soviet bloc 
objectives, including the use of political warfare. 
 
Kennan had recognised early on that the “German question must be center of any overall 
European peace settlement and of any future ordering of the world’s affairs based even 
nominally upon wide international agreement.”29 Program A revisited the “German 
question,” calling for quadripartite agreement by the occupying powers on the unification 
and neutralisation of Germany. Although such an arrangement would in the short term 
invoke the threat of a resurgent militarised Germany, adequate safeguards would provide 
against future German aggression. More important in the context of deepening Russo-
American divisions was the prospect that a mutually-beneficial settlement on Germany 
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would allow the political situation in Europe to retain some fluidity. From the summer of 
1948 Kennan increasingly realised that the cold war polarity between east and west 
would become semi-permanent should Washington and its allies continue on their current 
course: 
We can no longer retain the present line of division in Europe and yet hope to 
keep things flexible for an eventual retraction of Soviet power and the gradual 
emergence from Soviet control, and entrance into a free European 
community, of the present satellite countries. 
 
It was inevitable that partitioning Germany and creating a separate West German state 
tied into Western European recovery would eventually be linked to a western military 
alliance. This in turn would harden the Cold War schism and exacerbate mutual mistrust 
as “both we and the Russians will have to take measures which will tend to fix and 
perpetuate, rather than to overcome, that division.” Under these conditions “it would be 
hard- harder than it is now- to find “the road back” to a united and free Europe.”30  
 
It was somewhat ironic that Kennan now opposed partition given his earlier endorsement 
of it in 1945.31 Until1948 he had viewed partition as a means of “walling [Germany] off 
against eastern penetration.”32 As historian Robert Garson notes, Kennan repeatedly 
expressed his “antipathy to a rapprochement” because of his distrust of Moscow’s 
intentions.33 He had also been prominent in forging the shape of ERP and accepted that 
its one-sided terms were likely to result in the division of Europe because Moscow would 
consolidate a defensive position of strength in Eastern Europe in response.  
 
Kennan’s views had shifted by mid-1948. He now hoped that a U.S. diplomatic initiative 
could begin to counteract the projection of Russian political and military power in 
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Eastern Europe, particularly as incipient Western European recovery was improving the 
American strategic position in Europe vis-à-vis the Soviets. This shift marked a sea 
change from the fundamentally defensive containment policy embodied by ERP. 
Marshall Aid was designed to rehabilitate Western Europe in order to prevent further 
Soviet penetration of the region and was in one sense a negative strategy. Kennan now 
advocated moving to the offensive, albeit through diplomatic means, to retract Soviet 
power from areas presently under Moscow’s control. This process could begin through a 
pragmatic strategy to secure the withdrawal of Soviet garrisons from the Russian 
occupation zone in East Germany.34  
 
Kennan’s change of heart with Program A must be considered in light of the Soviet 
blockade of Berlin. The blockade demonstrated Moscow’s opposition to the London 
Program and plans to establish an independent West German state integrated into the rest 
of Western Europe.35 Kennan realised that “the division of Germany, and with it the 
division of Europe itself, would tend to congeal and to become more difficult of removal 
with the passage of time” while there would still also “be no real and permanent solution 
to the Berlin problem.”36 Rather than proceed with the development of polarised political 
and military blocs in Europe, Kennan submitted an alternative plan entitled PPS/37 on 12 
August, 1948. PPS/37 proposed the initiation of negotiations for the withdrawal of the 
vast majority of occupation forces from Germany and the gradual establishment of a 
united, democratic German government with genuine and independent powers.  
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Kennan perceived several advantages to this course beyond the “micro” issue of 
Germany. A quadripartite settlement on Germany could be linked to a similar agreement 
for Austria and Trieste. It would establish the possibility of successfully negotiating 
broader disagreements with the Kremlin and thereby retain flexibility rather than rigidity 
in continental Europe. This was crucial to enable the communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe to be gradually drawn towards the neutral states of Central Europe, away from 
unilateral Soviet domination. The “certain withdrawal of Soviet forces toward the east” 
would loosen the Kremlin’s levers of control in the region. Over time this might facilitate 
the emergence of continental Europe as a “third force” and counterbalance to U.S.-Soviet 
bipolarity.37 
 
PPS/37 argued that the opportunity should be taken while the “lines of cleavage” had not 
yet hardened. If Moscow rejected Program A, then “we should proceed vigorously with 
the London program” to partition Germany while leaving the offer open as the basis for 
possible future negotiations.38 Kennan readily accepted that “there is no serious 
possibility” of Program A’s “acceptance by the Russians in toto at this time.” In fact, “the 
significance of this program lies primarily in its potential psychological effect rather than 
in the possibility of its immediate acceptance.” The Russians and not the Americans 
would at least then appear to bear primary responsibility for dividing Germany and the 
continent through the very act of rejecting Program A, in much the same way that 
Moscow had lost face in snubbing ERP. But this should not have any long-lasting bearing 
on the possibility of future negotiations.  
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Kennan linked German unification to his strategic thinking more generally towards the 
Soviet bloc. As he developed Program A he believed that it offered a way, in 
combination with other actions, of loosening and subverting Russian control over the 
Soviet bloc without recourse to war. The negotiated withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
parts of Europe would compliment and make less hazardous American political warfare 
operations by softening Russian military control over the region. This would gradually 
enhance Washington’s ability to undermine the Soviet grip on its Eastern European 
puppet states through political subversion. Theoretically a unified neutral Germany might 
also enhance Soviet tolerance of nationalist movements in Eastern Europe drawn to a 
neutral middle way between west and east. 
 
Program A hoped to exploit Moscow’s weak bargaining position in light of the unpopular 
blockade of Berlin. While the Red Army remained encamped in Central and Eastern 
Europe American political warfare operations to garner nationalist independence 
movements among the local populations risked the immediate threat of armed Soviet 
reprisals. German partition would only harden Cold War lines of division and the 
acceleration towards hostile military alliances. This course undercut the feasibility of 
retracting Soviet power from Eastern Europe by peaceful means, thus rendering political 
warfare operations redundant.  
 
Although Moscow probably would not have accepted Program A in its original form, 
Kennan insisted that it was a “genuine and sincere bid for agreement” that could 
“constitute a starting point for what will probably be long and difficult negotiations.”39 
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But Moscow’s position was not explored because the Truman administration did not 
endorse Program A as official policy, preferring to press ahead with partition and the 
bolstering of Western Europe. The rejection of Program A marked the beginning of 
Kennan’s declining influence within the administration.40  
 
Program A was discarded when it ran into opposition at senior levels of the government. 
General Clay and OMGUS in Germany, along with the Department of Defense, now 
supported partition rather than a quadripartite deal including the Russians. In the context 
of the blockade Clay viewed the vulnerable American position in Berlin as indicative of 
Western Europe’s weak strategic position generally. The blockade exposed American 
impotence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the heart of Europe. The creation of an 
independent West Germany integrated into an economically powerful and rearmed 
Western European bloc would be a powerful defensive deterrent to any possible future 
Soviet aggression. Political and military alliances would help to preserve western unity, 
improve and consolidate internal conditions within West Germany and dispel the 
suspicions of America’s Western European allies that it might abandon them.41 This 
would allow Washington to exert greater control over its allies and discourage any 
Western European drift towards neutrality or communism.42 
 
Many of Kennan’s senior colleagues within the State Department including John 
McCloy, John Hickerson, Charles Bohlen and Robert Murphy also opposed Program A.43 
They felt it was unpredictable in terms of future European developments and divisive to 
the alliance system that the State Department was now working hard to forge. 
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Washington’s allies (particularly France) remained staunchly opposed to the unification 
of an independent German state so soon after the conclusion of the recent war. Paris was 
only reluctantly coming round to the idea of tying West Germany’s independence into the 
broader programme of recovery for Western Europe.  
 
When Kennan submitted his revised proposal to Marshall in November 1948 ahead of the 
London CFM meeting that winter, the alternative London Accords had already been 
accepted by the Truman administration and by Washington’s allies in Paris and London. 
The administration did not publicly admit that it now opposed brokering a deal to unify 
and neutralise Germany, but this was mainly to save face. Behind the scenes the course 
was firmly set to partition Germany and create an independent, democratic western-
leaning state linked to Western Europe and the United States through economic, political 
and military alliances.  
 
Kennan’s influence over developments was minimal despite his appointment as chairman 
of the NSC “Steering Committee” on German policy in the winter of 1948 and his March 
1949 visit to Germany.44 When Acheson replaced Marshall as Secretary of State at the 
turn of the year, the PPS director came up against one powerful opponent too many. 
Despite ubiquitous opposition, one final attempt was made to resurrect Program A before 
the Paris CFM meeting convening in the spring of 1949. The plan was disseminated 
among Department of Defense officials for their opinion. Secretary of Defense Louis 
Johnson and Chairman of the JCS General Omar Bradley were vehemently opposed out 
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of concerns that the plan would surrender Washington’s advantageous position and hand 
the initiative back to the Soviets.  
 
On the eve of the foreign ministers meeting a simplified version of Program A was 
leaked to New York Times columnist James Reston. The source of the leak was probably 
the Department of Defense, and the publication of its details caused panic among the 
French and British delegates in Paris that Washington was abandoning the London 
Program and nascent security pact. Program A was immediately officially ostracised by 
the Truman administration to minimise the potential harm it could cause to tripartite 
plans for a West German state.  Kennan’s vision of stimulating a “third force” of 
neutralised states in Central and Eastern Europe independent of both Washington and 
Moscow had finally and conclusively been put to rest.45  
  
The demise of Program A marked a more fundamental rejection by the Truman 
administration. Attempts to resolve Cold War differences in general through mediation 
with Moscow were for the moment defunct. An alternative course was chosen, to 
organise an American-led coalition of Western European nations including West 
Germany and to develop positions of unanswerable strength within the western bloc. 
Although primarily a defensive strategy, the development of “positions of strength” 
favoured by Truman, Acheson and Kennan’s successor as head of PPS Paul Nitze would 
inevitably deepen the divisions between the superpowers.46 One consequence of this 
course was that it invariably stimulated further entrenchment of Soviet control in Eastern 
Europe. This made the retraction of Soviet power in the east strategically unviable in the 
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short to medium term without recourse to war. Kennan correctly identified that the only 
feasible way of bridging the deepening gulf between Moscow and Washington was to 
return to the issue of German unification.  
 
Despite choosing an alternative course with the build-up of a western bloc, Washington 
did not reevaluate its aspiration to retract Soviet power from Eastern Europe by peaceful 
means. Even though this goal was all the more unfeasible in light of the militarisation of 
the Cold War in 1949, American policy papers retained the hope of “liberation” but 
tended to limit this to the “peaceful” diminishment of bloated Soviet influence. By 
retaining the aspiration to retract Soviet power, a window was left open for political 
warfare officials to stake their case to implement operations behind the iron curtain. But 
from the outset the strategic employment of political warfare remained in perpetual 
tension within the broader foreign policy of the Truman administration.  
 
U.S. Policy and the Moscow-Belgrade Dispute 
American policy-makers saw the dramatic deterioration of relations in early 1948 
between Stalin and Josip Broz Tito, the communist ruler of Yugoslavia, as an opportunity 
to exploit further divisions within the Soviet bloc. By coincidence the Tito-Stalin dispute 
occurred at the same time that NSC 10/2 was under consideration. Although 
unanticipated by the Truman administration, this presented an opening to link events on 
the ground with the newly established political warfare organisation.47  
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Tito’s break with the Soviet bloc was identified by the west and confirmed by a 
resolution passed by the convention of the Cominform in Bucharest late in June. The 
revelation exposed two embarrassing facts for Washington. Firstly, it had occurred in 
spite of American actions rather than as a result of them. Washington’s perception of a 
communist monolith discouraged any deviation of the Eastern European regimes from 
Moscow’s authority. They were faced with aloof hostility rather than a viable alternative 
source of support from the west. The Tito incident encouraged American officials to 
question the restrictiveness of this outlook.48 The rift also highlighted Washington’s 
present lack of a workable strategy to deal with this specific incident or its broader 
ramifications for the region. The approval of NSC 20/4’s generalised definition of 
American objectives was still months away. Its reactive case-by-case approach was 
clearly inadequate and lacked a broader strategic consideration of long-term goals.  
 
The majority of American officials including Kennan immediately regarded the rift as a 
significant factor that could potentially advance American interests.49 But opinions soon 
diverged over how best to exploit it in pursuit of wider American objectives. The CIA 
was downbeat about it significantly affecting the wider region. On 30 June Hillenkoetter 
advised Truman that “Tito’s recent example in defying the Cominform is not likely to be 
emulated in the immediate future by the other satellites.” As divisive as the rift might 
prove to the cohesion of the communist bloc, Russian military power and Yugoslavia’s 
unique position of relative independence meant that “the Communist Parties in the other 
Satellites are too vulnerable to Soviet force to risk a break with the Kremlin at this time.” 
The Agency felt that efforts to stimulate further rifts between Moscow and the Eastern 
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European governments would be futile because of the control exerted by other 
communist regimes and their loyalty to Moscow ensured by the intimidating presence of 
Soviet occupation garrisons.50  
 
Kennan took the lead in forging a contrary position. Until the rift precious few openings 
had presented themselves so it demanded that the United States do everything in its 
power to promote the further splintering of communist regimes from Moscow’s grasp. 
Just days after the rift came to light in western capitals Kennan produced PPS/35 in 
which he argued that the new situation “creates an entirely new problem of foreign policy 
for this Government.”51 Kennan seized upon the concept of fostering further deviationist 
“Titoist” regimes, in contrast to the CIA analysis. Although the authoritarian Yugoslav 
regime remained unpalatable, the prize of breaking up the Soviet bloc through internal 
stresses was enticing. Here, Kennan hoped, was the strategic opening through which the 
U.S. could contribute to the gradual retraction of Russian power in Eastern Europe. This 
was an attractive proposition and as a result the Yugoslav model was made the 
centerpiece of U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Kennan used 
his influence to affirm Washington’s encouragement of further “national Communist” 
governments in Eastern Europe as an interim step towards the longer-term aim to 
promote the emergence of democratic, non-communist regimes.  
 
Despite the Agency’s misgivings, PPS/35 was approved by undersecretary Lovett on 30 
June and by Secretary Marshall the following day. Its conclusions were instantly 
dispatched in a circular telegram to all U.S. diplomatic embassies and consular offices 
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abroad so that “representatives of this Government will exhibit a uniform reaction to the 
recent developments in Yugoslavia.”52 The paper was then circulated to the Council on 6 
July as NSC 18, just days after Kennan had produced the first draft, although the 
cumbersome NSC then took eight weeks to approve the conclusions of the Yugoslav 
paper.53  
 
Although US policy was officially defined by NSC 18 as the promotion of “Titoism,” the 
document itself offered little detail on what this encompassed beyond “guidance.” U.S. 
officials were instructed to act with circumspection in matters pertaining to Yugoslavia or 
the wider region, but the strategy to foster further “defections” amongst Eastern European 
communist leaders was not defined.  
 
A report drafted by the Planning Staff in August reiterated that Tito’s example should be 
exploited to disrupt Soviet control over the satellite regimes and advance their eventual 
independence from Moscow: 
The disaffection of Tito, to which the strain caused by the ERP problem 
undoubtedly contributed in some measure, has clearly demonstrated that it is 
possible for stresses in the Soviet-satellite relations to lead to a real 
weakening and disruption of the Russian domination.  
 
It should therefore be our aim to continue to do all in our power to increase 
these stresses and at the same time to make it possible for the satellite 
governments gradually to extricate themselves from Russian control and to 
find, if they so wish, acceptable forms of collaboration with the governments 
of the west.54  
 
Beyond general aims the American strategy to deal with the Tito regime and with other 
communist governments was uncertain. There was confusion in the U.S. Embassy in 
Belgrade, for instance, over whether American officials should initiate discussions with 
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the Yugoslav leader. If not, then what should be the response to any hypothetical 
approaches by the Yugoslav regime?55  
 
The initial application of NSC 18 was therefore problematic, but confusion over the U.S. 
position was not clarified by the formulation of a more detailed policy for nearly nine 
months. Furthermore, during this hiatus OPC was not consulted in relation to NSC 18 and 
the purported new policy of disrupting the Soviet-satellite relationship despite this 
seeming to fall within its operational jurisdiction. The need for a coordinated and swift 
approach gained urgency as the Yugoslav regime became increasingly isolated by 
retaliatory Cominform measures. Yet as the anti-Tito propaganda campaign and 
economic reprisals directed by Moscow intensified during the autumn and winter of 
1948, American policy was paralysed by strategic indecision.  
 
U.S. diplomatic representatives overseas desperately lobbied Washington in an effort to 
overcome its hesitancy, calling for more to be done in line with the policy set forth in 
NSC 18.  The American Chargé in Yugoslavia Robert Borden Reams had kept 
Washington fully apprised of developments at the height of the Tito-Stalin crisis.56 As 
the dust settled in the months that followed, Reams bombarded Washington with 
telegrams urging the State Department to kick American policy into life. On 31 August 
he insisted to Secretary Marshall that “[o]ur strategy should seek maximum exploitation 
increasing opportunities to widen [the] gulf between Yugoslavia and [the] USSR and [t
extend Tito’s influence among [the] Soviet satellites.” This new division, Reams 
reminded Marshall, “represents today the outstanding political possibility in [the] Soviet 
o] 
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sphere.”57 Two weeks later he exhorted the need for a “more active US policy toward 
Yugoslavia.” Tito’s regime had successfully defied the Kremlin for two and a half 
months, Reams argued, so “it would appear [that the] US should now discard [its] 
watchful waiting which has been [the] policy basis toward Yugoslavia and take some 
affirmative action.” He was backed up by the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Cave
Cannon who declared his desire “to break up the Soviet bloc” by playing “upon the fact 
that there was disunity in the Communist camp,” as well as by the Embassy’s political 
reporting officer William
ndish 
 K. Leonhart.58 
 
These views were consistent with the conclusions of NSC 18, but the calls for action had 
no immediate impact upon the bureaucracy in Washington. This was a renewed 
opportunity for the State Department to coordinate with OPC to initiate covert political 
warfare operations in Eastern Europe to exploit the Yugoslav situation. Even though 
Reams would not have been aware of OPCs existence, he came close to suggesting the 
type of activities that were within its field of expertise. Although it was too early to “seek 
political terms” with Tito,” he argued in mid-September, “[p]ossibilities do exist in 
informational and economic fields” to spread the message of Yugoslavia’s defiance of the 
Kremlin across the Soviet bloc.59 Yet according to John C. Campbell, the State 
Department officer in charge of Balkan affairs (and a future member of PPS), “it was 
terribly difficult to get anybody in Washington to move on this.” Instead of a dynamic 
response from the State Department, there “was just inertia.” Along with the CIA 
analysts, Charles Bohlen was particularly skeptical about the wider potential 
ramifications of the Tito-Stalin split. Bohlen cautioned that “thieves fall out. Okay, let’s 
 226
just keep an eye on it. It doesn’t concern us, and it’s not our business to get involved in it 
in any way or to predict how it’s going to go.”60  
 
The State Department’s sluggishness to respond was indicative of the continuing failure 
to develop a coherent strategy beyond the superficial policy advocated in NSC 18. 
Washington was eventually roused from its slumber, according to John Campbell, by “a 
famous telegram which the Embassy sent back saying, in effect, “How long is the 
Department going to sit around? Here we have the greatest heresy since Henry VIII, and 
Washington doesn’t seem to know it yet and to take account of it.””61 It was not until 
February 1949 that the administration even attempted to clarify official policy. PPS 
drafted a new policy paper, but even then it was limited to exploring economic 
measures.62  
 
Four days later the strategic problem of how the U.S. could gain “maximum advantage 
out of Tito’s deviation from Kremlin hegemony” was discussed at a State Department 
meeting. Yet beyond economic measures including loosening export-licensing controls to 
Yugoslavia, options were not explored even though Tito’s non-conformity was still 
considered a valuable “erosive and disintegrating force.”63 The revised version of the 
policy paper, adopted by the Council as NSC 18/2 on 17 February, propounded the merits 
of Titoism to disrupt Moscow’s control over Eastern Europe. But it still failed to divulge 
specific U.S. plans to harness this force in its interests, instead waxing lyrical on the 
merits of the principle of a pro-Tito stance: 
Much as we may dislike him, Tito is presently performing brilliantly in our 
interests in leading successfully and effectively the attack from within the 
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communist family on Soviet imperialism. Tito in being is perhaps our most 
precious asset in the struggle to contain and weaken Russian expansion. He 
must be allowed to prove on his own communist terms that an Eastern 
European country can secede from Moscow control and still succeed.64 
 
The State Department’s review of the economic aspects of NSC 18 coincided with a 
renewed attack on the feasibility of utilising the Tito template by the CIA. Having 
originally poured cold water on Kennan’s initial proposal in the immediate aftermath of 
the Tito-Stalin rift, the Agency released an estimate on the same day that Kennan drafted 
PPS/49 observing that “the Kremlin concurrently with its increased pressure on Tito, is 
taking measures to prevent a spread of “national” Communism into the remainder of the 
Satellite empire.” Therefore U.S. encouragement of further Titoists amongst the Eastern 
European regimes could undermine American objectives:  
Because its system of control is based upon unquestioning obedience to 
Moscow dictates, the Kremlin’s preoccupation with eliminating further 
sources of rebellion has resulted in an acceleration of plans to neutralize all 
satellite elements potentially hostile to the Soviet Union.65 
 
According to this analysis, Washington courtship of Tito might be inimical to its broader 
regional goals region as it might galvanise Moscow’s liquidation of nationalists and other 
opponents of Soviet power.  
 
Criticism of the strategic basis of the Titoist policy by the CIA did not deflect PPS 
however. In early March Ware Adams and John Paton Davies drafted a memorandum for 
Kennan in which they questioned “whether our national interest calls for any revision” of 
U.S. policy “at this stage.” Adams and Davies did not counsel a reevaluation of the 
Titoist policy. Instead they questioned the general emphasis of American policy on anti-
communism, a tendency that was both clumsy and detrimental to U.S. interests in their 
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opinion. According to their assessment it was “in spite of” American policies, “and 
remarkably so, that Tito has rebelled, and the Czechs are showing as much latent 
resistance as they are.” Washington’s depiction of a communist monolith had aided 
Stalin’s efforts to create and dominate a politico-ideological alliance in the east, while the 
Truman administration had failed to provide a viable alternative to Russian authority. 
“Our anti-communist policy” according to Adams and Davies, “is thus an increasingly 
great force in aid of the Kremlin’s desire to increase and solidify its monolith.”  
 
Adams and Davies disagreed with the CIA’s negative analyses of the prospects for 
nationalist communists to emerge as independent forces of the Kremlin. Their paper was 
a rallying cry borne out of their shared frustration with the U.S. representatives abroad at 
the lack of a clear policy and the failure thus far to foster further national communists. 
The PPS officials wondered whether “if we could put certain new refinements on our 
treatment of “Communism” it might provide an opportunity to “go to town” on the 
satellite and other communist areas outside Russia.”  
 
Two specific strategies were suggested by Adams and Davies. Firstly, the U.S. should 
encourage the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops “to and through” Germany and 
Austria, presumably along the lines of Program A. By doing this, “we would thus remove 
one of the major forces binding the satellites to the Soviet Union.” Weakening the Soviet 
military grip on Eastern Europe would allow Washington to “remove the other major 
political force binding the satellites to the Soviet Union.” Therefore American policies 
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must be redefined to distinguish anti-communism from “Russian imperialism,” to 
engender ideological divisions between Moscow and the satellite regimes.  
 
Adams and Davies did not explicitly refer to Tito, but he was the obvious role model for 
other regimes to emulate. The ideological offensive against Russian domination could be 
pursued primarily through a vigorous American psychological warfare campaign. The 
message of Russian imperialism, they believed, “would be a far keener weapon, much 
better designated to cut a satellite’s bonds with the U.S.S.R. rather than its bonds with 
us.” This would be far more effective “than is the blunderbuss of primitive “anti-
communism,” [aimed] against a vaguely defined, out of date, self-contradictory, and 
possibly dying, set of political theories.” Kennan apparently agreed with this sentiment, 
adding in pencil in the margin that the current “primitive anti-communism” actually 
splattered “buck-shot into the subjugated as well as the subjugator.”66 
 
The Spring 1949 Policy Debates  
Despite the divergent stances, these two negative assessments of American policy 
towards the Soviet bloc indicated the urgent need for a policy review. On 23 February, 
1949, the Planning Staff decided that a study of the situation in Eastern Europe should be 
conducted.  PPS summoned the chiefs of the European desks within the department as 
well as the ambassadors and ministers to Eastern Europe for a series of meetings held in 
Washington in March and early April. These consultations would explore any positive 
steps that the U.S. might take, and PPS was particularly keen to study measures to 
replicate Tito’s deviation from the Kremlin as he embodied Washington’s only 
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“foothold” in the region. The resulting recommendations were to then be submitted to the 
department and the NSC.67  
 
This indicates that the Washington consultations were not stimulated to address the CIA’s 
strategic concerns over current policy. Pressure from U.S. representatives on the ground 
may have prodded the PPS decision to undertake a policy review, along with the Adams-
Davies paper. It was also logical to extend the analysis of economic policy recently laid 
out in NSC 18/2 to incorporate a wider range of strategic themes. But the most likely 
stimulus for the review was bureaucratic rather than strategic. PPS aimed to preempt a 
new NSC Staff paper that was being prepared on the same subject. PPS could outflank 
this study prepared by the military-dominated NSC Staff with its own report and thereby 
retain overall control of policy formulation.  
 
The NSC Staff was prompted by the Department of Defense’s request for a more detailed 
definition of measures geared towards military responsibilities. The study on “Measures 
Required to Achieve U.S. Objectives with respect to the USSR” was conducted as a 
follow up to the general objectives that NSC 20/4 had laid out without broaching specific 
strategic details. The first draft of the NSC Staff report was completed on 11 January, 
1949, and was discussed by the NSC consultants six days later. Once again PPS 
demurred from committing to specific programmes of measures. Yet such an approach 
would have compelled the administration to clarify the strategic application of its 
policies. Instead the PPS consultant to the NSC George Butler objected to the draft 
report, just as Kennan had to Forrestal’s earlier paper NSC 20, on the grounds that it 
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“would lead to rigidity of U.S. position rather than to the flexibility of operations which 
is essential under present world conditions.” PPS did not attempt to prevent the report 
from being prepared on the understanding that the final paper would be disseminated 
“merely as a check list and not for implementation.”  
 
However, when the final document was released on 30 March, Kennan advised his 
seniors that it would be “dangerous” to give State Department approval to it. The 
Planning Staff was rattled by this external attempt to develop policy and resented the 
attempt to link the objectives in NSC 20/4 and NSC 18 to a specific set of measures. 
Kennan sent Marshall’s successor Dean Acheson and the new undersecretary James 
Webb two messages in early April stating his firm opposition to the paper.68 He then 
explained his position at a Departmental meeting on April 15 to ensure that the report 
would not be endorsed by his superiors. The military services, Kennan argued, seemed 
“unable to realize that in a field of foreign policy specific planning cannot be undertaken 
as they propose in the above paper.”  For this reason Kennan “had all along raised 
objection to this approach.” Now that NSC 20/4 had been approved “no further detailed 
programming was necessary or desirable.”  
 
On top of his objections to the nature of the paper, Kennan also opposed “its assumption 
that a war with Russia is necessary.” In contrast, State Department thinking was based on 
“the assumption that some modus vivendi was possible.”69 This was a reference to the 
PPS conception of peaceful means to promote American objectives, including the gradual 
fragmentation of Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe. Covert political warfare was 
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regarded as a vital component of the non-military armoury, although to date PPS had 
failed to integrate this methodology within its national policy statements. 
 
The NSC Staff report did not explicitly link OPC with a range of measures towards the 
Soviet bloc, although it referred to OPC’s work under NSC 10/2 in the section dealing 
with overt and wartime psychological warfare. Peacetime “covert” political warfare had 
been disembodied from the mainstream of strategic planning because of its high security 
classification within the government. Moreover, the NSC Staff concentrated on military 
planning and policies. Consequently, it largely paraphrased the generalised 
recommendations in NSC 20/4 pertaining to peacetime political and economic measures 
against the Soviet bloc and did not advance the strategic debate.  
 
The primary aim of U.S. policy in peacetime, according to the NSC Staff, was to foster 
“in all appropriate ways the political and economic unification of Europe.” The specific 
means of achieving this was not clarified. For instance the document advocated 
developing “internal dissension within the USSR and disagreements among the USSR 
and Soviet orbit nations” as well as the encouragement, development and support of 
“anti-Soviet activist organizations within the Soviet orbit.”70 But broad intentions were 
not translated into a specific strategy for OPC and other government agencies to 
implement. 
 
The assembly of the various regional specialists and representatives in Washington 
during March and April provided the forum for a comprehensive reevaluation of 
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American policy towards the Soviet bloc and the development of a strategic framework 
to tie together its goals.71 The breadth of participation also raised the prospect that policy 
would be better coordinated between the geographic desks and PPS in Washington and 
the U.S. Embassies and Missions in Soviet bloc countries. However, OPC was not 
represented at the discussions, so its input was not obtained and consideration of its role 
overlooked. Robert Joyce, the PPS liaison official to Wisner’s office, attended the final 
meeting on 1 April as well as the Planning Staff meetings related to the talks. Although 
Joyce presumably relayed some of the major themes and issues emanating from 
consultations back to Wisner, beyond this OPC was excluded.  
 
As an external agency it was logical that OPC did not participate in State Department 
discussions. More problematic was the fact that many of the desk hands and U.S. 
representatives abroad were excluded from access to OPC. Its compartmentalised and 
secretive existence within the administration therefore prevented OPC’s participation. 
Furthermore, PPS regarded OPC as its “instrument” to conduct State Department policy 
and therefore OPC’s opinion was considered superfluous at these policy meetings. But 
OPC’s exclusion underscored the failure to fully integrate political warfare into its 
strategic thinking on the policy level.  
 
Nevertheless, the Washington consultations were a genuine chance for the State 
Department to develop a strategy to pursue U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Yet at their conclusion little advance had been made on previous PPS and 
NSC policy statements. At the first meeting on 1 March, Kennan explained to the group 
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that U.S. policies over the past two years had focused on ERP and the objective “to help 
save Western Europe from communism.” Now that this “has been achieved to a great 
extent,” Washington’s aim should be “to obtain the retraction of Soviet power from 
Eastern Europe.” If this could be achieved then “war should not be necessary.”  
 
This correlated with the goals in NSC 20/4 but there were promising indications that the 
consultants would expand on the general aims expressed in that document. Kennan 
explained that the new study would comprise an individual and collective examination of 
the Eastern European countries. This would more effectively “determine what we can do 
to bring about the retraction of Soviet power from that area.” In particular, Kennan 
believed that the group assembled before him would be able “to determine what are the 
weak spots on which to hammer relentlessly” as well as to confirm “whether we want in 
the first instance some form of Titoism.” Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith endorsed the 
interim Titoist policy encapsulated in PPS/35 and NSC 18. The Kremlin’s leaders, he 
informed the meeting, “fear Titoism above everything else.” Echoing the Adams-Davies 
memorandum, Smith argued that Washington, on the other hand, should “not fear 
communism if it is not controlled by Moscow and not committed to aggression.”72  
 
Kennan’s call for a methodical examination of the individual satellite countries came at 
the same time that he was attempting to revitalise Program A. In his view, the successful 
outcome of that initiative and the withdrawal eastwards of Soviet troops would foster the 
conditions with which he hoped interim national communist or even independence 
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movements could flourish in Eastern Europe. The demise of Program A would, on the 
other hand, leave the gambit of national communism stranded.  
 
Yet it was plain by spring 1949 that the Truman administration was committed to the 
alternative course of German partition and a Western European military alliance. This 
route would inevitably harden the Soviet resolve to dominate Eastern Europe, negating 
the prospects of national communism. The broad “Titoist” policy was not replaced during 
the Washington consultations with a more specific and viable strategy that reflected the 
stark reality of Soviet intolerance of independent regional forces. The Eastern European 
ambassadors and division chiefs also ignored the Agency’s pessimistic assessments of the 
viability of fostering national communism. Following three meetings in March, the 
national communist policy continued to be endorsed at the final meeting on 1 April.73 
Kennan remained its keenest proponent, claiming that “Titoism as a disintegrating force 
in the Kremlin monolith should be stimulated and encouraged.”  
 
Although some operational ideas were raised at the Washington policy talks, no policy 
statements were produced at their conclusion clarifying U.S. strategy towards the Soviet 
bloc.74 Just one month after the consultations, the continued strategic vacuum was 
highlighted when Undersecretary Webb requested that PPS explore “a more active policy 
toward the satellites.”75 Despite this, the Planning Staff continued to resist the efforts of 
the Department of Defense to clarify policy through development of the NSC Staff paper. 
Ironically Kennan solicited Webb’s support, despite his own call for policy clarification, 
 236
and the undersecretary in turn approached Souers in the NSC to ensure that the NSC Staff 
paper did not gain leverage within the administration.76  
 
The Development of Soviet Bloc Policy, June-December 1949 
Having opposed the production of a policy statement by the NSC Staff, under Webb’s 
prompting PPS was obliged to supply the administration with an alternative State 
Department paper. Kennan once again found himself cornered in having to meet the 
administration’s need for a clarification of its policies. Yet it took the Planning Staff 
several months following the Washington consultations to submit a report. This delay 
allowed strategic uncertainties and ambiguities to persist in its dealings with the Soviet 
bloc in the meantime.  
 
By mid-1949 PPS began to develop fresh policy papers. Kennan’s role was now 
diminishing following the rejection of Program A. He recognised that isolated political 
warfare operations would be futile without simultaneous diplomatic settlements with 
Moscow. Kennan’s efforts to foster a viable strategy to overcome east-west divisions 
receded as his despondency over the militarisation of the Cold War increased. In the 
autumn of 1949 he stepped down as director of PPS and was formally succeeded by his 
deputy Paul Nitze at the beginning of 1950. Although Secretary Acheson nominally 
promoted Kennan to the position of State Department Counselor, the transfer reflected 
his alienation from the mainstream of departmental policy-making and his shift towards a 
career away from Washington.77  
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The personnel gap created by Kennan’s decline was immediately filled by his colleagues 
in the Planning Staff. But the strategic gap in U.S. policies was not so easily addressed. In 
mid-1949 Kennan assigned John Paton Davies “the task of thinking up some brave new 
approach to the question of what we do about Eastern Europe.” According to John C. 
Campbell, “the basic reason for […] the initiative, came from the fact that the Marshall 
plan seemed to be a fruitful idea for Western Europe, but for various reasons we had been 
unable to extend it to Eastern Europe.” This was the crux of the problem as the “Russians 
had prevented the East European countries from taking part” and this raised the dilemma 
that “what we were doing through the Marshall plan was really helping to freeze the 
division of Europe and did not help the situation at all in Eastern Europe.”78 
 
The first paper submitted was not a direct response to this request and was drafted by 
Robert Joyce rather than Davies.79 On 29 June, Joyce submitted a report on “Policy 
relating to Defection and Defectors from Soviet Power.” PPS/54 did not address the 
strategic dilemma of how to link U.S. policies in Western and Eastern Europe through a 
broad range of political warfare operations. Instead it was a tactical report on a specific 
operational field. Joyce believed the best sources of accurate information on the Soviet 
bloc available to the United States could be provided by defectors, particularly from the 
Soviet elite. He called for the systematic exploitation of this source of intelligence from 
government and communist party members, military and intelligence officers, technicians 
and other professionals seeking exile from Eastern Europe and the USSR. Joyce also 
linked PPS’s efforts to organise émigrés to be put to work on American psychological 
warfare operations against the Kremlin with a defector programme. According to Joyce 
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defectors would be amongst the best qualified for this role, to explode the myth of 
communist propaganda and to reveal the true conditions of life within the communist 
bloc.80   
 
Still in position at this time, Kennan endorsed PPS/54’s recommendations when he 
forwarded it to Acheson and Webb two weeks later. He urged that the State Department 
ensure that safe haven in the United States was provided to the maximum number of 
“bona fide escapees, defectors and deserters” from the Soviet bloc as possible. These 
political exiles should be mobilised to advance U.S. propaganda efforts and to enhance 
the administration’s knowledge and understanding of the Soviet world. “In Washington,” 
Kennan explained, “the Department of State should coordinate the position of the 
Government in important cases with a view to obtaining from them the maximum 
advantage in the fields of intelligence information and psychological exploitation.”81 
 
A broader policy report took shape within PPS in June than the “micro” defector paper. 
At a meeting of the Planning Staff on 2 June, the first draft of PPS/59 “U.S. Policy 
toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe” was discussed. This paper was 
prepared primarily by Joyce and Davies within PPS over the summer, in light of the 
Washington consultations back in March and April.82 On 24 August PPS met and agreed 
on a final draft that was submitted Webb two days later with the recommendation that it 




According to Joyce and Davies, the primary purpose of PPS/59 was to tackle one of the 
major problems facing U.S. strategists in mid-1949. This was to define a clear link 
between methods and the chief objective “to reduce and eventually to cause the 
elimination of dominant Soviet influence” in Eastern Europe. This general aim approved 
under NSC 20/4 nine months earlier was still not accompanied by a precise strategic plan 
akin to the administration’s approach to Western Europe. Although PPS/59 described the 
complex factors that limited US influence in the region, hinting at the earlier misgivings 
expressed by Adams and Davies over the efficacy of current US policies, it continued to 
evade the persistent challenge of identifying a feasible methodology for its policy.84  
 
PPS/59 acknowledged that the Yugoslav-Soviet rift was heavily influenced by the 
internal characteristics of the Tito regime. This tallied with attitudes long held by CIA 
analysts, although these opinions had not filtered into PPS/35 or NSC 18. Joyce and 
Davies now agreed with previous Agency estimates that identified the connection 
between Yugoslavia’s ability to exercise independence from Moscow and the specific 
nature of Tito’s domestic political power. According to PPS/59 several factors peculiar to 
Yugoslavia converged to enable the regime’s defiance of Moscow- the Yugoslav 
Communist Party was largely Tito’s personal creation, the country had not been occupied 
by the Red Army at the end of World War Two and from its inception the regime had 
successfully resisted widespread penetration by Stalinist agents.  
 
PPS/59 therefore accepted that unique circumstances in Yugoslavia explained why Tito 
was able to exercise an independent path from the Kremlin. It also recognised that such 
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“[c]onditions do not now exist in the satellite states which would permit them promptly to 
follow the pattern of Yugoslavia.”85 Yet the paper did not explicitly reject the notion of 
nurturing national communism. The absence of requisite conditions in any other Eastern 
European country seemed to render promoting further national communists invalid. Yet 
according to one Planning Staff colleague, PPS/59 was “merely a codification” of the 
existing Yugoslav policy and an attempt to apply it more generally to the rest of the 
Soviet bloc.86   
 
Joyce and Davies argued in language reminiscent of NSC 7 that “the time is ripe for us to 
place greater emphasis on the offensive.” Primarily this “offensive” should entail 
encouraging more “schismatic communist regimes” to emerge in the Titoist mould, no 
matter how “weak” the “grounds” for such a policy “may now appear.” Washington 
could contribute to the “heretical drifting away process,” according to PPS/59, without 
being “directly involved in engaging Soviet prestige.” This was crucial because 
infringing vital Soviet interests would almost certainly precipitate a military 
confrontation. The Truman administration was committed to avoiding a direct military 
conflict with Moscow unless its own vital interests and national security were threatened.  
 
Joyce and Davies were fishing for a Soviet bloc strategy but no convincing options took 
the bait. This resulted in illogical policy recommendations within PPS/59. It was admitted 
that promoting non-Stalinist communist regimes was “the only practical immediate 
expedient” open to U.S. strategists. The ultimate goal of fostering independent, 
democratic governments in Eastern Europe was therefore even less credible. But the 
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Planning Staff settled on the Titoist middle course riddled with flaws and contradictions 
despite warning that the promotion of heretical communism risked endangering the 
fundamental long term goal of fostering non-communist regimes. Given that neither 
course was realistic in practice, this theoretical concern actually mattered little.87 
Projecting national communism or anti-communism beyond Yugoslavia was not viable 
and PPS/59 contained numerous counter-arguments delegitimising the validity of this 
“strategy.” It was evident that Stalin would not tolerate nationalist communists who 
defied his supreme authority any more than he would accept anti-communists in his 
backyard. CIA analysts had long since debunked this notion. The latest round of purges 
in the satellite countries made it plain that developing any modicum of independence was 
infeasible without resort to war.88  
 
The flawed national communist policy barely papered over the strategic vacuum. 
Moreover, specific measures continued to be evaded. Instead the Planning Staff described 
U.S. activities in general terms. Washington should aim to bring about the withdrawal of 
Russian and American occupation forces from the European continent to remove one 
crucial lever of control exercised by the Kremlin over the satellite governments. 
Notwithstanding the hope that settlements over Germany and Austria could be reached, 
there was little Washington could do to influence the Red Army’s retraction from 
Germany and Eastern Europe. With the demise of Program A and Washington’s decision 
to proceed with the North Atlantic Treaty, the prospects for a negotiated settlement in 
Central Europe were as distant as ever.  
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PPS/59 also called for the US “to attack the weaknesses in the Stalinist penetration of 
satellite governments and mass organizations” even though it conceded that “this will be 
no easy task.” The “employment of “conventional political, economic and propaganda 
measures” would have to be “heavily” supplemented by the “weapons in the armory of 
clandestine operations” in order to “attain full effectiveness.” The Planning Staff 
recommended that covert operators should “unremittingly” focus their “attack” on “the 
ideological front, specifically directed at the Stalinist dogma of satellite dependence upon 
and subservience to the U.S.S.R.” Despite this emphasis on covert psychological and 
political warfare, Joyce and Davies betrayed the impotence of these methods in practice, 
for it was “probably in the economic realm that we can most concretely make our 
influence felt” rather than through any subversive methods. 
 
As with the other reports drafted in Washington, PPS/59 was of little practical use to 
OPC in the field. The document sent out a muddled message. OPC’s operations must be 
strategically aimed towards supporting certain types of nationalist communists over 
Stalinist groups, rather than to non-communists and anti-communists. The methods by 
which to wage this campaign were only vaguely described in the broadest terms. 
Although the dissemination of propaganda promoting the virtues of nationalism in the 
satellites was well within OPC’s capabilities, PPS/59 did not explain how this could be 
done without arousing nationalist sentiment of an anti-communist character. Of course, 
there was no practical way of restricting the effects of American-sponsored psychological 
warfare operations on the ground in these countries from the other side of the iron 
curtain.  
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The stricture that national communists rather than anti-communists should be promoted 
was not written into PPS/59 because it was strategically viable. It actually reflected the 
negative prerogative that Russian vital interests must not be threatened by U.S. actions to 
avoid provoking war with the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe’s independence. After 
all, PPS/59 described the region as being “of secondary importance on the European 
scene.”89 The national communist policy therefore opened up two strategic cul-de-sacs. 
In the unlikely event that “heretical” communists managed to organise a cogent political 
movement in an Eastern European nation, Washington was not prepared to step in with 
military support to protect it from the certain Soviet backlash. Washington would also not 
intervene if a popular anti-communist rebellion rose up against a satellite regime because 
to do so would again engage Soviet “prestige” which would almost certainly spiral into a 
direct military conflict. American policy, in other words, was facing a dead end. Both 
types of movement would inevitably be crushed by the Red Army, as was demonstrated 
to devastating effect in the coming decades in East Germany, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia.    
 
Despite its flaws, the substance of PPS/59’s conclusions and recommendations survived 
the debating and redrafting process. John Campbell recollected that during its preparation 
some “really rather extensive and sometimes bitter arguments” broke out between PPS 
and officials from the geographic desks over its promotion of nationalist communist 
groups. Sections of the State Department objected to a policy “that seemed to accept that 
Communism was okay for Eastern Europe, basically.” This was fundamentally a dispute 
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over the “morality” of the U.S. approach that did not call into question its strategic 
viability. Thus the core “strategy” survived in the absence of compelling alternatives.90  
With the demise of Program A and the determination of senior figures like Acheson and 
Nitze to only negotiate from “positions of strength,” there was a serious absence of 
feasible options towards the Soviet bloc. The State Department therefore clung to the 
pretense that the U.S. could influence regional developments behind the iron curtain 
through measures short of war. In reality this simply facilitated the pursuit of other 
priorities, especially the consolidation of political, economic and military strength in 
Western Europe.  
 
The London Conference of U.S. Ministers to Eastern Europe 
Although the wider administration generally concurred with PPS/59’s conclusions, the 
central concept to promote the Yugoslav model elsewhere in Eastern Europe was only 
tenuously accepted. The new statement of Soviet bloc policy was examined at a three day 
conference in London in late October of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission to Eastern Europe. 
This conference was convened at the suggestion of Truman in May that the Eastern 
European Chiefs of Mission should periodically meet to discuss and develop policies.91 It 
also provided an opportunity for the regional representatives to follow up on the 
Washington consultations now that a policy statement had been drafted by PPS.  
 
The group of ministers “unanimously” agreed with the gold standard that “Tito’s 
defection has created a schism in the communist world that should be exploited.” 
Yugoslavia’s current status “represents a fundamental challenge to Moscow’s control of 
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the world communist movement.” Furthermore, because Tito’s “defection” raised the 
“basic issue of nationalism” his example could challenge “the Kremlin’s control and 
discipline within the world communist apparatus.”  
 
When this issue was directly related to the “question of whether the Titoist movement 
would spread to other satellites” the expectations of the ministers was considerably less 
positive. There was “general agreement” among the participants that “because of 
geographic and other factors, including the presence of the Red Army and the lack of any 
organized opposition, there was no prospect at this juncture of a successful attempt to 
emulate Tito’s action.” The effort to “keep Tito afloat” was vital in terms of perpetuating 
the Moscow-Belgrade schism and to divert the Kremlin’s presumed expansionist energies 
away from Western Europe, but there was believed to be little potential of driving a 
wedge between Moscow and the other regimes in Eastern Europe.  
 
The ministers did not explicitly reject the central “strategy” now embodied in NSC 58 to 
foster further national communist movements outside Yugoslavia. Tellingly, however, 
the London conferees stressed the fundamental importance of devising a strategy to 
facilitate NSC 58’s conclusions. For the ministers, “the execution of the tactical plans” 
that would embody the substance of the generalised policy statement was “of the greatest 
importance.” This “tactical” approach required the State Department to begin “carefully” 
planning specific programmes of operations “with the maximum practicable 
coordination” with the missions “in the field” in Eastern Europe. The “most readily 
available weapons” envisaged at the London Conference included “economic pressures” 
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against the Soviet bloc countries, alongside the “proper use” of VOA and “possibly other 
informational media.” The representatives counseled that “tactical planning and 
implementation of such plans as are developed are a matter of great urgency and should 
be receiving the immediate attention of the appropriate elements of the U.S. 
Government.”92  
 
The London Conference highlighted that OPC’s role in the region was not being 
considered on a department-wide basis. Although security requirements dictated that the 
utmost secrecy should surround the organisation, OPC’s unique capabilities and mandate 
allowed it to conduct operations behind the iron curtain with far greater flexibility than 
any other government agency. Furthermore, OPC was specifically charged to develop the 
types of operation that had been touched upon by the Eastern European ministers- namely 
psychological, political and economic warfare activities. By calling for the initiation of 
coordinated tactical planning between the State Department and the field missions, the 
London Conferees demonstrated that OPC was at the very least not being coordinated 
with the official American missions in Eastern Europe.  
 
The strategic implications exposed by the London Conference were just as significant as 
the lack of organisational coordination. The appeal by the regional representatives for 
urgent tactical planning highlighted the continued absence of a strategic framework 
behind departmental policy statements. Responsibility for the development of policy 
tended to be delegated by senior departmental officials to PPS, but the Planning Staff had 
consistently shied away from detailed and specific planning within its policy papers. PPS 
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had successfully stifled calls from outside the department to link broad objectives with 
more definite methods in order to retain its control over policy. This had also covered up 
the fact that “peaceful” methods were totally inadequate to achieve the stated goals. 
However, this time the call for tactical planning beyond broad intentions came from 
within the Department of State.  
 
Despite the lack of a strategic basis for U.S. policy, when NSC 58 was disseminated 
among the Council members for consideration the State Department released two further 
reports focusing exclusively on Yugoslavia. These papers emphasised the short term 
“micro” goal of supporting Tito’s survival against Soviet and Cominform subversive 
pressures, without abandoning the concept of Titoism spreading throughout the Soviet 
“empire.” The first of these papers, released on 1 September, argued that Titoism should 
be preserved as “an erosive and disintegrating force within the Russian power sphere” in 
order that the United States could “extract the maximum political advantage from this 
quarrel within the communist family” without divulging any U.S. actions to support this. 
PPS/60, completed 10 days later, reiterated that the current Yugoslav regime embodied a 
“profound rift in the Kremlin control of international communism.” An “Information 
Memorandum” released by State’s Office of Public Affairs also declared that “the gloves 
are off in the conflict” between Moscow and Belgrade. This was “extremely important 
from the standpoint of world politics and communist ideology” in establishing “a position 
of equality for all communist states rather than deference to the decisions of Moscow.” 
Yet according to the State Department the longer term aim for Yugoslavia to emerge as 
an independent, democratic and Western-leaning state was “not realizable at this time.”93  
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Extending American support to Tito’s regime was firmer strategic ground than the 
broader pursuit of region-wide nationalism by communist “heretics” as called for in NSC 
58. But the release of specific reports at this time on the Yugoslav case diverted attention 
from more fundamental strategic concerns raised by the broader policy document. This 
effect was demonstrated at a meeting in Paris of the U.S. ambassadors to Western Europe 
held days before the London Conference of Eastern European ministers. While the well-
worn theme of the importance of Yugoslavia’s independent course from the Soviet Union 
was emphatically endorsed, the ambassadors did not review the policy of promoting 
region-wide Titoism. Now Minister to the Embassy in France, Charles Bohlen declared 
that despite the distasteful moral character of the Yugoslav regime, the “Tito heresy was 
the most important recent development, striking at the very roots of Kremlin domination, 
and may prove to be the deciding factor in the cold war.”94 Harriman concurred, adding 
that “victory or defeat of Tito may be our victory or defeat in the cold war.” The 
ambassadors did not explicitly question whether the Yugoslav model should form the 
basis of the broader regional policy contained in NSC 58 but appeared to tacitly concur.95  
 
The military also threw its support behind the principle of supporting Titoism in its 
response to PPS/60 rather than NSC/58. The Yugoslav paper was disseminated among 
Council members as NSC 18/3 in early November. In its response the JCS reported that 
they “fully concur” with the conclusions of that paper that “it is in the important interests 
of the West that Tito maintain his resistance.” The JCS anticipated that “security 
advantages to the United States” might accrue from this divisive situation. These 
advantages would develop, according to the JCS, “especially if Tito’s example gives 
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impetus to defections by other satellite states.” In short the JCS hoped that the Tito 
phenomenon would have a broader impact on Eastern Europe, a similar sentiment to that 
expressed in NSC 58: 
Yugoslav success in opposing Soviet domination could, in fact, present 
opportunities which the United States might capitalize on to attain certain of 
its national objectives as set forth in NSC20/4. 
 
For this reason “from the military point of view” the provision of economic and military 
aid to Yugoslavia to support its independent existence “short of participation” was 
deemed as sound. It was not the place of the military to suggest methods by which the US 
could foster further “defections” among the satellites in peacetime, and none were 
forthcoming.96  
 
No basic analysis of the strategic feasibility of promoting nationalism among the 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe as an interim stage in their de-communisation was 
adequately undertaken during the drafting of NSC 58 or NSC 18/3. The final version of 
the Yugoslav paper, approved as NSC 18/4 by President Truman on 18 November, 
focused on likely aggressive Soviet courses of action to undermine Yugoslavia in the 
near future. Little attention was drawn to the positive role that Washington could play in 
the wider region as emphasised in NSC 58.97  
 
The latest redraft of NSC 58 by the NSC Staff was discussed at a PPS meeting one week 
before the final statement was approved by the Council. Paul Nitze emphasised aspects of 
the paper, particularly concerning economic policy, that could confidently be pursued by 
Washington. But Nitze was puzzled about the overall strategy, expressing “some doubt 
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about the emphasis on covert activities, preferring to place our emphasis on the 
ideological factor.”98 This confusion indicated the prevailing lack of a clear and unified 
vision within PPS and the wider administration regarding how the undefined political 
warfare programme would bring about NSC 58’s interim and longer term objectives. 
Alongside the muddled policy and despite his growing alienation, Kennan continued to 
reject the calls for the State Department to define basic U.S. objectives linked to a 
detailed framework of methods.99 Both the design and application of Soviet bloc policy 
was in disarray.   
 
Although the State Department was unable to resolve the strategic flaws of the national 
communist policy, CIA again succinctly rejected its basic premise while NSC 58 was still 
being redrafted. A memo drafted on 7 November under the title “Satellite Relations with 
the USSR and the West” explicitly dismissed State’s suggestion that other regimes in 
Eastern Europe might follow the Yugoslav pattern. Whether or not this conclusion 
reached senior officials in the State Department or the NSC Staff, its nuanced estimation 
of the political situation behind the iron curtain made no impact on the flawed policy 
conclusions contained in NSC 58.  
 
The Agency continued to advise that the “separation of any Cominform Satellite from the 
Soviet orbit is unlikely under present conditions.” Circumstances “comparable to those 
which enabled Tito successfully to challenge Soviet domination in Yugoslavia do not 
exist in the other Satellites.” On top of this, Moscow’s resort to “drastic remedial 
measures” and the firm control of the satellite regimes “eliminate the possibility that any 
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Satellite in the near future can be separated from the Soviet Union by measures short of 
war.” The CIA accepted the notion that the seeds of nationalist discontent bore the 
greatest potential over the long term for driving out Soviet and communist domination. 
But the short term prospects for developing independent movements within the 
communist bloc were accurately assessed as extremely bleak.100  The logical conclusion 
from this was that the national communist strategy must be abandoned. Yet consideration 
of this did not even filter into the drafting of NSC 58 because it cut against the grain of 
State Department policy.  
 
The Planning Staff was not entirely oblivious to the cracks that were beginning to show 
in the developing policy statement. John Davies, who had vented his frustration over the 
lack of success of the national communist policy to Kennan in March 1949, penned 
another memorandum in October raising the alarm over several inadequacies, as he saw 
them, of U.S. operations targeting the Soviet bloc. In this paper Davies distanced himself 
from the interim national communist policy advocated by Kennan, without attempting to 
define an alternative strategic framework in its place. Instead he explored broad aspects 
of a U.S. strategy aimed at generally weakening the Kremlin’s control over its own 
population, and by extension the peoples of Eastern Europe. Washington should 
concentrate on undermining Moscow by harnessing the most powerful resource available 
to it in the region, the popular nationalist sentiment that was invariably anti-communist in 
character. Implicit in this message was that Kennan’s “middle course” of encouraging 
interim communist regimes acting independently of the Kremlin was neither desirable 
nor viable. 
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Davies argued that the Soviet imposition of the “iron curtain” and its “massive jamming” 
of VOA broadcasts evidenced the extent to which the rulers in the Kremlin feared the 
revolutionary potential of their own people. In two respects, Davies added emphatically, 
the United States “have thus far been delinquent in exploiting this Soviet vulnerability.” 
In terms of its peacetime activities Washington had failed to deliver an effective 
propaganda offensive against the Soviet Union. A “Russian non-returnee organization in 
Europe” should be established to act as a cover for psychological warfare operations 
against Moscow. The U.S. could then mobilise its energies towards the large-scale 
production and dissemination of anti-government propaganda leaflets “almost daily over 
the eastern portion of the U.S.S.R. by means of meteorological balloon.” This 
propaganda barrage would serve several purposes, according to Davies. It would 
supplement VOA broadcasts in “bolder and blunter tones,” vulnerable as they were to 
Soviet jamming. It would also engage and divert the Soviet security apparatus into the 
“highly uneconomic activity of collecting small pieces of paper throughout Russia west 
of the Urals.” It would also intensify the “prevalent atmosphere” of “domestic suspicion 
and mutual denunciation” within the Soviet Union. 
 
The suggestions made by Davies for peacetime measures were hardly radical in the 
context of the early cold war. In fact, they constituted the minimum of what PPS had 
been calling for over the last year in terms of expanding the psychological warfare 
campaign. Therefore this memo was significant not so much for what it proposed, but 
because Davies felt compelled to draw attention to the inadequacies of current U.S. 
policies and operations. This indicated that fissures were growing over the national 
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communist strategy, particularly because it was failing to deliver results and was 
generating considerable confusion within the administration over what operations the 
United States should actually conduct in Eastern Europe. 
 
This confusion primarily stemmed from the central dilemma of whether to endorse a 
strategy of liberation in Eastern Europe with all of the ramifications that this invoked. 
Alternatively should the United States settle for a more limited and arguably less 
effective middle course that ruled out provocative methods? In his October 1949 
memorandum Davies did not advocate a revolutionary policy during times of peace. He 
did however come fairly close to endorsing this by recommending the highly visible 
peacetime organisation of a U.S. capability to stimulate civil war in Russia should 
hostilities break out. Washington should establish “the nuclei of organized revolt in the 
event of a war.” Davies maintained that this “would seem to be relatively simple” and 
was something that had been “anticipated in the drafting of NSC 10/2.” The U.S. “should 
overtly enlist numerous small cadres from anti-Soviet elements” who could be “openly 
trained as airborne and parachute guerrilla units and foci of organized revolt.”  
 
Although these émigré units would be strictly limited to wartime use, their employment 
and training would serve U.S. peacetime objectives by acting as a deterrent to Soviet 
aggression. They would convey “the clear implication,” Davies explained, “that in the 
event of war they would be introduced into the interior of Russia for purposes of 
organizing civil war.” So long as the Soviet Union retained a totalitarian political system 
Davies felt that “such units may represent a closer approximation the absolute weapon 
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than the atomic bomb.” The Kremlin’s fear of indigenous uprisings was so intense that 
wielding the threat of revolution in peacetime might restrain the Kremlin from rash 
foreign policy adventures. The conspicuous organisation of émigré groups to stimulate 
civil war could be “the strongest insurance we can buy against overt Soviet 
aggression.”101 
 
The Adoption of NSC 58/2 
On 8 December, 1949, the NSC finally adopted a policy statement on the Soviet bloc. 
Despite the lengthy wait for its production, the new policy did not resolve the emerging 
administrative fissures over the developing policy’s strategic flaws. Instead NSC 58/2 
papered over the cracks, striking an ineffective compromise between advocating the 
overthrow of communist regimes and non-intervention in Eastern Europe.  
 
The middle course set out by NSC 58/2 retained the long term goal of developing 
“independent non-totalitarian and non-communist governments willing to accommodate 
themselves to, and participate in, the free world community.” Due to the realities of 
Soviet and communist power in the region, however, practical expediency dictated that 
the United States pursue the interim goal of installing temporary national communists 
behind the iron curtain. This therefore marked a shift from NSC 20/4 that had failed to 
distinguish between the removal of Soviet and communist power. The new approach 
would ostensibly allow Washington to move beyond the “defensive accomplishments” of 
the “containment” strategies in Western Europe. The NSC accepted that the “time is now 
ripe for us to place greater emphasis on the offensive to consider whether we cannot do 
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more to cause the elimination or at least a reduction of predominant Soviet influence in 
the satellite states of Eastern Europe.” In particular Washington should concentrate its 
energies on undermining the Soviet-satellite relationship now that Western European 
recovery and stability was relatively secure.   
 
The central question remained how to achieve the objectives set out in NSC 58/2 and 
what the “offensive” would specifically comprise. The document rejected recourse to a 
direct conflict “if for no other reason, because it is organically not feasible for this 
Government to initiate a policy of creating a war.” Of greater significance in reality, 
Washington deemed the region to be “of secondary importance on the European scene.” 
Advancing Eastern Europe’s self-determination was not a geopolitical priority so 
American policymakers would only commit limited methods and resources to this end. A 
direct conflict with the Soviet Union to secure the region’s independence was out of the 
question, especially since Moscow’s acquisition of the atomic bomb.102  
 
The explicit rejection of war as a means of liberating Eastern Europe was important for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it raised the fundamental question of whether U.S. objectives 
for the region could be achieved in the foreseeable future without recourse to military 
conflict. If U.S. goals as they stood were peaceably unrealisable then a dramatic 
reassessment of these aims was required. Furthermore, the explicit rejection of force of 
arms intrinsically restrained the methods Washington could pursue short of war. 
Operations would have to be limited to avoid provoking the Kremlin and sparking a 
major crisis.  
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This implicitly pushed American policy towards non-intervention. But this was 
ideologically repellant to American policy makers at the outset of the Cold War. On the 
domestic political level it would potentially be extremely damaging to adopt an explicit 
course of non-intervention acknowledging American impotence in Eastern Europe. At the 
dawn of the McCarthy era, and following the bruising attack on the administration 
following the perceived “loss” of China to Mao’s communist forces, the government 
could ill-afford another foreign policy hit on the domestic front. The Republicans were 
determined to capitalise on Truman’s growing unpopularity in foreign affairs, particularly 
because the GOP believed that Thomas Dewey partly failed in his presidential bid by 
pulling his punches on foreign policy. 
 
The administration was therefore in a bind over Eastern Europe. Faced with the 
unacceptable alternatives of war or negotiations, NSC 58/2 persisted with an unrealistic 
compromise policy to foster national communists in Eastern Europe as a temporary 
step.103 The policy was indecisive, reflecting growing disquiet within sections of the 
administration over the credibility of the national communist strategy balanced against 
the lack of suitable alternatives. Doubts over the broader prospects for national 
communism were even expressed in NSC 58/2. It was admitted, for instance, that 
conditions “do not now exist in the satellite states which would permit them promptly to 
follow the pattern of Yugoslavia.” Despite the lack of requisite conditions, confusingly it 
was suggested that if “we are willing that, as a first step, schismatic communist regimes 
supplant the present Stalinist governments, we stand a much better chance of success.” It 
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was unclear how such regimes could prevail when it was also accepted that the conditions 
for their emergence did not exist.  
 
The paper marked an improvement on previous policy statements because it did explore 
“specific” aims that could foster conditions akin to those in Yugoslavia. This included the 
elimination of “all forms of Soviet intimidation,” the isolation of “Stalinists from the 
nationalist elements” of the communist parties and criticism of the Stalinist dogma of 
“satellite subservience to the USSR” by encouraging nationalism. Washington should do 
“what it can practically, particularly through covert operations and propaganda.” But 
again NSC 58/2 contradicted itself. Political and psychological warfare should 
simultaneously be employed “to keep alive the anti-communist sentiment and hope” of 
non-communists within the satellites, as well as bolstering nationalist communist 
elements, according to the report’s conclusions. 
 
NSC 58/2 was an imaginative document, but it was not grounded in practical realism. For 
instance, it left unclear how national communist regimes, should they emerge, could 
avoid incurring the wrath of the Kremlin. The U.S. rejection of war ruled out militarily 
deterring Soviet reprisals.  NSC 58/2 fancifully envisaged the gradual emergence of two 
opposing communist blocs stimulated by the American policy to foster “a heretical 
drifting-away process on the part of the satellite states.” This was described as the “more 
feasible course” that might lead to the growth of “a Stalinist group and a non-conformist 
faction” rather than openly non-communist regimes. Hypothetically these “schismatic” 
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communist governments would evolve over the longer-term into democratic western-
oriented.104      
 
The middle course endorsed by NSC 58/2 led to a muddled and confused strategy. With 
the simultaneous promotion of national communists regimes and popular anti-communist 
movements behind the iron curtain it endorsed mutually exclusive aims. Meanwhile, the 
ramifications of Moscow’s inevitable intolerance of either group were downplayed. 
Finally, the regional aspirations stated in NSC 58/2 were further weakened with explicit 
acknowledgment that the U.S. would not militarily support the nationalist or 
independence movements in Eastern Europe that Washington was attempting to foster. 
 
The Transition of Policy in 1950 
Despite its inadequacies, PPS continued to promote the national communist policy 
following the approval of NSC 58/2 by the Council. On 9 December a PPS draft paper 
called for the launch of an “Offensive to Eliminate or Reduce Predominant Soviet 
Influence in the Satellite States of Europe and China.” Entitled “The Position of United 
States in World Affairs,” this document gave particular emphasis to replicating Titoism 
in other communist states: 
[…] we are now planning an offensive to foster communist heresy among the 
satellite states and in China, and so, if possible, to begin the disintegration of 
the Soviet empire. Encouraged by the possibilities of Titoism and the 
uncertainties of the developments in China, we are now seeking to devise 
some means to encourage the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes as 
temporary administrations, with the intention that eventually these regimes 
will be replaced by non-totalitarian governments willing to participate in 
good faith in a free world community.   
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PPS recognised certain problems inherent in this approach but failed to resolve them. In 
the short term a campaign to foster further communist “heretics” might provoke a 
defensive crackdown by Moscow. This course could prove counter-productive to the U.S. 
therefore, because “the conduct of an offensive on our part may for some time increase 
the sense of insecurity in the Kremlin and so contribute to solidifying Soviet influence 
and control in its empire rather than weakening it.” The near-certain liquidation of 
indigenous nationalist elements behind the iron curtain was brushed off with an 
unconvincing assertion that the “outcome will depend in great part on the skill and 
judgment with which we determine our moves.”105  
 
The first progress report on NSC 58/2 also failed to question the viability of “the short-
term objective of disrupting the Soviet-satellite relationship” by “weakening the Soviet 
grip in these countries.” Although it was difficult to measure “tangible results of our 
measures,” it was thought that the “wave of purges” of communists and non-communists 
in Eastern Europe indicated Soviet apprehension of “deviationism.” The progress report 
did not however acknowledge that this illustrated that political deviants of any persuasion 
were unlikely to survive. Instead emphasis was given to exploiting political instability 
within the Soviet bloc, because in “the atmosphere of suspicion and fear it may be open 
to us to widen some of the cracks which are appearing in the structure of Soviet control 
by psychological, economic and other means.”106   
 
Kennan also failed to accept the flaws inherent in the strategy of promoting nationalist 
communist regimes that he had helped to develop. At a series of meetings of the Planning 
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Staff held in mid-January 1950 he continued to defend the rationale behind NSC 58/2. 
Reiterating to his colleagues the Kremlin’s determination to prohibit “heretics,” Kennan 
argued that this would result in the “excommunication” (rather than liquidation) of 
communists from the Stalinist camp, adding that “your whole ideology falls apart if you 
permit to exist in the fold heretics who attack it.”107  
 
Kennan was swimming against the tide. Support for the national communist hypothesis 
was beginning to wane because it was widely accepted that the conditions in Yugoslavia 
facilitating Tito’s independent course did not exist in any other Eastern European 
country. Therefore any deviation of the Eastern European communist regimes would not 
be tolerated by Moscow. Charles Bohlen argued that the Kremlin was already cracking 
down on dissent in the satellites in order to confirm their control. They “don’t care how 
tough they have to be to accomplish that purpose” he declared. With Poland in mind in 
particular, Bohlen warned Kennan and the Planning Staff that the Soviets “don’t intend to 
pamper the Poles or stand for any nonsense from them, and they want the Poles to know 
that.”108  
 
On 1 January, 1950 John Paton Davies penned a memorandum which betrayed his own 
doubts over the American approach to the Cold War. Davies believed that the U.S. 
strategy was “a failure as it now stands.” Davies traced the reason for this back to the 
NSC 20 series which was “sufficiently vague in outlining the means by which these 
objectives could be attained or in evaluating the capabilities of the U.S. to successfully 
pursue such aims.” These reports, Davies complained, had failed in their most basic 
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requirement to clearly define fundamental American aims. For instance they did not 
clarify whether U.S. objectives were 
To contain the Soviet Union or to foment opposition on the part of the 
peoples of the USSR and the satellites against the Soviet regimes, or to bring 
about other means, which would not involve challenging the Soviet regime’s 
internal power, or to change the basic concepts and actions held by the Soviet 
leaders or ruling groups.109  
 
Davies followed this up with a more detailed paper in early March entitled 
“Recommended Measures against the U.S.S.R.” that focused on exploiting nationalism 
rather than national communism. This paper followed up the themes of his October 1949 
memorandum on the inadequacies of U.S. operations in Eastern Europe. Davies argued 
that while “the Kremlin has since the early days of the Bolshevik regime sought to 
subvert our society, we have not until the establishment of the Voice of America 
attempted to breach the [iron] curtain and make known to the Soviet people the meaning 
of freedom and democracy.” For Davies it was self-evident that the United States should 
immediately undertake its own subversive operations through OPC and other conduits to 
counter the Soviet threat: 
The direction which we should now take would seem to be obvious- the 
introduction into the U.S.S.R. by meteorological balloons of propaganda 
designed to (1) deepen the gulf between the Soviet people and the Kremlin, 
(2) foster passive resistance to the regime and (3) keep alive in the Soviet 
people appreciation for humane values and hope of their eventual fulfillment 
in what is now the Soviet Union. 
 
The psychological warfare programme, Davies counseled, must be carefully coordinated 
by the State Department with the implementing organisations. “If handled badly,” he 
warned, “this operation will do us harm.” However if it was “skillfully manipulated, 
particularly through non-American “fronts,” it may prove to be one of the most powerful 
weapons we can bring to bear in the cold war [….]”  
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In the October 1949 paper Davies had urged that preparations for armed uprisings in the 
Soviet bloc should be organised by the United States but strictly for wartime 
implementation. He went further in the follow-up memorandum in March 1950, arguing 
that the Soviet regime’s “existence could be imperiled not only by war with an external 
foe but also by successfully organized internal resistance.” Although he admitted that 
there is “no prospect of significant organized resistance inside the U.S.S.R. at this time” 
he recommended that “one of our prime tasks” should be “to enable the development now 
outside of the U.S.S.R. of potential leadership for such resistance.” Davies believed that 
such a programme could have meaning “not only in terms of preparation for a possible 
war” as he had previously suggested. It would also act “as a constant intimation of 
possible diversion in the Soviet rear tending to distract the Kremlin from focusing its full 
attention and energies on expansive operations.” Furthermore, he urged that “Similar 
programs should be put into effect” in the Soviet satellites. This was extremely close to a 
radical endorsement of an American campaign to organise and sponsor revolutionary 
forces in the Soviet bloc in peacetime.110      
 
In early February 1950 the State Department commenced several fresh studies exploring 
the broad region-wide objectives of American policy as well as case-by-case studies of 
the individual countries involved. These reports were not dominated by PPS or by 
Kennan but were turned over to departmental officers “with particular responsibility for 
the affairs of individual countries in this area” to make policy recommendations. Several 
themes including the use of economic and psychological warfare operations were 
specifically singled out for examination. Moreover, OPC was finally asked by State to 
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contribute to the development of a specific programme “with respect to the 
unconventional operations mentioned in NSC 58/2.”111  
 
The Department of State completed several position papers on the Soviet bloc in April 
1950 in preparation for the conference of the American, British and French Foreign 
Ministers arranged for 11-13 May. Although these papers did not explicitly reject the 
national communist policy, they shifted attention to a wider set of tactics. This had the 
effect of diluting the prominence of the promotion of national communism in the 
Department’s strategic thinking. The first report was prepared by the Office of Eastern 
European Affairs and was circulated around the Department on 11 April. Entitled “Policy 
toward Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe,” this paper proposed that the “principal 
purpose” of US policy towards the Soviet bloc “is to weaken the Soviet grip upon them, 
with the ultimate aim of eliminating preponderant Soviet power there [….]” The current 
trend of events, according to the Office of Eastern European Affairs, “is moving rapidly 
towards Moscow’s goal of undiluted communist regimes under absolute Soviet control” 
Washington should therefore do all it can “in accordance with Western interests” and the 
“basic principles of American policy” regarding self-determination to ensure “that the 
trend toward the domination and absorption of the nations of Eastern Europe by the 
USSR should be slowed and, if possible, reversed.” 
 
There was no new departure in these statements and no long-awaited clarification of 
specific U.S. aims and methods. But the report did strike a more realistic tone than 
previous papers propounding national communism as the primary short term tactic. Due 
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to the “position of virtual impotence to which the West has been reduced in Eastern 
Europe,” the paper acknowledged that “it is difficult to find positive means of attaining or 
even pursuing Western objectives.” Several measures were recommended, and although 
promoting Titoism was included it came a long way down the list of priority measures. 
Washington should “maintain a strong propaganda offensive against the communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe, especially through radio broadcasts, in order to maintain the 
morale of the people and to cause difficulties to Soviet efforts to establish full control.” 
The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe should continue to be 
encouraged through propaganda and diplomacy, while the forum of the UN should be 
used to maximum advantage. The United States, Great Britain and France “should 
coordinate their attitudes and policies toward the various exiled groups with a view to 
making the fullest use of them [….]” Eventually it was suggested that the U.S. “make full 
use of the advantage presented to them by Tito’s quarrel with the Kremlin in encouraging 
all signs of Titoism in the Soviet satellites.” Implicitly acknowledging a shift away from 
this policy, the report added that the “majority of the people in those countries oppose all 
varieties of communism.”112 
 
A second State Department paper on “Soviet Intentions and Capabilities” was 
disseminated a week after the report by the Office of Eastern European Affairs. This 
paper stressed that the “Soviet power system by its very nature is subject to various 
vulnerabilities.” Although these inherent weaknesses “by themselves will not seriously 
weaken the USSR,” the report stated that if they were “systematically exploited through 
external pressures […] they could produce repercussions which would weaken the Soviet 
 265
power position and possibly bring about a change in Soviet policy.” The tone of this 
document was also guarded. For instance, it was admitted that “Moscow’s insistence on 
rigid control of the Soviet empire makes the development of an organized opposition 
difficult.” But according to the paper the Soviet system’s weaknesses could be found 
within the very nature of its power. The Kremlin’s “insistence on open subservience” of 
all communists “creates a potential for deviationism in these Parties from Soviet 
leadership.” This gesture towards the national communist strategy was placed in context 
with other potential vulnerabilities that could also be exploited. This included disruption 
of the Soviet system upon Stalin’s death and the subsequent transfer of power, indigenous 
economic and political grievances among the populations behind the iron curtain 
stimulated by the Soviet system of internal controls, and gaps between the myth and 
reality of communist utopia as presented by Soviet propaganda.113 
 
One month later the second progress reports on NSC 18/4 and NSC 58/2 were filed 
within the State Department.114 On 26 May, the NSC 58/2 follow-up paper made clear 
that “progress” towards the achievement of its objectives was extremely problematic. The 
report pointedly acknowledged that all American efforts towards the end of fostering 
communist heretics had thus far failed. There was “no fundamental change in the 
situation of the satellite states or in the character of the Soviet-satellite relationship” since 
the first progress report was issued in early February. The conditions of Soviet control 
remained unaffected by US policy, with the continued presence of Soviet occupation 
forces and the upsurge of “drastic purges” within the Eastern European communist 
parties. The report depicted a bleak scenario for the prospects of the U.S. interim national 
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communist strategy, accepting that the “Soviets have been successful in warding off any 
trend which would start one or more of the satellite countries along the road which 
Yugoslavia has taken.”  
 
The evident futility in hoping that national communist movements could prosper 
encouraged emphasis within the progress paper on the longer term development of non-
communist nationalistic feeling. “[I]t cannot be determined with accuracy,” according to 
the report, “whether they have been able to stamp out nationalistic resistance to Soviet 
domination.” In a pronounced shift from the original paper, nationalism of any type 
should be encouraged, and particularly non-communist and anti-communist sentiment in 
the satellite countries. The “basic problem considered in NSC 58/2 remains the same,” 
that Washington was “attempting to pursue a double objective” to “sustain the hope and 
morale of the democratic majorities” within the Eastern European populations and take 
“full advantage of actual and potential cleavages among the Communists and ruling 
groups in order to weaken the Soviet grip and make it possible for the latter to be drawn 
out of the orbit of Soviet domination.” The bulk of the paper concentrated on the longer 
term fostering of democracy through support of indigenous nationalist forces, reflecting 
the complete failure of the national communist approach to produce results since the 
adoption of NSC 58/2.  
 
Several methods were recommended in the progress report to undermine Soviet power in 
its backyard. In particular, the United States must “rely more heavily on propaganda and 
on other means.” This included greater integration of OPC’s subversive psychological 
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and political warfare capability. OPC’s operations should be better coordinated with the 
State Department to counteract the “concerted Soviet-Communist campaign” against U.S. 
missions and officials in Eastern Europe. Propaganda operations to replace the activities 
of the U.S. missions should support the long term aim to establish free governments, with 
VOA programming to “be supplemented in the near future by radio broadcasts operated 
by the refugee national committees in the United States.” The psychological warfare 
campaign “is intended to increase confusion, suspicion and fear among the Communist 
leaders and parties” in order to subvert Soviet levers of control. As well as targeting the 
leadership and elites of the Soviet bloc, American propaganda would also attempt “to 
fortify the anti-Communist resistance of the masses of the population.”   
 
There were hints within the second progress report that an even more drastic policy shift 
had taken place. It was noted that the absence of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and 
Albania and “the particularly exposed position of the latter, may make it possible to take 
a somewhat more active line in pursuit of our objectives in these countries than in the 
other satellites.” This was an innocuous reference to an operation initiated by British 
intelligence to overthrow the communist regime in Albanian under Enver Hoxha.115 The 
progress report did not attempt to define a strategic framework to encapsulate and 
integrate this revolutionary campaign with less aggressive American operations 
elsewhere behind the iron curtain. The Albanian operation was simply tacked on to the 
existing policy although it was questionable whether its aims were consistent with the 





The second progress report on the implementation of NSC 58/2 did not resolve strategic 
difficulties faced by American policymakers in mid-1950. But it did indicate shifts in 
attitude towards previous policy. Tito had survived the vituperative Stalinist campaign to 
dislodge him, thanks in small part to American support. But beyond this questionable 
“success,” U.S. policy had failed abjectly to alter the political landscape of the Soviet 
bloc. In fact, none of the short or long-term U.S. objectives delineated in policy papers 
since November 1948 had been achieved.  
 
The report therefore called for further studies to be made in light of the minimal impact 
of American policies since the adoption of NSC 58/2 in December 1949. Weeks before 
the outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent implementation of NSC 68, the 
Truman administration was already turning its back on its cautious policy to foster 
interim national communist regimes. This had been predicated on not provoking the 
Kremlin. But now the long-term goal to undermine Soviet control of the satellites would 
be more logically aligned to the promotion of anti-communist and non-communist 
nationalist movements behind the iron curtain, although this clearly engendered 
provocative ramifications.  
 
Despite the shift in policy emphasis, Washington had still not overcome the paradox of 
aspiring to liberate Eastern Europe without resort to arms. Such a methodology was 
strategically futile while Moscow remained determined that the region would not be 
 269
abandoned. The American shift to a potentially more aggressive policy did not translate 
into a willingness to militarily intervene to support nationalist uprisings behind the iron 
curtain. Therefore the ultimate objective of establishing Eastern Europe’s independence 
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THE DIVERGENCE OF POLICY AND OPERATIONS 
BEFORE THE KOREAN WAR 
 
The approval of NSC 10/2 in June 1948 formally established an extensive U.S. political 
warfare capability in peacetime. Proponents of political warfare sought greater flexibility 
to act against the Soviet Union in the context of the early Cold War. The National 
Security Council therefore sanctioned the newly created Office of Policy Coordination to 
undertake unconventional activities lying between diplomacy and military intervention 
from 1948.  
 
Although NSC 10/2 established a broad capability and operational machinery, in mid-
1948 U.S. policy goals towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remained 
undefined. As a result, the strategic basis for the political warfare programme was 
ambiguous from the outset and OPC lacked clear strategic guidelines to direct its 
campaign. In Western Europe American policy objectives were clearly delineated, 
allowing OPC to integrate with and compliment broader U.S. policies. But in the east 
questions remained over the parameters of an American commitment to counteract Soviet 
power. General goals towards the Soviet bloc were eventually defined in NSC 20/4 
adopted in November 1948. But this paper, along with subsequent reports, failed to move 
beyond broad aspirations to clarify the strategic role of political warfare in pursuit of 
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broad U.S. policy aims. Consequently, although NSC 10/2 stimulated operational 
momentum, OPC’s political warfare activities were not tied into a coherent strategic 
approach towards the Soviet bloc. 
 
External factors and in particular the increasing perception of a hostile and expansionist 
Soviet threat undoubtedly stimulated the authorisation of a political warfare capability in 
mid-1948. But the development of the machinery was overshadowed by bureaucratic 
wrangling over control and responsibility of the new programme. Therefore not only was 
the strategic basis of political warfare unclear. OPC’s position within the bureaucratic 
framework was also ambiguous. The new organisation was granted considerable 
autonomy within a nebulous command structure at the outset. This facilitated its rapid 
initiation of a wide range of operations under extremely loose coordination from the 
departments and the NSC.  
 
NSC 10/2 vested responsibility for overseeing political warfare in the Director of Central 
Intelligence. The key aspect of this responsibility was to ensure that OPC was properly 
accountable and coordinated with the general thrust of mainstream American policy. 
Although the strategic objectives of OPC’s operations were themselves ambiguous, 
following NSC 10/2’s approval the chain of command from OPC to the CIA was 
undercut by the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. This revisited the convoluted 
PPS-CIA dispute over the authority for political warfare leading up to the adoption of 
NSC 10/2. The latest move was intended by PPS to shift the authority for political 
warfare from the CIA to the departments while leaving the Agency with full 
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responsibility. This actually resulted in the replacement of NSC 10/2’s provisions with 
loose and ineffective oversight procedures.  
 
OPC’s broad mandate combined with its lack of adequate strategic guidance and 
organisational accountability stimulated a considerable degree of uncoordinated 
operational momentum towards the Soviet bloc. OPC was able to evolve into a de facto 
policymaker as well as operator once its deference to the CIA’s command had been 
cancelled. Although the Planning Staff intended to utilise the new organisation as an 
“instrument” of departmental policy, lax supervision enabled it to initiate and implement 
its own plans under the dynamic leadership of Assistant Director for Policy Coordination 
(ADPC) Frank Wisner.  The ramifications were potentially serious as the new 
administrative procedures for political warfare were inadequate to ensure that operations 
were viable and consistent with the wider policies of the U.S. Government.  
 
OPC filled the strategic vacuum at the policy-level by energetically and aggressively 
pursuing anti-communist activities behind the iron curtain. An action-oriented operational 
culture soon flourished and went unchecked by Washington.  The development of this 
approach to Soviet bloc policy was potentially disastrous. Not only did the 
implementation of field operations without a coherent strategic and administrative 
framework result in the pursuit of flawed and ultimately ill-fated activities. This period 
was marked by increasing antagonism between Washington and Moscow. The first flash-
point of the Cold War, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, indicated the extent of the schism 
between east and west. Therefore OPC’s aggressive semi-autonomous actions against the 
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Soviet bloc carried grave risks of dangerously escalating tensions even further. In the 
field OPC went so far as to launch offensive, revolutionary operations. Not only were 
these activities strategically unsound as “liberation” campaigns. In general they far 
exceeded the cautious policies laid out by the State Department in Washington. Although 
OPC’s contribution to the successful attainment of American objectives was negligible 
prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict, its actions helped to ratchet up tensions and 
mutual suspicions between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
 
The Administration of Political Warfare Post-NSC 10/2 
Superficially NSC 10/2 resolved the CIA-PPS dispute that had raged for several months 
over control of an expanded political warfare capability. In reality NSC 10/2’s mediation 
of their bureaucratic differences was superficial. It masked the Planning Staff’s persistent 
determination that the departments- State in peacetime and Defense in times of war- 
rather than the CIA should exert principal control over political warfare.  
 
The Planning Staff, and in particular George Kennan, was set on asserting departmental 
prerogatives. The Agency’s resistance to the PPS agenda compelled it to compromise 
during the final drafting stages of NSC 10/2. Thus PPS reluctantly accepted formal 
Agency authority over OPC for the greater cause of securing congressional funds to 
establish the organisation and initiate operations. Although this “compromise” 
diminished the State Department’s nominal control under NSC 10/2’s provisions, PPS 
anticipated that it might later take advantage of this arrangement to assert the State 
Department’s authority. Whether Kennan and his colleagues realised this before or after 
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NSC 10/2’s approval remains unclear. Regardless, the objective for Kennan throughout 
was to secure the State Department’s principal authority to direct OPC’s implementation 
of its political warfare programme.  
 
In the months after the adoption of NSC 10/2 PPS moved in rapidly to assert its control 
over the direction of the new political warfare organisation. This intervention 
significantly altered the general procedural arrangements for planning and 
implementation of political warfare projects stipulated in NSC 10/2. Agency authority 
was swept away and replaced with a loose and informal set of mechanisms by which 
OPC’s operations would be planned and approved by departmental representatives rather 
than the DCI.  
 
Kennan needed to overcome two inter-related challenges before departmental authority 
over political warfare could be assured. Firstly, the Agency’s administrative control over 
OPC needed to be definitively removed. This would facilitate PPS’s assertion of 
authority in the resulting vacuum. This task was complicated because Secretary of State 
Marshall continued to object to the State Department assuming responsibility for political 
warfare, meaning that this must continue to reside outside the department’s jurisdiction. 
Attempts to remove CIA’s authority had already impeded the implementation of PPS’s 
vision for political warfare for several months. Ultimately however, the approval of NSC 
10/2 removed CIA’s principal bargaining chip in its dispute with the Planning Staff. As a 
result, overcoming its opposition post-NSC 10/2 proved relatively straightforward. The 
primary stumbling block in the longer term was in fact the clear assertion of departmental 
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authority following the removal of Agency control. Although the CIA’s control over 
OPC was cancelled, the State Department was left with the responsibility of filling this 
vacuum to ensure that OPC receive adequate external guidance and oversight.  
 
On 6 August, 1948, Kennan moved decisively in an effort to achieve both of these key 
objectives at a pivotal meeting convened in Souers’s office. Fortified by a new sense of 
urgency with the delicate Berlin crisis looming large, Kennan aimed to both remove the 
DCI’s authority over OPC as delineated in NSC 10/2 and to assert departmental control 
in its place. Several veterans of the earlier 10/2 dispute also attended this watershed 
meeting at which past arrangements swept away. The new agreement decisively shaped 
the future development of OPC and the implementation of political warfare operations 
against the Soviet bloc. 
 
Kennan successfully overcame the first major bureaucratic obstacle with relative ease. 
Removing the DCI’s powers under NSC 10/2 was central to the State Department’s 
ability to direct the political warfare programme. With the support of Sydney Souers 
Kennan rescinded these authorities in one fell swoop. The arrangement they brokered 
exclusively suited the departments, with the transfer of control over OPC and political 
warfare from the Agency to them. Kennan reassured DCI Hillenkoetter that the 
departments would pay “due deference to the [CIA’s] organizational requirements” 
following the transfer of authority to them. This was a necessary palliative to ensure that 
the CIA continued to accept administrative responsibility for housing OPC. But it was a 
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thinly-disguised defeat for Hillenkeotter as the new arrangement vested full control over 
OPC in the Departments of State and Defense.  
 
Kennan declared that the new organisation must receive its “policy guidance and 
direction” directly from State and the National Military Establishment. For this to occur, 
the CIA leadership must grant OPC considerable autonomy from the Agency.1 
Meanwhile State and Defense would establish direct channels into OPC through the 
appointment of departmental representatives.  These officials would feed projects 
complimenting departmental policy directly into the new office rather than via the DCI. 
To emphasise that Hillenkoetter must not interfere in this process Kennan argued that the 
head of OPC “must have the fullest and freest access” to these representatives. He 
justified the revision of NSC 10/2 by affirming that “political warfare is essentially an 
instrument of foreign policy” and so “the activity which serves this aim must function to 
the fullest extent possible as a direct instrumentality” of the departments. 
 
Frank Wisner, who was soon confirmed as director of the new organisation, further 
whittled down the DCI’s influence. Wisner recommended that he should not have to 
submit political warfare projects through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy but instead 
pass them directly to the departmental representatives. Hillenkoetter submitted to this 
final blow with the modest condition that the DCI would be kept “informed” of all 
“important” projects and decisions. Hillenkoetter accepted that in peacetime OPC should 
have direct guidance from the State Department, but in turn it must assume political 
responsibility for the political warfare operations it would now control. Kennan happily 
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accepted this, understanding that this was meaningless in practice while OPC continued 
to find cover within the Agency. He therefore informed Hillenkoetter that he would 
personally be accountable as the State Department’s designated representative to the 
political warfare office.2  
 
Hillenkoetter meekly accepted Kennan’s terms on 6 August. He was no longer prepared 
to fight to retain the DCI’s authority over political warfare in the face of PPS’s 
unrelenting determination to control the programme. Whereas for PPS the dispute was of 
primary strategic importance to allow it to plan and direct its own programme of 
measures, in contrast the CIA leadership had originally been reluctant to engage in 
potentially controversial activities. For the Agency the struggle was based on the 
administrative necessity of retaining authority over the operations for which it had 
responsibility.  
 
OPC was now granted considerable autonomy under NSC 10/2’s broad operational 
mandate and the new command arrangements brokered by Kennan and Souers. This did 
not markedly reduce the Agency’s liability for OPC activities. The CIA retained the 
responsibility of providing administrative cover although Kennan accepted operational 
responsibility for political warfare. Because Kennan’s responsibility was only informal, it 
was inevitable that the buck would still stop with the Agency rather than the departments. 
However, should an embarrassing operational connection to the State Department be 
exposed in the future, Kennan accepted that he would take the fall for it. 
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Therefore the drawn-out struggle since the drafting of NSC 4-A, the running of SPG and 
the production of NSC 10/2 came to an end with Hillenkoetter’s anti-climactic 
capitulation. The balance of administrative power swung decisively to the departments on 
6 August, 1948, marking PPS’s triumph over the CIA in the long-running feud to control 
political warfare. Although it had not been possible to implement the Planning Staff’s 
optimal arrangement to create a political warfare organisation within the State 
Department directly controlled by PPS, this was a satisfactory alternative. “A cardinal 
consideration in the establishment of Wisner’s office under NSC 10/2,” Kennan reminded 
Lovett in October 1948, “was that, while this Department can take no responsibility for 
his operations, we should nevertheless maintain a firm guiding hand.”3 Kennan was 
confident that the CIA’s cover for OPC would hold, while links to the Departments of 
State and Defense would not be exposed. Key to this was the stipulation that OPC’s 
operations must remain covert to conceal Washington’s links to them. If the departments 
could plausibly deny responsibility for OPC activities in public, this would ensure that 
their accountability for political warfare would remain minimal. 
 
The successful removal of CIA obstruction to departmental control over the semi-
autonomous OPC was confirmed in October 1948. Yet this also demonstrated that the 
Agency no longer considered itself accountable for OPC’s actions. That month the CIA’s 
legal counsel Lawrence Houston failed in one final attempt to persuade Hillenkoetter to 
reverse his surrender and resume the struggle for the administrative powers sanctioned to 
the DCI by NSC 10/2. On 19 October, soon after OPC was formally established, Houston 
sent legal advice to Hillenkoetter repudiating Kennan’s system of control over OPC 
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arranged around the 6 August “understanding.” Houston argued that the DCI “must look” 
to NSC 10/2 as “the official mandate” by which “to ascertain his responsibilities” and not 
be cajoled by overbearing departmental officials. Houston reminded Hillenkoetter that 
“this mandate on its face places full administrative and operational control and 
responsibility on the Director.” Yes, the DCI was required to obtain “policy guidance” 
regarding political warfare from the departments, but this did not equate to the full 
transfer of control to them. Houston advised Hillenkoetter that “steps be taken to make a 
final clarification on responsibility and control for OPC covert operations” once and for 
all to settle the “divergence in views” primarily between the State Department and the 
CIA.4
 
Houston’s argument was soundly founded in NSC 10/2’s provisions, but his efforts were 
nonetheless in vain. Hillenkoetter was no longer willing to contest the bureaucratic 
arrangements for political warfare having already ceded his authority to the departments. 
Several factors influenced his attitude. The administrative stakes were not as high as they 
had previously been for the Agency. Its operational future was no longer under imminent 
threat as there was no prospect that its secret intelligence function would be removed. 
Therefore Hillenkoetter had little to gain by engaging in further skirmishes with PPS. 
Political warfare was not even close to his heart, yet the dispute had become increasingly 
fractious in the early summer of 1948. In all likelihood he felt greatly relieved to finally 
throw in the towel.  
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Hillenkoetter therefore discarded Houston’s legal advice. This tacitly confirmed the 
removal of the DCI’s authorities over covert political warfare stipulated by NSC 10/2. 
His capitulation to PPS also signaled that future opportunities to re-assert the DCI’s 
control would not be exploited under his directorship.5 This was reinforced by the 
undermining of Hillenkoetter’s position and credibility within the wider bureaucracy 
during the final eighteen months of his tenure as DCI.6 His demise precluded any attempt 
or inclination to regain the authority for political warfare previously vested in the DCI.7 
Consequently, it was not restored for two years until Hillenkoetter’s successor, General 
Walter Bedell Smith, re-established the CIA’s control by integrating OPC within the 
Agency in 1952.8  
 
Superficially, Kennan’s successful cancellation of the DCI’s authority now gave full 
control to direct OPC’s political warfare operations to the departments. To fulfill this they 
would perform a “liaison” role that encompassed two key responsibilities. Firstly, the 
departments must ensure that political warfare planning and implementation was 
strategically linked to broader policies and consonant with its objectives. Secondly, they 
now took on the responsibility for closer oversight of the day-to-day development of 
OPC’s plans and operations.  
 
Kennan was keen to limit the number of departmental officials in contact with OPC at the 
outset. In October 1948 he recommended to Lovett that the State Department commit “a 
small body of personnel- perhaps no more than five men- who have Foreign Service and 
Departmental experience” for this task. These officials would “be designated to guide 
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Wisner’s operation, both from within this Department and within Wisner’s own office.”9 
Kennan’s motives were twofold. This would concentrate the power to direct OPC in the 
hands of the Planning Staff. Limited access to OPC would also minimise the chance of 
security breaches and help to maintain a shroud of secrecy over operations.   
 
In practice several weaknesses undermined the informal arrangement ceding control over 
political warfare to the departments. Foremost of these was that the new procedure relied 
on too narrow a base to ensure adequate external direction of the new political warfare 
organisation. This in turn created a vacuum of accountability over OPC. For the 
departments continued to shirk formal responsibility for OPC despite reducing the 
authorities vested in the DCI. The revision of NSC 10/2 blurred the chain of command 
between policy-makers, managers and field operators.  
 
The new set-up essentially placed the authority to oversee political warfare to the State 
Department’s designated liaison officer to OPC.10  In peacetime Kennan effectively was 
the sole arbiter for ensuring OPC’s coordination and consistency with U.S. policy 
objectives. This reflected the confidence Kennan held in his own ability to define U.S. 
policy with an integrated political warfare component as well as to juggle this with his 
numerous other demanding responsibilities as PPS director.  
 
Notwithstanding Kennan’s professional and intellectual credentials to link political 
warfare to broader policies, it was a precarious arrangement that concentrated excessive 
responsibility on too narrow a base. Necessary safeguards and oversight mechanisms 
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were lacking once NSC 10/2’s provisions were modified. But the failure of Kennan’s 
seniors in the NSC to react to this reflected that political warfare was an enclave strategy 
of the Planning Staff. It was not widely understood, accepted or even known about by the 
majority of government officials. Without proper integration and accountability, there 
was a potential risk that OPC could pursue operations independently without the 
necessary mechanisms to safeguard its consistency with overall policies.  
 
Another problem with the new arrangement was exposed almost immediately. Kennan 
soon felt compelled to relinquish his liaison role to allow him to fulfill his duties 
directing the Planning Staff.11 This authority was subsequently handed to OSS veteran 
Robert Joyce, although Kennan retained a close interest in political warfare projects 
throughout 1949. Far more significant was Kennan’s loss of influence within the State 
Department over the direction of foreign policy during 1949. His fall from favour within 
the Truman administration coincided with his waning influence over the strategic 
application of covert political warfare. Over the course of 1949 Kennan attempted to link 
the strategic and operational strands of political warfare in order to initiate a unified 
strategy towards Western and Eastern Europe, but this effort alienated him from his 
colleagues and superiors within the Truman administration. Paradoxically, it was 
Kennan’s closer attention to the strategic employment of political warfare that pushed 
him further from the foreign policy mainstream.  
 
In particular, Kennan’s failed attempts to find wider support for Program A to unify and 
neutralise Germany impacted on the strategic viability of political warfare. The decision 
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to pursue German partition and the rearmament of Western Europe isolated Kennan’s 
strategic conceptualisation of political warfare, exacerbating is status as an enclave 
strategy. Kennan recognised that the long-term division not only of Germany but Europe 
would undermine his concept of political warfare. Covert operations coordinated with 
diplomatic and economic initiatives would now be unable to soften Soviet domination 
over Eastern Europe sufficiently to facilitate the retraction of its power by peaceful 
means.  
 
With the recession of Kennan’s influence within the Truman administration the link 
between PPS and OPC was based more on operational guidance rather than strategic 
direction. This was reinforced because Kennan’s replacement as PPS liaison officer to 
OPC, Robert Joyce, was much less interested than Kennan in connecting OPC’s activities 
in Eastern Europe to a grand strategy. His expertise and passion lay in the development of 
operations themselves, making him “more CIA than the CIA” according to a Wisner aide, 
Gilbert Greenway.12 Joyce was a veteran activist and personal friend of Wisner’s, having 
served in the Balkans with OSS during the war.13 He was “a doer, not an ivory tower 
thinker” in the words of OPC’s chief of special operations Frank Lindsay.14 Given his 
wartime experience Joyce, like Wisner, had witnessed the blunt end of Russian 
occupation policies in Eastern Europe towards the end of the war. His wartime service 
therefore made him professionally and personally more predisposed to the 
implementation of operations than to the methodical deliberation over strategies. As a 
result of this professional instinct and inclination, Joyce exercised minimal restraint over 
OPC’s operations.15  
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Kennan’s gradual recession did not therefore result in the collapse of the August 1948 
arrangement and a return to NSC 10/2’s provisions. Had this occurred then Wisner and 
OPC would have been brought directly back under the authority of DCI Hillenkoetter, 
whose cautious leadership style and reticence to launch controversial operations would 
have acted as a restraining factor upon the political warfare organisation in its nascent 
stages. Instead the Departmental channels to OPC were maintained, but the informal 
liaison between State, Defense and OPC was now predominantly concentrated on specific 
operational details rather than on broader strategic issues. This tenuous oversight 
mechanism facilitated the divergence of the strategic and operational dimensions of 
political warfare during 1949 as OPC enjoyed an increasing degree of autonomy to plan 
and implement its own projects.  
 
Joyce’s Planning Staff colleague John Paton Davies attempted to stimulate a 
reconsideration of political warfare during 1949 and 1950. But Davies failed to address 
the core strategic problems undermining U.S. political warfare against the Soviet bloc. 
He lamented the failure to organise and successfully implement U.S. operations. But 
while Davies acknowledged that American actions had thus far not produced the desired 
results, he did not identify the inherent strategic flaws undermining these efforts. Instead 
of launching a reassessment of present policies to identify strategic weaknesses in the 
current approach, his frustration at the present lack of progress in Eastern Europe led 
Davies to call for an intensification of operations. His criticisms therefore fed into the 
hands of Joyce and Wisner, reinforcing their emphasis on operations rather than 
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assessments of the viability of the present course. When Wisner’s patrons promulgated 
more operations, they were preaching to the converted.  
 
The mixture of personalities and administrative roles encouraged a symbiotic relationship 
between PPS and OPC. Wisner’s agency conducted the operations proposed by the 
Planning Staff without excessive interference from them into its other activities. This 
deviated from the original concept formulated in NSC 10/2 envisaging that the 
departments would direct the political warfare organisation through the Operations 
Advisory Committee. Although the body had been stricken from NSC 10/2, Kennan had 
reasserted the notion of departmental oversight with the liaison arrangements. 
Departmental direction shifted to cooperation during 1949. 
 
An important factor behind OPC’s rapid expansion was the leadership it enjoyed under 
Frank Wisner. Kennan was not personally acquainted with Wisner before his 
appointment, although they soon forged social links at the Georgetown “Sunday Night 
Suppers.”16 Kennan was moderately impressed with Wisner’s credentials when 
recommending him to head the new political warfare office.17 “I personally have no 
knowledge of his ability,” Kennan informed Lovett, assuring his boss that “his 
qualifications seem seasonably good, and I should think that it would be relatively easy to 
spare him for this purpose.” The advice Kennan received regarding Wisner’s ability to 
head OPC was justified as he was, by all accounts a brilliant, energetic and dynamic man. 
His wartime experience serving in OSS in Eastern Europe also stood him in good stead 
for the OPC posting.18  
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But before Wisner’s selection to head OPC, Kennan assumed that he would be able to 
control Wisner and his organisation. In fact Kennan underestimated the personal drive 
and anti-communist conviction of the man placed at the helm of OPC. Wisner was 
ambitious and ideologically driven to anti-communism following his direct contact with 
“the greatest moral outrage of his life, the Soviet takeover of Romania.” Wisner’s 
obsessive anxieties about Russia were fully developed before then end of World War II, 
feelings described as “excessive” by his OSS colleague stationed at Wiesbaden in 
Germany in 1945, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 19 Kennan’s endorsement of Wisner’s 
appointment “on the recommendations of people who know him” therefore left 
considerable potential for Kennan to be surprised in the future.20  
 
Nonetheless, Wisner’s dynamism and his anti-communist beliefs do not explain why 
operations diverged from policies to such a great extent from 1949 onwards. Wisner 
accepted that the departments would provide OPC with “policy guidance” in the summer 
and autumn of 1948. Under his command OPC was not a “maverick” organisation. It did 
not abuse the power and mandate granted to it by the NSC. Instead it maximised the 
potential and autonomy it was afforded within the bureaucracy, readily taking on 
operational opportunities that came its way in order to sustain its expansion.  
 
A salient factor in OPC’s sustained growth, therefore, was that there was no simultaneous 
strategic review of its activities.  The responsibility for evaluating its actions rested 
primarily with the departments in their liaison role, and ultimately with the NSC. 
Assessments of the strategic advisability of ongoing operations were clearly desirable and 
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prudent. Had adequate oversight procedures been established between the policy-makers 
and operators then such assessment would have been an ongoing routine. But no 
sufficient mechanisms existed to ensure OPC’s accountability.  
 
In contrast, Wisner was presented with a broad operational mandate and capability to take 
on Soviet and communist influence, backed up by aspirational policy statements calling 
for the retraction of Soviet power in Europe. A man with Wisner’s attributes needed no 
further encouragement to act independently and assertively, and he interpreted NSC 10/2 
as a “broad license” to launch energetically into operations.21 At the same time, the new 
organisation naturally attempted to expand its base of operations in order to carve a niche 
for itself in Washington to justify ever-increasing budget allocations. 
 
The Activation of OPC 
OPC was officially activated on 1 September, 1948.22 Wisner spent the remaining four 
months of 1948 organising the new agency and preparing a list of programmes and 
activities. This was done in coordination with representatives of the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, JCS and State Department at a series of meetings of an Advisory Council. 
Hillenkoetter’s surrender to the departments meant that the Agency was not represented 
at these meetings at which the preliminary planning for political warfare operations took 
place. But in accordance with the August 6 “understanding,” in late October Wisner 
transmitted a general outline of the preliminary planning for the clandestine programme 
to Hillenkoetter to ensure that he remained “informed.”23  
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Wisner was obliged to remain on favorable terms with the Agency because it held the 
OPC purse strings, even if it did not exert policy control over its activities. It was an 
awkward arrangement whereby Hillenkoetter was cut entirely out of the planning loop 
even while his organisation provided the cover and budget for OPC’s activities. To 
placate the DCI, Wisner assured Hillenkoetter that he would review more specific plans 
and programmes with him as soon as they had been finalised. This review would not take 
place before the plans had first been submitted for approval to the departments.  
 
During the preparatory phase, steps were taken by the State Department to ensure that the 
new organisation would be tied into the wider U.S. strategy in Western Europe. PPS 
began feeding “policy guidance” to OPC at the end of August.24 In late September 
Kennan drafted a letter, forwarded to Undersecretary Lovett for his approval before 
transmittal to Secretary of Defense Forrestal, in which the State Department requested the 
full cooperation of the U.S. military authorities in Germany with the activities of the new 
organisation. OPC’s ability to operate in Germany was of singular importance to the 
political warfare effort envisaged by PPS. It was the primary site of Soviet refugees and 
political deserters scattered amongst the teeming Displaced Persons (DP) camps. It was 
also geographically located on the edge of the iron curtain.  
 
Kennan’s request to the military for support was based on the functional concern that 
“Wisner is going to encounter, as one of his first major obstacles, the problem of 
cooperation with the Army in Germany.” Kennan hoped Lovett’s formal request would 
provide OPC with a “boost” in its initial dealings with the military services.25 The effect 
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of this approach was positive on the strategic, as well as the functional level. It 
established an early precedent of contact to foster a good working relationship between 
the departments and OPC regarding its activities in Germany. Nurturing a spirit of 
common purpose was essential to the coordination of military, diplomatic and political 
warfare policies across Western Europe.  
 
Forrestal replied positively, declaring his “wholehearted agreement” with the views 
expressed in Lovett’s letter and the desirability to obtain the full cooperation of the 
military services in Germany in support of OPC’s activities there. To achieve the 
necessary coordination, the Secretary of Defense had already allowed Wisner to hold 
discussions with officials from the Department of the Army who were said to entirely 
concur with the activities and authorities he proposed. The details of this meeting were 
also transmitted to General Clay in Germany to ensure his inclusion in the initial phases 
of OPC planning.26    
 
OPC also liaised with ECA, again ensuring that its activities complemented the 
administration of ERP aid to the participating Western European countries. One historian 
goes so far as to say that Wisner exploited his previous State Department position to affix 
OPC as a “virtual appendage to the Marshall Plan organization.” By doing this he could 
commandeer its resources for “men, foreign currency, and official cover to OPC in its 
covert campaign to compete with the Russians at every ‘unofficial’ level of European 
life.”27 Striving towards such ends, on 16 November, 1948, Wisner met with ECA 
Administrator Paul Hoffman and European Ambassador Averell Harriman.28 Wisner’s 
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motivation for this meeting was, like the German arrangements, primarily functional 
rather than strategic. He hoped to secure invaluable access to ERP counterpart funds for 
OPC’s operations in Western Europe. One condition of the original Marshall Plan deal 
was that the beneficiary nations had to contribute an equal amount of all ERP allocations 
it received from the United States in local currency, 95 percent of which would be used 
for Marshall Plan programmes. The other 5 percent would be reserved by the U.S. 
government, in practice amounting to a pot containing roughly $200million per year that 
had no designated purpose.29  
 
Having secured agreement with Hoffman and Harriman, Wisner approached the acting 
ECA administrator Richard Bissell who was initially “somewhat baffled by the request” 
to have access to the counterpart funds because he was at that time “very uninformed 
about covert activities.” Nonetheless Wisner reassured Bissell of the legitimate need for 
the money and it was duly authorised.30 The counterpart funds were a particularly useful 
source to finance OPC’s support of non-communist labour movements in Italy and 
France, at least in the beginning before more permanent and lucrative sources of funding 
had been secured. The secret distribution of funds by SPG to pro-western interests served 
as the template that OPC immediately adopted and in time expanded upon.  
 
This liaison also had beneficial strategic consequences by tying OPC into ECA’s pre-
existing strategic framework. Bissell himself recognised the advantages of close 
collaboration, stating in his memoirs that “had we known more we would have regarded 
OPC’s activities as increasing the chances of success.”31 The establishment of a healthy, 
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mutually-beneficial working relationship between the two agencies allowed senior 
administration officials outside the small political warfare policy loop access to its 
projects and thereby influence the actual operations it planned to undertake within ECA’s 
jurisdiction. This enhanced a fairly well-coordinated application of US policies in 
Western Europe by a diverse group of implementing agencies, ensuring that OPC did not 
tread on too many toes. 
 
OPC’s experience in the east was a total contrast. There was no parallel process of liaison 
between OPC officials and American representatives or organisations dealing with 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This did not constitute an inherent failure of 
liaison. During its preparatory phase OPC was not assimilated into an operational or 
organisational framework for the Soviet bloc as it was in Western Europe because there 
was no pre-existing structure or strategic approach within which to integrate. The 
Departments of State and Defense, ECA, and the White House all participated in the 
development of Western European policy formulation. But the void in strategic planning 
for Eastern Europe was compounded by an inadequate organisational-operational 
structure in the field. This was further exacerbated by the declarations of persona non 
grata to American representatives during the purges of 1949 and the undermining of the 
U.S. missions in the region by the communist authorities.32 Nonetheless, the 
organisational and strategic vacuum provided an opportunity for OPC to develop its own 
operational utility within the Truman administration by carving out a unique role to 
challenge Soviet power within the communist bloc through its political warfare 
operations.  
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Washington resented the ignominy of having its ministers and representatives in Eastern 
Europe publicly implicated during the purges and show trials in Hungary and Bulgaria. 
But the need for action was made all the more pertinent by the palpable sense or 
emergency gripping the Truman administration as communist regimes tightened their 
control over Eastern Europe. Nothing fueled the American perception that action was 
necessary more than the fall of the Beneš Government in Czechoslovakia in February 
1948, followed by the death in mysterious circumstances of former Foreign Minister (and 
non-communist) Jan Masaryk two weeks later. The communisation of Eastern Europe, in 
itself, did not directly threaten U.S. national security. But the perception was that this 
indicated the Kremlin’s intrinsic expansionist intentions, casting a shadow over Western 
Europe.  
 
Sanctioning a Broad Operational Mandate 
In early 1949 Wisner was authorised to proceed under a broad operational mandate by the 
Truman administration. OPC was given the green light despite the Washington’s failure 
to formulate a coherent strategic framework linking Western and Eastern Europe and the 
lack of effective machinery to guide and regulate OPC activities. These factors enabled 
OPC to gradually exert de facto influence on American policy against the Soviet bloc.  
 
On 6 January, 1949, the State Department formally and unconditionally approved the first 
list of projects drafted by OPC. This proposal was developed during Advisory Council 
meetings between OPC and the Departments of State and Defense during the winter of 
1948. In its final form as presented to the Departments in early 1949, the list of projects 
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referred back to both the Planning Staff’s “inauguration of political warfare” paper and to 
NSC 10/2. This meant that while OPC proposed both the selective collection of 
operations envisaged several months earlier by PPS, it also drew upon a far broader range 
of activities sanctioned under NSC 10/2 to incorporate military needs. The more 
expansive operations were generally directed towards wartime planning. This indicated 
the real possibility that this boundary could be crossed in peacetime should such 
operations move from pure planning to implementation before the outbreak of war. 
 
The proposal divided political warfare development within OPC into five functional 
groups. Under the rubric of psychological warfare, media, radio and other 
“miscellaneous” activities were considered including “direct mail, poison pen, rumors 
etc.” These measures were effectively a throwback to NSC 4-A and an extension of the 
activities already initiated by SPG a year before. The continuity between them was 
strengthened with the new organisation inheriting the leftovers from SPG, including a 
modest amount of unspent funds and a small selection of propaganda and covert 
financing projects. 
 
Political warfare was defined as supporting underground resistance movements, 
employing displaced persons and refugees, encouraging defections from the Soviet bloc 
and aiding anti-communists in “Free” countries. These missions were also in line with the 
earlier PPS memorandum and NSC 10/2. But unlike the envisaged psychological warfare 
measures, these actions urgently required strategic clarification prior to their 
employment. Where psychological warfare was merely a method to obstruct, harass, and 
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discredit Soviet-led communism, these political warfare measures went much further in 
aspiring to break up or significantly undermine communist regimes. OPC’s proposed 
political warfare activities therefore also complimented the general goals endorsed in 
NSC 20/4. But crucially, OPC did not also receive from the State Department (or 
anywhere else) more specific strategic guidance that had failed to be provided by NSC 
20/4 to structure the implementation of operations and ensure their advisability and 
feasibility.  
 
The third functional group was to be responsible for economic warfare comprising 
commodity and fiscal operations. This harked back to NSC 10/2 more than to the 
Planning Staff proposal. PPS was initially vague on the employment of economic 
warfare, illustrating that the strengths and interests of Kennan, Davies and others lay 
primarily in political measures. By early 1949 PPS began to consider the uses of 
economic warfare to counter communist power, particularly in light of Tito’s situation, 
but this was only after OPC had been authorised to proceed with economic warfare 
operations. While the Planning Staff conveyed grand aspirations about harnessing 
“Titoism” to break up Moscow’s centrifugal domination of its satellites, at the same time 
it quietly admitted that economic measures offered the best practical opportunity to make 
an impact.33  
 
In conjunction with the political warfare division, the fourth functional group could 
potentially drive OPC into peacetime operations of a far more offensive character than 
the Planning Staff had earlier intended. Under a preventative direct action section, 
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planning and training would begin for the wartime measures requested by the military 
services. Generated by widespread fears in military circles that war with Soviet Union 
was imminent, this included support of guerillas, sabotage, counter-sabotage, demolition 
and evacuation programmes. The military also called for OPC to start establishing “stay-
behind networks” in Western Europe in peacetime. These small well-trained groups 
should only become active in the event of a Soviet military invasion of Western Europe, 
both as sources of intelligence and as points of resistance behind enemy lines. The final 
functional group was to undertake various miscellaneous responsibilities including the 
preparation of front organisations and war plans as well as to house OPC’s administrative 
staff.34 
 
The available documentation suggests that Kennan was primarily responsible for 
evaluating and approving the OPC proposal. On 6 January, 1949, he signed off on the 
OPC projects on behalf of the State Department, and it is unclear whether he received the 
prior support of the Secretary and Undersecretary of State. Presumably the proposals 
were also sent to the Pentagon for endorsement, although the key approval in peacetime 
was from State. In all likelihood it was the military’s liaison officer to OPC Joseph 
McNarney who gave the initial proposals the backing of the Department of Defense. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the OPC proposal went higher up the chain of 
command, to either the Secretaries of State and Defense or to the White House. At the 
time that OPC was finalising its first wave of projects Marshall was winding down in his 
capacity as Secretary of State, while Forrestal was cutting an increasingly erratic and 
marginal figure at the Pentagon.  
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All this contributed to the lack of an authoritative external overseer to assess the OPC 
proposals. Kennan did not recognise the potential pitfall that such an unconditional 
endorsement might come to exceed the operational mandate envisaged by the Planning 
Staff. Kennan relied on the arrangement of an extremely selective and narrow base from 
which OPC would be given strategic guidance, as organised since August 1948. By 
controlling the strategic orders passed down to Wisner he hoped to shape the direction of 
OPC’s activities.  
 
There were significant problems with this arrangement. As has been noted already, there 
were significant flaws concerning the strategic aspects of U.S. policy towards Eastern 
Europe. While it was logical that OPC would integrate into existing U.S. policies in 
Western Europe it was far from clear how this proposed set of generic covert operations 
would be translated in practice in Soviet bloc countries. Moreover, as Kennan’s role 
faded there was an increasing reticence within the Planning Staff to confront strategic 
issues and deliver such guidance to OPC.  
 
Exacerbating this problem, the operational guidance and liaison channels into OPC were 
founded on a much wider base than the procedures established for strategic direction. 
This meant that while the flow of strategic guidance was restricted and increasingly 
minimal, there was a simultaneous burgeoning of operational advice from a more 
extensive and diverse group of officials in the military as well as the Planning Staff. The 
inaugural list of operations went beyond the Planning Staff’s earlier political warfare 
proposal because it reflected the military influence imparted by NSC 10/2. So for 
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instance the inclusion of wartime “preventative direct action” projects in the report did 
not raise any eyebrows in PPS because military representatives had been in close 
consultation with OPC alongside the State Department in preparation of the final 
proposal.  
 
Instead of promoting the selective consideration of operations on the merit of their 
strategic viability, Kennan inadvertently served to strengthen the case for launching more 
activities. Kennan’s only qualification to Wisner at the operational outset of OPC was 
that “this presentation contains the minimum of what is required from the foreign policy 
stand-point in the way of covert operations during the coming year.” Kennan had in mind 
the functional groups responsible for psychological and political warfare, rather than the 
sections receiving military liaison responsible for wartime planning. He told Wisner that 
there “may be one or two instances in which we will have to ask you to add to the list of 
functions set forth in this representation.” This was by no means a call for a blanket 
expansion of OPC projects, including the use of revolutionary guerrilla tactics behind the 
iron curtain in peacetime. Rather it indicated that the Planning Staff was still coming to 
grips with the ways in which OPC might be utilised in peacetime, that the political 
warfare project was a work in progress. Kennan hoped to keep the State Department’s 
options open, believing that in all likelihood PPS would develop supplementary 
initiatives over the next few months that would augment the political warfare 
programmes it had already asked OPC to initiate.  
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This attitude also demonstrates that the departmental liaison officers were from the very 
beginning willing to give OPC considerable autonomy in planning operations, even while 
Kennan was still at the apex of responsibility. Kennan’s judgment that OPC would be 
called to undertake more projects in the near future encouraged the tendency towards an 
expansive approach to political warfare and indicated that policy was still being drawn up 
in an ad hoc fashion within the State Department. The implication that Wisner’s initial 
list of projects was insufficient tacitly encouraged further OPC planning beyond its initial 
set of proposals. All this tended to place greater emphasis on action rather than on a 
selective strategic approach. As a result the strategic dilemmas over how to tackle Eastern 
Europe were eclipsed by the operational impetus to get projects underway. Indeed such 
action appeared to be urgent. “As the international situation develops,” Kennan informed 
Wisner, “every day makes more evident the importance of the role which will have to 
played by covert operations if our national interests are to be adequately protected.”35 
This message carried clear risks because Wisner required little motivation from Kennan 
to take more action from.  Although this was of itself not a problem, the resulting glut of 
operations would simultaneously need to be externally scrutinised by the departments for 
their strategic value. There was no meaningful structure, will, or strategic basis that 
existed to ensure this. These factors therefore contributed to the independent activist 
culture that immediately flourished within OPC. 
 
OPC’s Autonomy and the Futility of Policy Guidance 
The lack of formal oversight procedures and the inability of anyone to take up the 
strategic mantle after Kennan’s decline opened up the space for operations to diverge 
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from policy. A vacuum resulted in which no one was able to oversee or direct the entire 
political warfare programme. While the operational vacuum was filled by Wisner and the 
OPC leadership, without the strict application of strategic guidelines the linkage of OPC-
initiated operations to policy objectives was tenuous. In Western Europe the divergence 
of operations and policy was not so pronounced because OPC was compelled to integrate 
with U.S. Government agencies already implementing official policies in the field. But in 
the Soviet bloc, where the United States exerted minimal influence, coordination between 
policy-makers and field operatives broke down and this ultimately fostered the non-
strategic employment of operations. The frailties of NSC 10/2 and the August 1948 
“understanding” ensured that Washington’s approach would be random and disorganised. 
This undermined Washington’s attempts to fulfill the aspirations that it had subscribed to 
in NSC 20/4 to retract Soviet power from Eastern Europe and muddled the strategic 
objectives that OPC was purportedly intended to pursue.  
 
The strategic flaws undermining U.S. policies towards the Soviet bloc were compounded 
by OPC’s swift increase in stature. The symbiotic relationship that rapidly developed 
between OPC and the departments was part of the problem. OPC was created to carry out 
the wishes of the departments but it quickly evolved into an equal partner. PPS took an 
active interest in its own projects that it passed on to OPC for implementation. It also 
wanted to be kept informed of any major OPC initiatives developed in the political 
warfare field. But the State Department backed away from actively overseeing OPC’s 
military-initiated plans or activities.  
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The overburdened departmental representatives did not see it as their role to supervise 
OPC. They wanted to be kept informed of any major political warfare programmes and to 
supply Wisner with projects of their own for OPC to implement. As a consequence, the 
weekly meetings with Wisner deteriorated into meaningless affairs. According to one 
observer the liaison often “degenerated into a sort of stereotyped chore for all 
concerned.”36 Here, OPC operations were not closely evaluated and assessed by the 
liaison officials, with restrictions placed on them where necessary. To the contrary the 
departmental representatives tended to be extremely sympathetic to any projects 
suggested by Wisner and his team, rarely denying him permission to proceed on large 
projects that he brought to their attention.  
 
Even when Nitze replaced Kennan as head of PPS, the departmental meetings with OPC 
continued to be “a kind of validating board that met in Wisner’s office” according to one 
eyewitness.37 This meant that minimal overall supervision was applied, while the 
guidance OPC received was so vague that it left “maximum opportunity for project 
development” in the hands of OPC and not the departments.38 The transmission of 
“guidance” to OPC was haphazard at best and this fostered a culture of independence 
whereby OPC could initiate its own projects without the exercise of any external scrutiny 
or control.39  
 
The liaison arrangement excluded other divisions within the departments from having 
contact with OPC. Bureaucratic compartmentalisation was a real problem that could 
fragment the position of each department on any given policy. This undercut any unified 
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departmental approach to the question of dealing with the Soviet bloc. An example of this 
institutional segregation was embodied in PPS’s exclusive access to OPC. Other sections 
within the State Department, including the geographic desks and foreign embassies, were 
cut out of the political warfare planning loop. Knowledge of NSC 10/2’s approval was 
limited to only a handful of members of the department in an attempt to maintain tight 
security over OPC activities.40 But the “need to know” approach led to a splintering of 
policies between different sections of the same department.  
 
There were important consequences of this strict compartmentalisation of political 
warfare within the bureaucracy. Strategic planning towards Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union incorporating political warfare could not be unified on a pan-departmental 
basis. Offices within the departments with a primary interest in Soviet bloc policy, such 
as the regional desks in the State Department, were effectively excluded from OPC’s 
affairs. These groups were unable to participate in either the planning or the oversight of 
political warfare to guarantee OPC’s accountability, despite its direct relevance to their 
work.  This meant that while the geographic desks could promote policies towards the 
Soviet bloc independently of PPS, there were no mechanisms to ensure that they 
corresponded with political warfare projects initiated either by the Planning Staff or by 
OPC itself. As a result there was ample opportunity for major conflicts of interest. 
 
The vacuum of independent oversight committee and formal procedures to coordinate 
and regulate OPC beyond the weekly consultations, gave OPC generous latitude to 
develop into a “quasi-independent entity.”41 This autonomy, originally encouraged to 
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separate OPC from superfluous ties to the CIA, fostered an operational culture of 
expansion rather than regulation. OPC’s autonomous bureaucratic position was quickly 
consolidated by Wisner. Key to this was making OPC practically self-sufficient as this 
ensured that it was not beholden to the departments. Wisner rapidly expanded the original 
skeletal staff, drawing upon his wartime contacts within OSS and tapping into “the P 
source” of Ivy Leaguers and Wall Street lawyers to attract the brightest and most 
dynamic young Americans into his organisation.42 This allowed the fledgling agency to 
establish its own political warfare expertise independent of the CIA, the military or PPS. 
OPC also secured its own facilities and equipment where possible, making it less reliant 
on external operational assistance. This immediately set it apart from rival departmental 
intelligence agencies that invariably depended on their parent organisations for logistical 
support. As OPC became better equipped its practical need to collaborate with the 
departments when it came to conducting operations was exponentially reduced.  
 
A culture quickly developed within OPC, spurred on by Wisner’s infectious and dynamic 
leadership, fostering an institutional loyalty to OPC itself and not to either the CIA or the 
departments.43 William Colby recollects how Wisner cultivated “the atmosphere of an 
order of Knights Templar, to save Western freedom from Communist darkness” in the 
early years of the Cold War.44 Western European operations were coordinated with the 
various departments and agencies active on the ground. But increasing emphasis was 
placed on operations against the Soviet bloc, for which OPC tended to look to the 
Department of Defense for operational support rather than strategic guidance, for instance 
with cooperation in using military equipment to facilitate its secret missions.  
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At the same time the State Department’s strategic control over OPC was diminishing. 
While OPC was not meant to be a policy-making body, its initiation of operations 
effectively meant that it was a de facto shaper of policy. Charles Whitehurst, an OPC 
operative on the Far Eastern desk, recalled how “Wisner would tell us to keep our mouths 
shut because we weren’t supposed to make policy.” Much more important than formal 
chains of command and official policy statements were the social links. Whitehurst 
recalls that policy was often made “at a dinner party” rather than at the conference 
table.45 Wisner also looked beyond the State Department, tapping into an extremely 
influential professional and social network of New York and Washington lawyers, 
academics and government figures to garner support for OPC’s activities. The weekly 
OPC-Department meetings proved totally inadequate as a means of managing and 
coordinating the ever-increasing raft of programs initiated not only by the departments 
but by OPC itself. One OPC official recalled how under a tangible sense of community 
Wisner and his staff “arrogated themselves total power, with no inhibiting precedent. 
They could do what they wanted, just as long as the “higher authority,” as we called the 
president, did not expressly forbid it.”46  
 
OPC’s semi-independence from the Departments depended on its ability to freely expend 
secret funds. It quickly secured several sources of spending power, including access to 
the lucrative ERP counterpart funds. OPC’s budget was appropriated to the Departments 
of Defense and State but was formally housed within the CIA as an administrative 
arrangement to hide it from public disclosure. In practice, after the August 1948 
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“understanding” had been reached, Hillenkoetter did not attempt to influence the way in 
which the OPC budget was spent.  
 
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, signed into law on 20 June, confirmed 
OPC’s budgetary independence from the government bureaucracy.47 Section 10 (b) 
granted unrivalled freedom to the DCI, and by extension to the ADPC, to spend 
Congressional appropriations without regard for normal governmental oversight 
procedures: 
The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to 
the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of 
Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or 
emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the 
certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a 
sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.48 
 
Many CIA veterans recall the earliest days of the Agency as “halcyon” because of the 
benign relationship it enjoyed with Congress in that period. While the Agency reported to 
four congressional committees, the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in 
the House and the Senate, in practice this only involved contact with a handful of 
congressmen. Their attitude tended to be one of non-interference and therefore securing 
the budgets it requested was never a problem for the Agency at this time. In 1995 Richard 
Helms recounted how the House Appropriations Committee Chairman Clarence Cannon 
would take hearings on the Agency’s budget proposal with two or three other 
Representatives present:  
[Cannon] would end the session by pointing out very carefully to the Director 
that he should not go around talking to a lot of Congressmen because they 
leaked all the time, that he would take of the budget and not to worry about it, 
and that secrecy was all important in this kind of activity. 
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According to Helms the “same situation existed in the Senate.”49 Once the CIA Act was 
passed, the DCI was imbued with full authority to expend these funds. According to 
another CIA veteran, Deputy CIA General Counsel John Warner, it was “a blank check to 
the Director of Central Intelligence to spend it any way he sees fit.”50  
 
Wisner did not have direct control over OPC’s budget. Theoretically this presented an 
alternative indirect means of regulating OPC’s activities. CIA legal counsel Larry 
Houston demonstrated in October 1948 that there was still the will in the Agency to 
contest the usurpation of its control of OPC by the departments.51 But Hillenkoetter was 
content to leave OPC to the departments and never attempted to contest the August 1948 
“understanding” by flexing CIA’s budgetary muscle. As Walter Pforzheimer later 
recounted, “if he [Hillenkoetter] interfered, there would have been a call from the State 
Department.”52 OPC therefore enjoyed almost unlimited spending power, as Greenway 
recalled: “We couldn’t spend it all. I remember once meeting with Wisner and the 
comptroller. My God, I said, how can we spend that? There were no limits and nobody 
had to account for it. It was amazing.”53 
 
OPC’s internal bureaucracy was also not conducive to the strategic development of 
operations. Within OPC, just as within the departments, the institution evolved into 
fragmented compartments. OPC headquarters based in Washington, D.C. was responsible 
for initiating projects and making certain that they were closely coordinated and 
consistent with the official policy line handed down from the departments. OPC 
headquarters was organised into four functional staffs dealing with political, 
 314
psychological, paramilitary and economic warfare programmes respectively. Six 
geographic divisions were also established and the divisions were meant to receive 
administrative support from the functional staffs. But as soon as the system was 
organised it generated a great deal of friction between the functional staffs, the 
geographic divisions and the field stations who became “competitors” rather than “joint 
participants” in a coordinated effort.54 According to an internal study conducted in 
November 1950 “the present organization makes for duplication of effort and an 
extensive amount of unnecessary coordination and competition rather than cooperation 
and teamwork [....]” OPC’s leadership was unable from the beginning to effectively 
manage and coordinate the preparation of operations within its own headquarters. The 
signs were extremely inauspicious for the prospects of coordinating departmental policy 
with OPC’s field operations.55  
 
The coordination of policy and operations faced an additional institutional hurdle. While 
OPC’s Washington headquarters was responsible for initiating and planning projects, it 
was the function of the various field stations to implement them through OPC field task 
forces. OPC rapidly expanded, prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, and this 
expansion saw a growth in the number of field stations being operated to 47 by June 
1950.56 This rapid expansion soon overtook the precarious management style and system 
overseen by Wisner and his senior staff. This undercut their ability, in the words of one 
intelligence historian, to “keep up with the amoeba like dividing and proliferation of 
subelements which occurred.”57 As they grew in number and size the field stations 
increasingly asserted their own initiative in planning operations rather than maintaining 
 315
the formal procedure of receiving and implementing projects from Washington, 
according to the Church Committee historian Anna Karalekas: 
Predictably, field personnel began to develop their own perspective on 
suitable operations and their mode of conduct [….] Gradually, as the numbers 
of overseas personnel grew and the number of stations increased, the stations 
assumed the initiative in project development.58  
 
This breakdown within OPC over the formal control of project development created 
another displacement of departmental policy from OPC’s field operations. This further 
impaired the overall centralised coordination and strategic employment of political 
warfare operations that were divorced from Washington’s policy-making circles.  
 
The frenzied environment that belied OPC was not entirely inadvertent. Actually, a 
dynamic if disorganised culture within OPC was nurtured by its senior staff. Wisner was 
naturally action-oriented in such sharp contrast to the cautious Hillenkoetter. His 
crusading zeal and visceral anti-communist convictions filtered throughout his 
organisation from the Washington headquarters to the field stations. Despite Kennan’s 
previous declaration of State Department authority to direct political warfare operations, 
attitudes within OPC rendered departmental opinion increasingly irrelevant during the 
course of 1949. Instead of viewing operations as supportive of general departmental 
policy, a more assertive, project-oriented approach developed whereby the operation 
rather than the policy it was supporting became the end for OPC officials.59 Action rather 
than caution was encouraged by the incentive of rewards tending to derive from the 
preparation of projects and their implantation as operations. Commendation and 
promotion were far more likely to result when an operator threw caution to the wind and 
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proceeded with an operation.60 As a result projects tended to expand exponentially, as 
William Corson eloquently observes: 
[…] each of the various streams of covert activities- psychological warfare, 
political warfare, economic warfare, and preventative direct action- had a way 
of broadening out, and a single “project,” not really thought through in terms 
of risks, ends, purposes, and consequences, became the precedent and 
justification for a trickle of similar ones. From them a torrent emerged, 
engulfing intelligence operators [….]61 
 
In the first years of OPC’s existence the perception was that there was little to lose in 
pursuing operations and much to gain. Its vibrant staff of youthful cold warriors 
enthusiastically planned and implemented operations against the Soviet bloc for personal, 
professional and ideological reasons. This fostered a disorganised scatter-gun approach to 
operations rather than a tightly-knit programme retaining a firm grip on uniform methods 
and objectives. 
 
The Launch of Operations by OPC 
Due to the secretive nature of the activities OPC engaged in, it remains problematic to 
this day to conduct a comprehensive review of the political warfare operations conducted 
against the Soviet bloc from late 1948 onwards. On the one hand, these missions were 
extremely sensitive and conducted amid high security. Frustratingly, sixty years on a 
considerable amount of information regarding the development of political warfare plans 
contained in U.S. archives remains classified. Furthermore, there are substantial gaps in 
the evidence available on the OPC operations themselves quite simply because such 
details were never recorded in written form. Unlike policy papers and strategic decisions 
which are of course subject to processing and development within government 
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bureaucracies, accounting for the practical undertaking of missions is almost totally 
reliant on the more haphazard source of eye-witness testimonies.62 
 
Despite these shortcomings, there is sufficient evidence to provide an adequate historical 
record of OPC’s missions against the Soviet bloc in the early Cold War, although it is 
hoped that more evidence becomes available to allow a fuller picture.63 From 1949 the 
U.S. launched operations against Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Soviet 
Moldavia and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.64 More is known about 
OPC operations undertaken against Albania, Yugoslavia, Poland and the Ukraine in the 
early Cold War, and a brief description of these particular actions will follow.  
 
All these secret missions varied widely in terms of both their tactics and their 
objectives.65 Some were conducted as strictly intelligence and reconnaissance missions, 
to gather vital information on Soviet military levels and capabilities. Other operations 
were conducted in coordination with the Pentagon’s strategic war planning. OPC inserted 
small teams of agents to establish sleeper cells and stay-behind networks behind enemy 
lines. These could be activated in the event of war breaking out between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, deemed an important role as many believed that such a conflict 
was imminent.66 OPC was therefore required by the military to set up evacuation routes 
for downed U.S. pilots and resistance leaders, to provide intelligence on enemy troop 
strengths and movements, and to conduct harassment and sabotage operations against 
specific enemy targets and retard the enemy advance.67 Certain projects and operations 
also went well beyond these limited aims. Washington explicitly sanctioned at least one 
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campaign to topple a ruling communist regime behind the iron curtain, despite the 
provocative nature of such efforts and the inevitable dim view by which these actions 
would be taken in Moscow. 
 
Albania: Operation Valuable  
The most notorious operation in this ilk is the joint Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)-OPC 
campaign to overthrow Enver Hoxha’s communist government in Albania.68 This 
country was identified as the “first target” of an offensive liberation programme in 
November 1948 by the British Russia Committee.69 Albania was deemed appropriate 
because it was geographically isolated from the rest of the Soviet bloc following Tito’s 
split with Stalin in mid-1948. Western officials felt it might be susceptible to a political 
warfare campaign as it was a relatively small and weak member of the communist bloc. 
Despite its relative strategic insignificance, there were also positive strategic reasons for 
overthrowing the communist regime in Albania and separating it from Moscow. For 
example, the Hoxha regime continued to support the long-running Greek communist 
insurgency. Furthermore, intelligence reports indicated that the Soviets were planning to 
build a submarine base at Velona Bay, allowing them direct access to the vital sea lanes 
in the Mediterranean.70  
le 
 
The British SIS planned to train and then infiltrate teams of Albanian agents inside the 
country to stir up a partisan resistance movement, with the ultimate aim being to topp
Hoxha’s communist regime. But a lack of resources available to the British quickly 
forced its hand to turn to Washington to come in on the Albanian venture. The British 
 319
delegation led by SIS’s William Hayter that met with State Department and OPC officia
in Washington was warmly received, with Wisner and Joyce enthusiastically endorsing 
the project. Wisner identified the Albanian operation, codenamed Valuable by the Brit




 be feasible elsewhere” within the Soviet bloc without provoking a 





e more disorderly exercise of authority over OPC’s various 





A Special Policy Committee (SPC) was promptly set up in Washington to exercise bro
operational control over Operation Valuable. SPC consisted of representatives of the 
various interested parties- Robert Joyce from the State Department, Frank Lindsay from 
OPC, Earl Jellicoe of the British Embassy and Kim Philby, the Soviet mole who w
SIS representative in Washington. The organisation and character of the Albanian 
operation was therefore distinct from other offensive activities conducted by OPC. It was 
conducted with the unequivocal blessing of senior administrative officials in Washington 
(as well as London). Secretary of State Acheson gave the green light following a meetin
with his British counterpart Ernest Bevin in September 1949.72 As a result of this high-
level endorsement, Operation Valuable had an integrated chain of command, forming a
“bridge between the State Department and intelligence operations.” This set-up was a 
considerable departure from th
o
 
Tighter operational planning and control was certainly beneficial. So too was the fact th
the Anglo-American team identified specific aims and methods towards Albania. A
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result they could organise the requisite capabilities to meet their operational g
Instead of wavering between “liberation” and “evolution,” the endgame was 
unambiguously to overthrow Hoxha. From 1949 teams of Albanian “pixies” we
in paramilitary techniques in Malta by the British and in West Germany by the 
Americans. These agents were to be infiltrated by sea, over land and by air to rally an 
indigenous resistance movement that, once suffi
oals. 
re trained 
ciently powerful, would move against the 
ling communist authorities.  
cted the 
ed that the 




Nevertheless, the project threw up numerous problems at the policy and operational 
levels. Firstly, Acheson’s endorsement of Operation Valuable actually contradi
official policies of the State Department. Here was an explicit endorsement of 
“liberation” at the operational level even though policymakers continued to refuse to 
commit to such a strategy within official policies, instead propounding the alternative 
approach of Titoism through various NSC directives. When given a clear and seemingly 
viable proposition to liberate a communist country, Acheson demonstrat
a
 
Acheson’s impulsive decision overrode the State Department’s non-committal stance on 
its support for revolution and flew in the face of the opinion of his advisers.74 On the day 
before the Secretary of State met with Bevin to confirm American support for Operat
Valuable, his Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Perkins sent 
Acheson a memorandum warning him to be careful not to commit to “any premature 
opening up of this question” that the British might encourage. According to Perkins the 
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m the Hoxha regime towards 
proving relations between the two countries.77    
 
etached 
.” On the 
aramilitary operations are rarely a viable substitute for conventional military action.”79   
 
istance 
75 Of most concern was the impact it might have on Tito’s 
retention of power in Yugoslavia by providing a Soviet pretext for military interven
there. Potentially it could also reignite the Greek civil war that was dying down by 
1949.76 Moreover, the Albanian project supplanted the internal debates within the 
Department over whether to accept recent moves fro
im
 
Despite some positive features of the American approach to the planning of the Albanian 
operations, the campaign that began in earnest in October 1949 ended in abject failure. It 
proved impossible for the west to incite an effective resistance movement against Hoxha 
primarily because the campaign was based upon a misguided strategic premise. As Harry
Rositzke observes, even a “weak regime” like Cold War Albania could not be d
from the Soviet orbit “by covert paramilitary actions alone.”78 Michael Dravis 
corroborates this conclusion, arguing that wartime unconventional operations proved 
useful against Nazi Germany as “natural corollaries to a larger military strategy
other hand the “Anglo-American plan for Albania was flawed because covert 
p
 
Indeed, two contemporary CIA reports produced in September and December 1949 had
warned of this very early into the campaign. According to the pessimistic judgment of 
Agency analysts, there was little chance of successfully fomenting indigenous res
movements capable of toppling Hoxha.80 This totally contrasted with the feeling 
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prevalent in OPC at the time that “we had only to shake the trees and the ripe plums 
would fall.”81 The CIA’s more realistic assessment was borne out by events as, despite 
Albania’s relative weakness and the proportionately large Anglo-American mobilisatio
of anti-communist forces against Hoxha, the Anglo-American insertions were utterly 
ineffective against the ruthless Albanian security forces. The western-trained guerrillas 
were completely undermined both by Kim Philby’s treachery, and more importantly





 soon as 
ey entered Albanian territory. The luckiest escaped by fleeing overland to Greece. 
cut 
 
arly 1950s and morale 
mongst the Albanian émigré communities had plummeted.85  
82 From his OSO vantage point, Richard Helms recognised 
“some of these operations OPC was taking on as being overly ambitious, too big to be
really secure” and therefore “natural targets for penetration.”83 Many Albanian agents 
were ambushed by Hoxha’s secret police, the Sigurimi, and captured or killed as
th
 
Although Wisner initially brandished Operation Valuable a test case for the viability of 
liberation, operations were allowed to drag on despite the record of dismal failure until 
Tirana’s public exposure of the campaign in 1954. The failure of the Americans to 
their losses sooner has astounded historians ever since. For instance Robin Winks 
observes that “Seldom has an intelligence operation proceeded so resolutely from one
disaster to another.”84 Nicholas Bethell describes the “bizarre decision” taken by the 




The inability to overthrow the Hoxha regime also papered over the cracks of the 
inadequacies of longer-term politico-strategic planning. The thorny question of who 
should replace Hoxha in the event of his overthrow proved extremely difficult to resolve 
given the divergent views of the Americans and the British and the divisive relationships 
between the various exile Albanian communities.86 A covert, but nonetheless problema
link was made between the field operations and an Albanian political face. An Albanian 
National Committee under the leadership of Mithat Frashëri was established under th
auspices of NCFE. This was intended to provide the basis of an Albanian government
exile while the covert political warfare operations were undertaken to oust Hoxha’s 
regime. Unfortunately for the Anglo-Americans, the deep rifts between the Albanian
exile communities undermined any chance of there ever being a united political front to 





aramilitary programme being undertaken. Operations were 








A Misplaced Action against Yugoslavia 
Ever since Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform in mid-1948 the State Department ha
attempted to mould a policy both specific to Yugoslavia and with broader connotatio
for the region to exploit divisions within the communist bloc. The resultant policy of 
fostering “Titoism” under the NSC 18 series and later directives was predicated on 
supporting the “heretic” Yugoslav leader and protecting his regime from encroachments 
by the Soviet Union and its satellites. Yet Beatrice Heuser has observed that Yugoslavia
may in fact have been OPC’s first target following the adoption of NSC 10/2 to detac
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communist nation from the Soviet bloc.87 Wisner’s office began to infiltrate right-wing 
Monarchist exiles into Yugoslavia with a view to overthrowing Tito’s regime. In an 
incredibly divisive move that could only be regarded as an affront to the Yugoslav leade
the majority of those inserted were Serbian Chetniks who had fought a bitter civil war 
with Tito’s Partisans during the war ag
r, 
ainst Nazi Germany. Inconceivably, these exiles 





ered regime. It 
 an episode that demonstrates just how wide operations were able to diverge from 
idiotic 
w
and arrested by the security police.88   
 
It is quite remarkable that a covert OPC campaign was launched to undermine the 
Yugoslav regime in 1948-9. This utterly contradicted Washington’s official posit
that country and more damagingly, it fundamentally undercut the basis for the entire
regional policy of encouraging further deviationist leaders to emerge within the 
communist camp. Any exposure of western perfidy against Tito could only compe
greater loyalty and cohesion within the Soviet sphere and discourage national communis
dissidents from seeking closer ties with Washington or London. Furthermore, the 
Yugoslav operation directly conflicted with the parallel overt and covert policies being 
implemented by the State Department, particularly the outward shows of diplomatic 
support and clandestine shipment of arms and economic aid to the beleagu
is
policies within the context of the strategic vacuum and OPC’s autonomy. 
 
Reaction in Washington and London following the exposure of the misguided operation 
was fittingly incredulous. In the Foreign Office Charles Bateman described “this 
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American behaviour” as “inconceivably stupid,” a feeling that Foreign Secretary Bevin 
sympathised with and passed on to the State Department.89 U.S. Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia Cavendish Cannon first learned of the OPC operation ex post facto. He too 
was horrified that OPC could engage in such an amateurish and counter-productive 
activity. In a furious cable back to Washington he reminded his superiors that the agr
policy was to seek the proliferation of the Titoist example as it was the “sole apparent 
agency for undermining Soviet influence in East Europe.” According to Cannon the 
notion that Tito’s downfall would result in a more representative and Western-o
regime constituted a “highly wishful approach to east European political realities.” There 
was, according to him, a total lack of leadership and organisation amongst anti-
communists and non-communist groups who could possibly supplant the current regime. 
In contrast, the Cominform “is ready to exploit by force any weakening in Tito’s secur
apparatus. We are not ready and not likely to be.” Similarly to Operation Valuable, little
thought had been given to the complex issue of the post-revolution political situation. 






.S. could undermine Tito and simultaneously plant democratic roots. “In Yugoslavia 





there are not three choices b
 
Poland: Support of WIN 
OPC launched another project in the late 1940s that went well beyond the purportedl
limited policies of the State Department. Wisner and his colleagues in OPC aimed instea
at encouraging and equipping an anti-communist resistance movement to topple the 
ruling communist government in Poland.91 According to Harry Rositzke, the attemp
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mobilise the Polish Freedom and Independence Movement (with the Polish acronym 
WIN) by the western intelligence services was the “most substantial and disastrous 
paramilitary effort inside the Soviet orbit.”92 Yet at the time the signs were auspicious of
potential success. The Polish campaign appeared to be better conceived than the Albanian 
project because extensive underground anti-Soviet resistance movements had existed in 
Poland and across the Baltic states and the Ukraine since the war. But as Richard Aldr
points out, the timing of the operation w
 
ich 
as not propitious, as by late 1948 when SIS and 
PC attempted to engage with WIN it was already severely depleted and thoroughly 
hree 
ed 
nants of the 
olish government in exile based in London that an extensive resistance movement 
O
penetrated by Soviet intelligence.93     
 
As with Operation Valuable, the Polish project originated with the British SIS, but by 
early 1949 Wisner was a keen proponent. With strong support from Colonel Robert 
McDowell at the JCS, OPC took over financing of the operation and the United States 
endeavoured to equip and organise an indigenous resistance network over the next t
years. Unfortunately for the Americans the majority of WIN protagonists had been turn
by the Polish communist security police, the UB, under the guidance of the Soviet 
Ministry of State Security, the MGB. This included the prominent WIN leader Joseph 
Sienko who had managed to “escape” from Poland in 1947 and headed for London. 
Sienko duped the British, and in turn the Americans, by convincing the rem
P
remained in place in Poland with as many as 20,000 committed members.  
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In 1951 doubts were raised by Frank Lindsay and John Bross over the credibility of WIN 
when it requested that OPC parachute in high-ranking U.S. military officers to orchestrat
the resistance movement’s training programme. Bross recollected that the idea of “an 
American general, hanging from a parachute, descending into a Communist country, gav
us some pause for thought.”
e 
e 
pt a significant reassessment. The operation continued to supply agents, arms 
and materiel into the waiting hands of the UB osed by the official Polish 




sation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) 





94 Nonetheless, these concerns over the security of WIN did 
not prom
 until it was exp
communist media in December 1952, m
at OPC. 
 
The Ukraine: Operation ZRELOPE 
OPC also perceived favourable prospects for the anti-Soviet resistance movement in th
Ukraine in the early Cold War.95 Between 1945 and 1950 over 30,000 Soviet military
and Communist Party officials were assassinated by Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas
Stephan Bandera’s extreme right-wing Organi
a
effectiveness was that the Ukrainian guerrilla force generally managed to resist the
penetration of the Soviet security services.96  
 
Spurred on by these successes in the field, OPC began to recruit Ukrainian exiles 
scattered throughout the Displaced Persons camps across Europe. The DP camps were 
valuable source of recruitment for OPC not only in operations against the Ukraine bu
towards the entire eastern bloc. Wisner had understood the significance of the teemin
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DP camps ever since he had first had contact with them soon after his appointment as 
Charles Saltzman’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas within the State 
Department in 1947. He and Lindsay later recruited men like William Sloan Coffin, 
Michael Burke and Carmel Offie into OPC and these officials scoured the DP camps for






les against the eastern bloc. Unfortunately for the American recruiters, the DP camps 
e 
 in 
97  One OPC veteran, Harry Rositzke, 
recollects how “hundreds of courageous men […] preferred to fight the Russians or the 
communists rather than linger in DP camps or emigrate to Brazil. Scores of agents paid 
with their lives for our concern.”98 Another, William Sloane Coffin recalled that “It wa
all tragic, all lost. But it was war. You buried your buddies and kept fighting.”99 Many o
the émigrés recruited by OPC were then organised into national committees under NCFE
where they could be systematically trained and deployed for various politic
ro
were also fertile grounds for the Soviet secret services, and many of those who swelled 
OPC’s ranks had already been turned into double agents against the west. 
 
Young male émigrés of various political backgrounds, including many with chequered 
wartime collaborationist records with the Nazis, were trained to undertake intelligence-
gathering missions and to join up with the resistance movement in the Carpathian 
Mountains under a programme codenamed Operation ZRELOPE.100 The British wer
fairly fatalistic about the prospects of OUN ever being any more than a “nuisance” to the 
Soviets.101 But OPC saw other uses for the Ukrainian resistance movement, particularly 
as tensions with Russia escalated following the Berlin crisis and the outbreak of the 
Korean War. As the perception of imminent war with Moscow increased, the Pentagon
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particular placed high importance on developing “an early warning system, to tip us off i
there were indications of mobilization in the area.”
f 
e movement. According to one former 






ilure when the Ukrainian nationalists were worn down by the Soviet security police. 
The only positive to come out of this, acc o another veteran of the campaign 
avid Murphy, was that “on the other hand, we learned how not to do it.”105  
ely 
102 Faced by what it believed was a 
pending Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the military was therefore prepared to be 
fairly cynical in its use of the Ukrainian resistanc
A
Ukraine as a behind-the-lines counter to a Soviet military action against Western Europ
[…] could play no serious paramilitary role.”103 
 
OPC therefore continued to insert agents and airdrop medical supplies, cash and rad
transmitting equipment into the Ukraine from the late 1940s onwards.104 These efforts 
were once again futile. As one veteran of the OPC campaign in the region, Tom Po
sardonically recounted, the “only thing” proved by these activities was “the law of 
gravity.” By 1953 the strategic infeasibility of resistance movements being able to defe
the Red Army was borne out. As with all the other attempts by OPC to mobilise a 







The tragic irony of the early political warfare campaign waged by the United States and 
its allies against the communist states of the Soviet bloc is that Washington most lik
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contributed to the downfall of the groups inside Eastern Europe that it hoped to support 
by the very nature of its limited commitment to them. The U.S. resort to political warfar
against the eastern bloc was on the one hand too limited and small-scale to achiev
results. There was never a concomitant military commitment to achieve liberation. On the 
other hand, these activities were sufficiently conspicuous and threatening to arouse the 
concerted interest of the Soviet and local communist secret police services. This 





f the Soviet secret police system and increasing reliance on repressive measures to 
ounteract the rise of nationalism or anti-communism. The limited American political 
arfare campaign proved to be no match against such a formidable adversary.   
106 In the Ukraine a





















                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 The organisation was still designated OSP at this time, but for ease it is referred to here as OPC.  
 
2 Memorandum of Conversation and Understanding, 6 August, 1948, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence 
,” 112-3, Grose, Operation Rollback, 110, Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence 
gency George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy , 
 1953 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
992), 78, and Rudgers, “The Origins of Covert Action.,” 255. 
0, 
 and 
s Division” under the DCI. This would have effectively 




illenkoetter as “a very ineffective and pedestrian officer,” while he considered the CIA operation “lousy” 
49, 
RUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Documents 373, 357 and 359. 
s largely apathetic to 
 
Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 298. Also see Corke, “George Kennan and the Inauguration of 
Political Warfare
A , 42, Miscamble, , 108-9, Mitrovich
Undermining the Kremlin, 19-20, Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of 
Central Intelligence: October 1950-February
1
 
3 Kennan to Lovett, 29 October, 1948, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-195
Document 305. 
 
4 Houston to Hillenkoetter, “Responsibility and Control for OPC,” 19 October, 1948, Warner, The CIA 
under Harry Truman, Document 46, 235-9. 
 
5 Several opportunities did arise, foremost of which was the recommendation in NSC 50 that OSO
OPC should be integrated into an “Operation
re
undermined Hillenkoetter, that one of its principal recommendations indirectly promoted the 
reestablishment of the DCI’s operational authority over OPC. See Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith
as Director of Central Intelligence, 47, 111, DCI Hillenkoetter letter to Secretary of State Acheson, 19 
August, 1949, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 394, De
Special Assistant Howe to Armstrong, 8 September, 1949, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence 
Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 398. 
 
6 Hillenkoetter’s demise began when the ISG final report released on 1 January, 1949, blamed inadeq
leadership and direction of CIA principally on the DCI. From the moment that ISG submitted its report it 
was widely understood within the administration that Hillenkoetter was to be replaced and whispers of his 
shortcomings became increasingly frequent. Lovett was particularly damning in his opinion of 
H
up to this point. See Report from the Intelligence Survey Group to the NSC, “The Central Intelligence 
Organization and National Organization for Intelligence,” 1 January, 1949, FRUS, Emergence of the 
Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, Document 358, Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as 
Director of Central Intelligence, 48, Director of the Executive Secretariat Humelsine to Undersecretary of 
State Webb, 8 March, 1949, Blum Letter to Correa, 18 December, 1948, Blum to Dulles, 19 January, 19
F
 
7 From the summer of 1949 following heavy criticism in NSC 50, Hillenkoetter wa
Wisner’s organisation, and for that matter the Agency itself. He became “psychologically withdrawn” and 
“unwilling to exercise initiative and leadership” according to Montague. Symptomatic of this, his attitude
towards the Intelligence Advisory Committee became “passive” and “sarcastic,” resulting in its functional 
demise. See Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, 47-8, 78. 
 
 332
                                                                                                                                                 
lishment, 1945-1950, 





ion as the State Department’s representative on the NSC Staff in 
ecember 1948, being replaced in this role by George Butler. Kennan to Souers, 2 December, 1948, RG 
 ten members in September 1948 in part to accommodate its political warfare role. Carlton 
avage explained that “[a]dditional responsibilities brought about through the involvement of the Planning 
ge to 
yrnes, 9 September, 1948, RG 59, PPS, Box 33, NARA. 
 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 40. 
 Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Schribner’s, 
t Men, 29. 
norable Men, 73, Corke, “George 
ennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare,” 113-4, Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American 
-200, 227-8, Karalekas, History of the 
entral Intelligence Agency, 46-8, Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign 
ins of Covert Action.,” 256. For an account of his exploits in wartime 
omania see Eduard Mark, “The OSS in Romania, 1944-45: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold 
 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 19-23, Hersh, The Old Boys, 159.  
 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 30. 
8 On DCI Walter Bedell Smith’s efforts to assert the CIA’s control over political warfare, see Montague, 
General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, 77-105, 202-15. 
 
9 Kennan to Lovett, 29 October, 1948, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Estab
D
personnel for the OPC assignment. Because of the highly classified nature of NSC 10/2 most officials 
not aware of its existence and the importance attached to it by certain senior government figures.  
 
10 This responsibility would switch to the Pentagon should war break out. Its representative Colonel Ivan 
Yeaton (succeeded by Joseph McNarney and then John Magruder) would maintain a link to OPC in 
peacetime and attend weekly meetings with Kennan and Wisner.NSC Meeting, 19 August, 1948, FRU
Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, D
 
11 Kennan also relinquished his posit
D
59, PPS, Box 11, NARA. Moreover, PPS as a body felt the strain of its new responsibilities, expanding 
from seven to
S








14 Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 208. 
 
15 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 30. 
 
16 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 27-8. 
 
17 Miscamble and Thomas both assert that Kennan knew Wisner well through the Washington social 
networks of government officials but they had not in fact met at this point. Miscamble, George F. Kennan 
and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 109, Thomas, The Very Bes
 
18 For accounts of Wisner’s personality and attributes see Colby, Ho
K
Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Schribner’s, 1992), 177
C
Policy, 109, and Rudgers, “The Orig
R








22 CIA General Order No. 10, 27 August, 1948, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-
1950, Document 300. 
 
 333
                                                                                                                                                 
50, Document 306. This document is also available in Warner, The CIA under 
arry Truman, Document 47, 241-2. 
t, 31 August, 1948, RG 59, PPS, Box 33, NARA. Kennan informed the 
ndersecretary that the form submitted to Wisner by him in his capacity as the Department’s representative 
tly this was with the “plausible denial” caveat 
 mind: “This means that I am ostensibly acting in a personal capacity, and can, if necessary, be denied by 
Old Boys, 219. 
8, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 
945-1950, Document 307. The FRUS document speculates on the identity of the men with whom Wisner 
iman, Hoffman and Bruce. Peter Grose states that it was 
 fact Harriman and Hoffman who attended. See Grose, Operation Rollback, 117. 
nathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From 
alta to the Bay of Pigs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 68. 
f a Cold Warrior, 68. 
 John C. Campbell Oral History, HSTL, 196-7. 
 See PPS/59 “U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe,” 25 August, 1949, Nelson, 
 Wisner to Hillenkoetter, 29 October, 1948, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-
able in RG 59, PPS, Box 33, NARA. 
 Richard Stilwell, who oversaw OPC’s Asian Division after the outbreak of the Korean War, quoted in 
 Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 46-7. 
nd Military 
telligence, Book I, Final Report, 1, 107. 




24 See Kennan to Lovet
U
to OPC was “in writing but not on letterhead paper.” Apparen
in
the Secretary.” Just how convincing such denials would be should a form handwritten by a senior State 
Department figure like Kennan be exposed, was left undiscussed. 
25 Lovett letter to Forrestal, 1 October, 1948, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-
1950, Document 301. 
 
26 Forrestal letter to Lovett, 13 October, 1948, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-
1950, Document 304. 
 
27 Richard Harris Smith quoted in Hersh, The 
 
28 Memorandum for the File, 16 November, 194
1
met at this meeting, that it was any two from Harr
in
 
29 Richard M. Bissell with Jo
Y
 
30 Bissell, Reflections o
 





PPS Papers, 1949, 124-38. 
 
34
1950, Document 306. 
 
35 Kennan to Wisner, 6 January, 1949, FRUS, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950, 
Document 308. This document is also avail
 
36 Quoted in Corke, “George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare,” 113. 
 
37




39 Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 112, Foreign a
In
 
40 “List of Department of State and Foreign Service Personnel Having Knowledge of Political Warfare 
Operations,” RG 59, PPS, Box 11A, NARA. 
 
 334
                                                                                                                                                 
Coordination: From NSC 10/2 to NSC 68,” Intelligence 
nd Counter-Intelligence 11, No. 2 (Summer 1998), 213.  
 Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington: Acropolis Books, 
ennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare,” 113-4, Hersh, The Old Boys, 271, 
eonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and their Family Network 
 William Colby, Honourable Men: My Life in the CIA (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 73.  
 For accounts of the debates and passage of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, see Barrett, The CIA and 
y Truman, 
ocument 53, 287-94. 
y of Intelligence, The Origin and Development of the CIA in 
e Administration of Harry S. Truman (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1995), 50. 
d 
 See Warner’s comments in CSI, The Origin and Development of the CIA, 66-7. Warner adds that “This 
is the basic tool which enables CIA to conduct espionage, 
landestine activities, the U-2, the SR-71 and all the various covert operations. Without this you are unable 
 Houston to Hillenkoetter, “Responsibility and Control for OPC,” 19 October, 1948, Warner, The CIA 
“The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy 
ool: An Analysis of Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951,” 
at because “project approval within OPC was left basically to the initiative of individuals 
ithin the respective divisions rather than to any kind of an interdivision review board, or executive-led 
n which the OPC project system” it was 
lmost impossible “for anyone except Wisner to render an accurate statement about how many operations 
he was too busy with other problems to carry out such a census.” 
See Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, 313-4. 
 




1977), 103, Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, 308-9, Thomas, The Very Best Men, 15-6, 40. 
 
43 Corke, “George K
L
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978), 244-5.  
 
44
45 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 39-40. 
 
46 Ibid., 11. 
 
47
Congress, 30-48, Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 50-2, and Rudgers, Creating the 
Secret State, 164-6. 
 
48 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 20 June, 1949, Warner, The CIA under Harr
D
 
49 Richard Helms quoted in Center for the Stud
th
For more on CIA’s relationship with Congress see David M. Barrett, The CIA and Congress: The Untol
Story from Truman to Kennedy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).  
 
50
confidential fund, unvouchered funds, 
c
to spend money secretly in a way that is not publicized and subject to audit and leaks.” 
 
51
under Harry Truman, Document 46, 235-9. 
 
52 Walter Pforzheimer interview in D. H. Berger, 
T
(Federation of American Scientists) available online at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/berger.htm. 
 
53 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 40-1. 
 
54 Gregory F. Treverton, The CIA and the Limits of American Intervention in the Postwar World (London: 
Tauris, 1988), 37-8.  
 
55 Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 45. 
 
56 Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, 314-5. 
 
57 Corson adds th
w
organization” and because of the “extreme compartmentalizatio
a
were underway at any given moment- and 
 335
                                                                                                                                                 
osion of an atomic bomb and the 






acy (London; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), Lucas, Freedom’s 
ar, Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin, Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and 
n who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Knopf, 1979), John Ranelagh, The 
gency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (Sevenoaks: Sceptre, 1988), Harry Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret 
k: Simon & Schuster, 1995) and Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown (New York: 
illiam Morrow, 1987).   
 For instance see Grose, Operation Rollback, 165-74. Also see John C. Campbell Oral History, HSTL, 
 For instance Thomas Powers believes the lack of success of the political warfare campaign in Eastern 
 
up 
. Dravis, “Storming Fortress Albania: American 
58 Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 46. 
 




60 Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 45-6. 
 
61 Corson, The Armies of Ignorance, 326. 
62 Regarding the limitations and difficulties in seeking information on secret intelligence and “covert 
action” operations, see Len Scott, “Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy,” 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Summer 2004). 
 
63 For historical accounts of these various activities see Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, 
America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2002), Trevor Barnes, “The Secret Cold 
War: The C.I.A. and American Foreign Policy in Europe, 1946-1956,” The Historical Journal, Part I, Vo
24, No. 2 (June 1981), Part II, Vol. 25, No. 3 (September 1985), Berger, “The Use of Covert Paramil
Activity as a Policy Tool,” Nicholas Bethell, The Great Betrayal: The Untold Story of Kim Philby’s Biggest 
Coup (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948), Jeffrey Burds, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 
1944-1948 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies, 2001), Ray 
S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington: Acropolis Books, 19
William R. Corson, The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire (New York: 
The Dial Press/ James Wade, 1977), Corke, US Covert Operations, Michael W. Dravis, “Storming Fortre
Albania: American Covert Operations in Microcosm, 1949-54,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 7, 
No. 4 (1992), Peter Grose, Operation Rollback: America’s Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2000), Hersh, The Old Boys, Beatrice Heuser, “Covert Action within British an
American Concepts of Containment, 1948-1951,” Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy 
and the Cold War, 1945-1951 (London: Routeledge, 1992), , idem., Western ‘Containment’ Policies in the 
Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53 (London; New York: Routledge, 1989), Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The 
CIA and American Democr
W
John Foster Dulles and their Family Network (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978), Thomas Powers, 
The Ma
A
Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 
Christopher Simpson, Blowback: America’s Recruitment of Nazis and its Effects on the Cold War (New 
York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early 







Europe was not a failure of liberation because the United States “was not really trying to challenge Russian
control of the East, only to create and internal threat which might be used in war.” See Powers, The Man 
who Kept the Secrets, 43. 
 
66 Berger, “The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool.”  
 
67 Harry Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 16-23. 
 
68 In particular see Nicholas Bethell, The Great Betrayal: The Untold Story of Kim Philby’s Biggest Co
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948) and Michael W
 336
                                                                                                                                                 
ty, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1992), 425-
2. Also see Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 152-4, 160-5, Sarah-Jane Corke, US Covert Operations and Cold 
-100, Grose, Operation 
ollback, 154-62, Hersh, The Old Boys, 244-8, 252-4, Beatrice Heuser, “Covert Action within British and 
nment, 1948-1951,” Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy 
nd the Cold War, 1945-1951 (London: Routeledge, 1992), 69-71, idem., Western ‘Containment’ Policies 
 Bethell, The Great Betrayal, 3-4, 36-7, Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 152-3. 
 Hersh, The Old Boys, 254. 
 
inting 
ffice, 1976), 315-6. Also see Heuser, “Covert Action,” 70-1. 
h OPC in the planning of Albanian 
perations as demonstrating a broader experience of joint development of anti-Soviet bloc projects, rather 
 George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 210. 
 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins to Acheson, 13 September, 1949, 
 Heuser, “Covert Action,” 71.  
 See for instance Memorandum of Conversation between Assistant Chief, Division of Southern European 
hytella, 14 May, 1949, and Director of 
uropean Affairs Hickerson to Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs Dean Rusk, 16 May, 1949, 
 Harry Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action 
 Dravis, “Storming Fortress Albania,” 436. 
 Heuser, “Covert Action,” 71, Corke, US Covert Operations. 94. 
 James McCargar, who was the American commander of the Albanian operation until April 1950, quoted 
e reasons behind the failure of the Albanian operation 
 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 72. 
 Helms quoted in Hersh, The Old Boys, 256. 
 Winks, Cloak and Gown, 399. 
Covert Operations in Microcosm, 1949-54,” Intelligence and National Securi
4
War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA (London: Routledge, 2008), 82
R
American Concepts of Contai
a
in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53 (London; New York: Routledge, 1989), 75-80, Miscamble, 
George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 207-10, Robin W. Winks, Cloak and 
Gown (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 393-401. 
69
 




72 Memorandum of Conversation between Acheson and Bevin in Washington, 14 September, 1949, FRUS:
Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1949, Volume V (Washington: United States Government Pr
O
 
73 Miscamble sees the participation of Joyce, Davies and Kennan wit
o
than as an exception. Miscamble,
 
74 For the previously non-committal departmental position see Acheson to Embassy in Italy, 25 August, 
1949, and Policy Paper by the Acting Chief, Division of Southern European Affairs Campbell, “Albania,” 
12 September, 1949, FRUS: Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1949, Volume V, 310, 311-13. 
 
75





Affairs John C. Campbell and Albanian Minister to France Behar S
E
FRUS: Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1949, Volume V, 299-302, 302-3. 
 
78







in Bethell, The Great Betrayal, 118, 
 








                                                                                                                                                 
 this down to the frenzied anti-communist atmosphere of 
e time in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election and the public popularity of the Republican platform 
 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 163-4, Dravis, “Storming Fortress Albania,” 429, Hersh, The Old Boys, 245. 
peration Rollback, 152-4, Heuser, “Covert Action,” 72-3, 
id., 44-6,  
, 46. 




t see Aldrich, The 
idden Hand, 143, 167-72, Jeffrey Burds, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948 
 Center for Russian and East European Studies, 2001), Corke, US 
overt Operations. 108-9, Grose, Operation Rollback, 171-4, 182-7, Hersh, The Old Boys, 258-9, Rositzke, 
 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 25, 33-5. 
raine, 18. 
t “It was a visceral business of using any 
astard as long as he was anti-Communist [… and] the eagerness or desire to enlist collaborators meant that 
 Burds, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 17 
 
103 Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations, 169. 
 
104 Burds, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 17-8. 
 
105 Tom Polgar and David Murphy quoted in Thomas, The Very Best Men, 67. 
 
106 Burds, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Ukraine, 43. 
 
85 Bethell, The Great Betrayal, 197. Bethell puts
th




87 Heuser, Western ‘Containment’ Policies, 45. 
 
88 See Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 163, Grose, O
ib
89 Heuser, Western ‘Containment’ Policies
 
90 Cannon to A
9
 
91 For more on the Polish operation, see Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 165-7, Grose, Operation Rollba
176-9, Hersh, The Old Boys, 261-3, Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations, 169-71. 
 
92 Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations, 169. 
 
93 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 165-6
 
94 Ibid., 167. 
 
95 For more on the American support of the Ukrainian nationalist resistance movemen
H
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
C
The CIA’s Secret Operations, 167-9, Simpson, Blowback, 160-72, Thomas, The Very Best Men, 34-6. 
 
96 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 168. 
 
97 Grose, Operation Rollback, 147-8,
 
98 Harry Rositzke quoted in Burds, The Early Cold War in Soviet West Uk
 
99 Thomas, The Very Best Men, 60. 
 
100 Harry Rositzke recalled to author Christopher Simpson tha
b
sure, you didn’t look at their credentials too closely.” Simpson, Blowback 159. 
 





A LEGACY OF DISORDER OVER DESIGN: 
THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL FAILURE OF  
U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE AFTER 1950 
 
Washington’s political warfare campaign against the Soviet bloc continued to be 
undermined by fundamental strategic flaws after 1950. European Cold War divisions 
were intractably frozen by the time the Korean War broke out in mid-1950. Soviet 
dominance of the “satellite” nations on its western flank was firmly established and 
preservation of the status quo was intimately linked to Moscow’s vital national security 
interests. This nullified any foreseeable opportunity for the removal of Soviet-communist 
power from Eastern Europe through U.S. political warfare activities, or for that matter by 
any means short of a full-scale military campaign.  
 
The American aspiration to liberate Eastern Europe during the 1950s based on a course of 
limited “covert” operations was therefore unrealistic and unfeasible. Government policy 
papers increasingly reflected this unwelcome reality, although there remained a tendency 
to temper pessimistic forecasts with the hope that future opportunities to influence the 
Soviet bloc would arise. For instance in a policy paper released in August 1951 the NSC 
acknowledged that although “stresses and strains have developed in the European 
satellites,” there were still “no indications that the difficulties are sufficiently serious to 
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jeopardize the Communist regimes, to reduce the firm grip of Soviet control over these 
regimes, or to prevent them from undertaking any action demanded by the Kremlin.”1  
 
Despite the flawed strategic conception, modifications to the American approach tended 
to focus on the political warfare machinery rather than on crucial policy failings. This 
was partly because strategic difficulties had become intimately tied in with the 
longstanding problem of organisational dysfunction. While improvements were clearly 
needed to ameliorate the internecine feuding that had been tolerated- and even fostered- 
by the system, no amount of organisational restructuring alone could resolve the basic 
outstanding strategic contradictions that left American policy goals unrealisable. 
 
In part the attempt to improve organisational structures and practices was intended to deal 
with the loose approach to political warfare operations that had developed in the late 
1940s. The initial concern of Hillenkoetter’s successor, DCI Walter Bedell Smith, was to 
challenge CIA’s deference to the Departments of State and Defense over the direction of 
OPC, rather than to clarify strategic ambiguities regarding OPC’s mission. His first act 
was to assert the CIA’s authority over Wisner’s group by bringing it under the DCI’s 
centralised control at a meeting on 11 October, 1950. His repudiation of the August 1948 
“understanding,” from which OPC had derived a considerable amount of autonomy, was 
“well-received” by the departmental representatives to OPC (Joyce at State, Magruder at 
Defense and Admiral Leslie Stevens for the JCS).2 The struggle to control political 
warfare between the previous principals Kennan and Hillenkoetter was avoided because 
both men had moved on in their respective careers. Bedell Smith’s rank and force of 
 340
personality were sufficient to ensure that his wishes were accepted. After initially 
hesitating, the DCI went beyond centralisation to fully integrate OPC and the Agency’s 
secret intelligence unit OSO, leading to the creation of the “Clandestine Services” 
(euphemistically known as the Directorate of Plans) on 1 August 1952.3 
 
Although these measures were justifiable improvements to the operation of the political 
warfare machinery, no amount of organisational tinkering to deal with operations could 
cope with the broader problem. American strategy remained incoherent, with peacetime 
tactical plans oscillating between the pursuit of violent revolution and gradualist 
evolution within the communist bloc. There was a fundamental failure on the part of U.S. 
policy-makers to design a viable and cogent set of methods and objectives on a national 
basis towards the Soviet bloc. OPC was substantially unregulated to decide the course of 
its operations free from an overarching strategic conception. The strategic vacuum 
inevitably resulted in a lack of consistency in American activities and policies towards 
the east.  
 
The Impact of NSC 68 on Strategy and Operations 
The strategic basis for the “liberation” of the Soviet bloc was not clarified by the 
production of a foreign policy “blueprint” in 1950. NSC 68 demanded the expansion of 
the political warfare offensive against Moscow and its allies but it did not resolve the 
issue of strategic aims and feasibility. Instead the vague goals of NSC 20/4 were simply 
reaffirmed.4 An intensified political warfare campaign would aim “to check and roll back 
the Kremlin’s drive for world domination.” NSC 68 advocated a costly increase in 
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American conventional and nuclear military capabilities. This in turn would provide an 
“adequate military shield” under which Western strength could be enhanced and “a 
vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union” could be launched. The United 
States should “take dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin 
inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control” while the development of a 
preponderant military capacity would act as a deterrent against Soviet reprisals.  
 
According to the policy paper, the effort should comprise an expansion of “affirmative 
and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare 
and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest 
and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries”5 The offensive character of this policy 
was confirmed when Truman staff assistant Charles Murphy asked for clarification at an 
NSC meeting in September 1950 that this meant that “we should intensify our efforts to 
look for ways to wrest the initiative from the Soviets and to roll them back.” Secretary of 
State Acheson replied that this was “very important and quite right.”6   
 
NSC 68 therefore allocated more resources to the departments and agencies engaged in 
political warfare. Much of the restructuring of the political warfare apparatus after 1950 
originated in the organisational strains of the expansion it sanctioned, although the 
document itself did not address underlying bureaucratic divisions that existed between 
government departments and agencies.7 Yet the basic problem was not these deep-seated 
institutional divisions, but the lack of a unifying concept. The allocation of greater 
resources to the bureaucracy under NSC 68 and the restructuring after its implementation 
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did not settle the strategic question to define the parameters and character of the “political 
offensive” against Moscow. This approach to the problem simply widened the gap 
between practical and strategic capabilities. 
 
Recent scholarship has implied that, to the contrary, political warfare was central to NSC 
68 and by extension to US national security strategy. According to this view, the Truman 
administration believed a military build-up was crucial in order to enable the United 
States to conduct its intensified clandestine campaign to roll back Soviet power in 
Europe.8 While NSC 68 did open up the space for the expansion of political warfare 
operations and justified this by determining that Soviet reprisals would be deterred with 
the build-up of preponderant American power, the lack of strategic consideration of the 
political warfare campaign is most significant. In fact senior Truman administration 
officials never paid meaningful attention to the strategic basis of a liberation campaign. 
This contrasts completely with the detailed examination of the approach towards Western 
European political and military policy conducted at the highest levels in Washington and 
coordinated between the departments through the State-Defense Policy Review Group.  
 
PPS director Paul Nitze, the chief drafter of NSC 68, did not share Kennan’s later views 
on the strategic employment of political warfare within a unified European policy 
framework. In keeping with the attitudes of his superiors Acheson, Marshall and Truman, 
for Nitze the “first concern” was protecting the security of Western Europe where 
America’s NATO allies “were in serious need of reassurance that the balance of power 
was not tipping in favour of the Soviet Union.” This would be achieved by developing 
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“positions of strength” in the west through the build-up of conventional forces as well as 
a nuclear deterrent, rather than through the concentration of effort on a subversive 
methodology to undermine the Soviet Union itself.9  
 
From this perspective US counter-force was seen as a valuable component, but not as a 
means of liberating the satellite regimes per se. Instead political warfare could be 
employed to destabilise the Soviet system in order to stave off the imminent Soviet 
assault on the “free world” inherent in NSC 68’s message that Moscow craved global 
domination. As time went on Nitze developed a “hierarchy of national security 
objectives.” He supported the intensification of political warfare against the Soviet Union 
when faced with the determined opposition of Russian specialist Charles Bohlen during 
1951-2. Nitze argued that “as the free world’s capabilities are developed, opportunities 
will arise for inducing or compelling a retraction of Soviet power, not, of course, without 
any risks but at acceptable risks.”10 In contrast to Kennan’s concept that it should be an 
integral component, Nitze believed that the political warfare offensive should only be 
pursued once a preponderant level of military power had been achieved.  
 
Kennan’s loss of influence during the drafting process of NSC 68 added to the neglect of 
a political warfare strategy. According to Scott Lucas, “Kennan’s voice was scarcely 
heard as Nitze dominated the meetings of the State-Defense Policy Review Group.”11 
Nitze confirmed that the drafting of NSC 68 “fell almost entirely” on himself, John 
Davies, Bob Tufts and Robert Hooker at PPS.12 Kennan therefore felt the “bludgeon” of 
the new approach more sensitively than most in the government.13 His diminishing 
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influence and the lack of other figures to pick up his baton meant that a unifying concept 
was not provided within the pages of NSC 68 or elsewhere. The notion of an offensive to 
retract Soviet-directed communism was peripheral in contrast to the determination to 
bolster the material and psychological strength of the “free world.”  
 
Senior policymakers in the post-war period allowed the conceptualisation of an American 
strategy for Eastern Europe to ride the coattails of its Western European policy. The 
vague notion prevailed that by first developing a position of strength in Western Europe 
somehow Eastern Europe would transform itself along western lines. This was related to 
Kennan’s principle of attracting Eastern Europe into the western fold by creating a 
wealthy and politically stable Western Europe. Kennan had belatedly sought ways of 
unifying a policy to strengthen Western Europe in combination with diplomatic efforts to 
retract Soviet power from Central and Eastern Europe. But in practical terms American 
officials dealing with Eastern European policy were left adrift by Washington’s 
overwhelming emphasis on Western Europe between 1947 and 1950.  
 
This is not to say that there was not the ideological commitment at the highest levels of 
the government to aspire for the realisation of the American interpretation of the Yalta 
“Declaration of Liberated Europe” in Eastern Europe. But men of influence like Truman, 
Marshall, Lovett, Acheson, Nitze and Forrestal did not move beyond the aspiration to 
develop strategically-conceived policies specifically aimed at influencing the political 
fate of Eastern Europe while the international situation remained flexible. Once Europe 
had divided into hostile Cold War camps the only realistic (but unthinkable) option left 
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open to American planners to induce free elections and representative governments in 
Eastern Europe was a full-scale military campaign to drive out the Soviet garrisons.  
 
U.S. policy was instead driven by concerns over Western Europe’s political future. This 
policy was disconnected from any efforts to deal with Eastern Europe, particularly from 
1948-9 as plans to partition Germany and formalise a military alliance with Western 
Europe gathered pace. The paradox of this was that as America successfully advanced 
towards achieving its goals in Western Europe, the chances of securing its aspirations in 
the east receded. Ironically, the relative clarity of Washington’s Western European policy 
from 1947 onwards actually compounded the development of a unified European strategy 
as relations between Russia and America soured. Stalinist Russia felt gravely threatened 
by the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the establishment of an independent West 
Germany and creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). From late 
1948 Moscow’s national security was therefore irrevocably linked to the maintenance of 
a hegemonic but nonetheless “defensive” position in Eastern Europe.  
 
The lack of a unified European strategy by no means put Eastern Europe out of bounds 
for U.S. operations. This was so even though when the Truman administration 
approached the issue of undermining Soviet control of the region in some depth, 
particularly during 1949, discussions quickly exposed a lack of workable alternatives. 
Political warfare was essentially regarded as a lesser evil. It was preferable to the 
alternatives- in particular negotiations and military action- even though this methodology 
itself did not necessarily resolve how to roll back Soviet power in the east.  
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On the one hand, for domestic political reasons, political warfare operations were 
preferable to complete passivity. Although Washington attempted to shroud OPC’s 
activities in secrecy, internal and domestic political pressure dictated that the government 
was seen to be doing something. The overall political warfare programme was a visible 
venture. Washington engaged thousands of Eastern European exiles and domestic émigré 
communities within the United States in a moral challenge to Soviet rule, although the 
government attempted to blur its direct links through its orchestration of “State-private” 
networks and front organisations.14 This also provided an outlet for Cold Warriors to 
exercise their anti-communist fervour. On the other hand Washington ran with political 
warfare rather than risk a hot war because of all the terrible connotations evoked by a 
full-scale conflict with Russia. Ultimately the military option held little prospect of 
unifying Europe on any worthwhile terms given the emerging scenario of Mutually 
Assured Destruction in the atomic age. 
 
By 1949 political warfare had reached its limits in practical terms. There was very little 
that could be done by the United States to influence the Soviet bloc without some sort of 
a strategic resolution. If the “liberation” of Eastern Europe through political warfare 
alone was unfeasible, then this opens up the question of what the viable alternatives were 
beyond military conflict and passivity on the tactical level. Diplomacy was the only 
remaining realistic alternative- and in the long run it proved the most effective medium 
for thawing relations between east and west.  
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Numerous attempts were of course made in the post-war period to reach a political 
settlement over Eastern and Central Europe, particularly through the forum of the 
Council of Foreign Minister meetings. Although such efforts proved extremely divisive, 
prior to the Cold War freeze of 1948-9, a negotiated resolution over Eastern Europe was 
the most realistic option by which the Truman administration might have reached a 
modus vivendi with Moscow. This did not necessarily demand that diplomacy would 
have to be separated from political warfare. Indeed a combination of methods was exactly 
what Kennan called for in 1948-9, although at this stage American Western European 
policy had undermined its viability.  
 
Even after Europe divided along Cold War lines, diplomacy still offered a way to 
partially achieve American aspirations, while opening up a space for political warfare to 
play a viable role in inducing further gains. In the late 1940s Washington was in an 
optimal position to secure favourable terms from Moscow over the political neutralisation 
of Central Europe (Germany and Austria). In 1947 the United States had not held a 
sufficient position of strength to exploit a political settlement to its maximum advantage. 
Because of this American planners had expected to be rebuffed over ERP by the Eastern 
European regimes. So it was that in 1947 Washington’s limited capabilities meant that it 
had been unable to parlay out of the Marshall Plan the opening up of Eastern Europe.  
 
By 1949 a firm position of strength had successfully been established in Western Europe 
through implementation of the Marshall Plan, the favourable Italian election results and 
drawing down of the Greek civil war. In contrast, the Soviet position in Central Europe 
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was at its lowest ebb following the ill-conceived blockade of Berlin. Moscow’s sense of 
acute vulnerability, stemming particularly from the impending creation of an independent 
and prospectively powerful West German state, created a unique window of opportunity 
making it temporarily amenable to a face-saving settlement to unify and neutralise 
Germany.  
 
Despite the American “successes” in Western Europe, the broader objectives in NSC 
20/4 towards the Soviet bloc had not been accomplished by 1949. This led Kennan and 
the Policy Planning Staff to return to the question of a unified European strategy centred 
on the German question. Given the relative strength of the American position and its 
popular support among the German people, Kennan and PPS realised that any agreement 
reached at this time would undoubtedly favour the west more than the east. Through a 
combination of diplomatic and economic measures alongside a political warfare 
campaign the Soviet bloc could be incrementally softened up and the Eastern European 
states drawn over to the west by attraction rather than coercion.  
 
Furthermore, Marshall and Kennan both recognised during the development of Program 
A for the neutralisation of Germany that even if Moscow rejected initial American 
diplomatic gestures, Washington would still gain political capital from the taking the 
initiative. PPS37/1 noted that “Program A is unlikely to be accepted at this juncture, and 
therefore unlikely to constitute a solution of the Berlin difficulty at the present time.” 
Nevertheless it would “provide one more channel” for possible future discussions and 
should therefore be considered as “a starting point for what will probably be long and 
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difficult negotiations.” In the interim the United States would “be in a relatively 
favourable propaganda position vis-à-vis the Germans in Berlin and elsewhere” because 
the “significance of this program lies primarily in its potential psychological effect rather 
than in the possibility of its immediate acceptance.”15 This was an important 
consideration not only in relation to Germany but more broadly as the public relations 
struggle with Moscow to win over world public opinion was seen as extremely 
significant. Soviet rejection of American diplomatic overtures would inevitably discredit 
the legitimacy of Russia’s own “peace offensive.” 
 
Important differences between the Nitze/Acheson concept and Kennan’s position seemed 
to indicate that there were other advantages in pursuing a diplomatic route.16 Nitze and 
Acheson agreed that preponderant positions of strength should be established in Western 
Europe through political, military and economic initiatives prior to negotiating 
settlements with Moscow. This was primarily a “defensive” approach that aimed to 
safeguard American interests in Western Europe against further Soviet-communist 
encroachment. Nitze claimed in his memoirs that he did not “consider a policy of 
rearmament as necessarily implying the futility of negotiations or the imminent 
possibility of a shooting war.”17 But there was a genuine risk that the pursuit of 
preponderant strength would become an end in itself, losing sight of the ultimate purpose 
of settling Cold War hostilities. Acheson gave an indication of this in testimony before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the eve of the Paris Conference of Foreign 
Ministers in 1949. Under questioning from Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Acheson 
indicated that the unification of Germany was not “an end in itself” but that the key 
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objective instead was “the strengthening and recovery of Western Europe.” Vandenberg 
challenged the Secretary of State that the U.S. agenda at Paris appeared to be negative, to 
gain a Soviet rejection of the American proposal in order that it could proceed with 
Germany’s partition and the establishment of NATO. With considerable prescience the 
senator asked “does this mean that the result of this meeting is going to establish […] the 
fact that there is a permanent Cold War [….]” Acheson’s evasive reply was that 
differences would not necessarily be “permanent” but that the immediate task was “to see 
who develops more strength.”18  
 
There were other disadvantages with the Nitze/Acheson concept of building up 
preponderant American strength. The manifestations of this programme- ERP, NATO, 
the tripartite partition of Germany etc- were perceived as offensive initiatives in Moscow 
and therefore acutely threatening. They stimulated parallel defensive responses by the 
Kremlin that escalated Cold War tensions and hardened the “lines of cleavage” that 
Kennan had feared.19 Paradoxically, Kennan’s own belated attempt to use western 
political and economic vitality as a magnet to attract Eastern European states into the 
western bloc probably posed a greater threat to Moscow’s grip on the region. But this 
more “offensive” approach to peacefully retract Soviet power and unite Europe on 
western terms would actually appear to be a more benign policy to the Russians.  
 
In any case by 1949 Kennan’s desire to employ diplomacy alongside political warfare 
was at odds with mainstream attitudes in Washington. A consensus was forged that was 
embodied by the Nitze/Acheson concept of building up positions of strength first in 
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Western Europe and then pursuing diplomatic solutions for the Soviet bloc at an 
undefined later stage. This viewpoint was fortified by the perception of increasing Soviet 
and world communist belligerence.  
 
As a result American strategy was powerless to transcend the European divide, and 
instead tended towards mutual U.S.-Soviet exacerbation of the bipolar schism. 
Washington did not devise a “wedge” strategy to separate Moscow from its satellites. To 
the contrary, although the Planning Staff attempted to produce a unifying strategic 
framework for a pan-European policy, Kennan’s window of opportunity was extremely 
limited. Ultimately it was not possible to gain the support of Truman, Acheson, Nitze and 
other senior officials, especially after autumn 1949 when the Soviet Union successfully 
exploded an atomic bomb and Washington suffered the “loss” of China to Mao’s 
communist forces. The seeming escalation of the global threat heralded by these events 
cemented the Truman administration’s preference for “militarised” policy solutions. 
 
Although the Kennan thesis was definitively rejected with the demise of Program A in 
favour of the Nitze/Acheson model, American policymakers were unable to design an 
alternative approach to the European dilemma. From this point the United States pursued 
preponderant levels of military and economic power over the Soviet adversary, yet a 
workable strategy for Eastern Europe was not devised to replace the obsolete political 
warfare offensive. Instead, the strategic vacuum left the field open at the operational level 
for OPC to continue to operate against the Soviet bloc. So long as the retraction of Soviet 
power was retained as an aspiration at the policy level, then the space remained for 
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political warfare activists to conduct anti-Soviet and anti-communist operations. But the 
ill-fated campaign was strategically ineffective because it was conducted in isolation of 
diplomatic attempts to produce political settlements in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
Political warfare therefore best complimented the dichotomy at the heart of U.S. policy in 
Europe. It did not hinder the development of a powerful western bloc through political, 
economic and military alliances. Moreover, it offered flexible and unconventional 
methods to counteract Soviet-led communist interests in Western Europe. Political 
warfare also had its uses when applied to Eastern Europe. It partially assuaged those in 
the Truman administration who wanted to adopt a more aggressive stance against 
communism. Even though the strategic reality was that political warfare was impotent to 
affect the hegemonic Soviet position, it allowed Washington to maintain the links that 
had already been built up with private and émigré groups and to retain a public 
commitment to the liberation of Eastern Europe.  
 
But this approach did not constitute a solution to the longstanding question of how to 
overcome Soviet domination by peaceful means to liberate Eastern Europe. Instead it 
fostered a perpetuation of the status quo enabling American priorities elsewhere to be 
secured. At the highest levels, therefore, the Truman administration actually paid scant 
attention to liberating Eastern Europe from Russian dominance. Instead it was left to the 
working levels of the government, to the American missions and representatives in the 
region as well as to the Policy Planning Staff and geographic desk hands in the State 
Department, to attempt to utilise the scraps left over from Western European policy. De 
 353
facto influence was increasingly wielded at the operational rather than policy-making 
level, particularly by OPC, in the vacuum left by strategists at a loss to devise policies 
from such limited options. Individual operations behind the iron curtain could never 
achieve the goals stated in NSC 20/4 without some sort of unifying conception to exploit 
political, economic and even paramilitary openings. Strategically, the policies that 
resulted were therefore as fragmented as the bureaucracy that had created them. 
 
NSC 68 did nothing to modify this trend of US foreign policy. The irony of the policy 
paper was that while it marginalised the strategic basis for political warfare, it actually 
opened up the space operationally for it to come to the fore of American activity. This 
was because of the vast increase in the allocation of resources in support of a “political 
offensive.” This was not a departure but a new opening, as Michael Warner observes. For 
although NSC 68 and the Korean War “precipitated exponential growth at OPC […] it 
nevertheless seems clear that the Office was growing rapidly even before it received new 
tasking.”20 
 
The strategic vacuum was linked to a leadership vacuum because senior officials 
including President Truman and his Secretaries of State and Defense did not want to 
make a practical or strategic commitment to liberation, prioritising other elements of 
policy above Eastern Europe. It was within the context of this vacuum that NSC 68 
proved to be such a potent catalyst for expanded political warfare operations. Although 
the strategic framework delineating how to proceed was not provided, the message 
disseminated to the operational branches was that action was urgently required. Joyce 
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informed senior OPC officials at a meeting at Carmel Offie’s house on 18 April 1950 that 
the new national security strategy “if approved, will have a material effect upon OPC 
planning and operations.”21 According to Joyce, OPC was now authorised to “take 
dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union,” 
a message he passed on verbatim from the passages of NSC 68. This would include: 
Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert 
means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological 
warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected 
strategic satellite countries.22 
 
At this stage OPC was asked to prepare estimates of the requisite funds for the envisaged 
expanded programme. Joyce also conveyed the State Department’s preference for 
utilising foreign rather than American agents where possible.23 Presumably this was in 
line with the concept of plausible denial, as well as the extra advantage of being the 
cheaper option.  
 
While not providing strategic clarity, unmistakable “assumptions” were conveyed to OPC 
in May 1950 to proceed with a “major effort in the field of covert operations” against the 
Soviet bloc and Russia itself, a campaign that was set to run for at least the next six 
years.24 This instantly encouraged OPC to demand larger budgets and to enlarge its 
personnel strength. According to an official investigation, on the operational level the 
number of anti-communist projects and operations “simply skyrocketed” as a result.25  
 
NSC 68 was eventually adopted in light of the outbreak of the Korean War. Huge 
demands were now placed on OPC/CIA by the NSC and the State Department. But the 
Department of Defense and JCS in particular urged that covert operations be undertaken 
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further afield than Cold War Europe in the Far East. OPC was directed to engage in the 
Korean theatre with emphasis placed on infiltrating agents into China to conduct 
intelligence, propaganda and paramilitary missions behind enemy lines in support of 
military operations.26 General MacArthur had previously tried to keep what was regarded 
as the amateurish OPC out of the region, in the same way that he had resisted Donovan’s 
OSS in the Pacific theatre in World War Two. Although OPC had managed to initiate a 
limited base of operations in Asia in 1949, the Korean War proved to be the decisive 
catalyst cementing the CIA’s geographic scope on a global basis.27 The legacy of this 
expansion post-Korea was that the CIA increasingly targeted the developing world to 
discredit “International Communism” and curtail its spreading influence worldwide.28 
 
Even as the Far East was opened up to OPC, the prevalent interpretation of the Korean 
War as the opening salvo by Moscow in a general war meant that American attention was 
still focussed substantially on Europe. After all, NSC 68 had been drafted in light of the 
Soviet development of the atomic bomb and was a product of the American 
establishment’s anxiety over the strategic ramifications of this on the U.S. position in 
Europe.29 Consequently, approximately half of OPC’s operational output continued to be 
directed towards Europe rather than the Far East for the duration of the Korean War.30 
Activities included a proliferation of psychological warfare, propaganda and cultural 
programmes targeting the entire Eastern European region and the Soviet Union. This was 
most notably undertaken through the organisation of the ostensibly private National 
Committee for a Free Europe founded in June 1949 in New York. Supplementing the 
overt activities of VOA and West Berlin’s Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), NCFE’s 
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broadcasting arm Radio Free Europe unleashed a propaganda campaign from its 
headquarters in Munich targeting the populations of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria beginning with its first transmission to Czechoslovakia on 4 July 
1950. The avowed purpose of RFE according to the official CIA handbook issued in 
November 1951 was “to contribute to the liberation of the nations imprisoned behind the 
Iron Curtain by maintaining their morale and stimulating in them a spirit of non-
cooperation with the Soviet dominated regimes.”31 This effort was complimented by the 
separate but parallel American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia 
which created Radio Liberty in 1951 to conduct anti-communist Russian-language 
broadcasts targeting the Soviet Union itself.32  
 
This was in fact just the tip of the iceberg of the American political and psychological 
warfare effort against the Soviet Union and communist ideology. The United States 
launched a “crusade” against Moscow that harnessed all walks of life against the Soviet 
foe. In practice this fostered a hidden State-private nexus mobilising a broad range of 
intellectual, cultural, informational, political, business, labour, student, youth and 
women’s organisations against Soviet-communist ideology both in the United States and 
across the world.33  
 
Operations aimed at unseating communist regimes through more direct covert 
paramilitary intervention are also known to have been financed and directed by the U.S. 
Government in this period. This was even confirmed by the official Senate investigation 
into the CIA’s covert activities undertaken in the mid-1970s.34 Despite the provocative 
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nature and destabilising effect of such operations on international relations, the United 
States attempted to foster anti-government resistance movements across the region.35  
 
The Organisation of Operations under the CIA 
Between 1951 and the end of the Truman administration attempts were made to rectify 
organisational problems caused by the adoption of political warfare as a component of 
U.S. foreign policy. Arguably, these efforts represented a pragmatic way to deal with the 
fragmented approach that had prevailed since the creation of OPC and the August 1948 
understanding that had partially separated it from the coordinated control of the 
bureaucracy.  
 
Two structural developments in particular potentially offered the administration a tighter 
base from which to proceed with a coordinated political warfare offensive against the 
Soviet Union. Firstly, DCI Walter Bedell Smith asserted the CIA’s authority over OPC’s 
activities and merged political warfare with the other elements of the U.S. intelligence 
system. The need for clearer control of OPC had been brought to a head with its massive 
expansion under NSC 68. It was partially resolved in late 1950 by the creation of the post 
of Deputy Director of Plans that provided centralised control under the DCI. The merger 
of OPC and OSO in 1952 cemented the Agency’s responsibility and authority for 
political warfare, despite Bedell Smith’s personal misgivings about these activities.36 
Further bureaucratic tensions were stimulated by the eventual merger, particularly 
flowing from the longstanding rivalry between the intelligence collectors at OSO and 
OPC’s activists. This was embodied in Wisner’s famous derisive characterisation of OSO 
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as “a bunch of old washerwomen gossiping over their laundry.”37 Nonetheless 
centralisation and integration, despite these tensions, represented clear progress from the 
fragmented set-up that had existed since mid-1948.    
 
The OPC merger followed formal reaffirmation by the NSC in October 1951 of the 
Agency’s authority to conduct political warfare. NSC 10/5 resulted from DCI Smith’s 
attempts to disengage the CIA from the extremes of the political warfare offensive. He 
was initially “dismayed” at the scale of OPC operations brought under the CIA’s 
centralised control in late 1950. This prompted his call for a “worldwide structure for 
covert operations on a much grander scale than OPC had previously contemplated” to 
prevent the CIA from being overwhelmed.38 Fearful that this would “militate against the 
performance” by the Agency of “its primary intelligence functions,” he established a 
“Murder Board” to purge OPC operations that were deemed to be of dubious value.39 
Roughly one in three projects was eventually culled, though the DCI’s attempts to scale 
back OPC’s activities ultimately only had a “marginal effect” according to Agency 
historian Ludwell Lee Montague. He was not helped by the fact that his deputies Allen 
Dulles and Frank Wisner discreetly undermined his attempt to transfer OPC’s 
paramilitary activities to the Department of Defense.40    
 
Such was the scale of OPC’s political warfare undertakings in the aftermath of NSC 68 
that Bedell Smith sought clarification from the NSC over the desired “Scope and Pace of 
Covert Operations.” The issue was not broadened to introduce strategic questions 
regarding American Cold War objectives as it was not the DCI’s place to do so within the 
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bureaucracy. He simply sought clarification of the CIA’s organisational authority and 
operational responsibility for political warfare. Bedell Smith’s “Magnitude Paper” 
forwarded on 8 May 1951 therefore urged the NSC to authorise a comprehensive review 
to re-evaluate the CIA’s role in the political warfare campaign. The hope was that these 
activities would either be formally separated from the Agency or at least scaled back by 
NSC ruling.41  
 
To some extent Bedell Smith’s action backfired as an NSC special committee now 
explicitly committed the Agency to conduct political warfare on a very large scale.42 DCI 
Smith had hoped that the CIA would be recognised principally as an intelligence agency 
rather than the centre for political warfare operations. Instead the NSC formally approved 
“the immediate expansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2, and the 
intensification of covert operations [....]” NSC 10/5 confirmed CIA’s responsibility under 
NSC 68’s expanded mandate to place “maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, 
including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites and Communist China.” The 
CIA must “when and where appropriate in the light of U.S. capabilities and the risk of 
war, contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits 
which no longer constitute a threat to U.S. security.” It should also develop “underground 
resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum 
practicable extent.”43  
 
The attempt to orchestrate OPC’s political warfare campaign under the Agency’s 
auspices belatedly provided some bureaucratic order to the operation of political warfare. 
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Following the adoption of NSC 10/5, Bedell Smith accepted the CIA’s responsibility for 
political warfare and integrated OPC with OSO. The merger enabled the better 
management and coordination of political warfare operations under a clarified chain of 
command. But this still did not provide planners and operators with a clear unifying 
conception of the strategic premise behind operations. 
 
The Rise and Fall of PSB 
A second development in the reorganisation of the political warfare machinery 
potentially provided the foundations for resolving the persistent problem of defining a 
Cold War strategy. A coordinating body called the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) 
was created in April 1951 by President Truman to link the operational arm (the CIA) with 
the policy-making branches (the Departments of State and Defense). PSB comprised 
Undersecretary of State James Webb, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett and 
DCI Bedell Smith, along with a staff directed by Gordon Gray. This followed the 
recommendations of Project TROY that “some single authority” should be created with 
the “capacity to design a comprehensive program and power to obtain execution of this 
program.”44 Its primary responsibility was to provide the:  
formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies 
responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological 
objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of 




Measures for tighter operational coordination were duly set up by the Agency following 
the establishment of PSB and OPC’s integration within the Agency. DCI Smith 
established strict procedures governing the initiation, review and approval for all major 
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political warfare projects. A CIA committee would initially review the proposal and 
submit recommendations to Deputy Director of Plans (DDP) Wisner. If he concurred 
then the plan would be transmitted to the DCI and upon the director’s acceptance it 
would be forwarded to PSB for evaluation and approval. This rigorous process was a far 
cry from the lax set-up under the August 1948 “understanding” and was designed to 
ensure that no major programme could be undertaken without prior analysis and 
endorsement of its merits on a broad bureaucratic basis below NSC level.46 
 
The modified arrangement meant that for the first time under Truman, Washington had 
organised all the elements of the covert apparatus in combination with a coordinating 
body to provide a framework for operations. The PSB Staff then attempted to move 
beyond simply coordinating operations between departments to provide a unifying 
strategic conception for the political warfare campaign. This endeavour was ultimately 
overtaken by organisational wrangling that negated a united bureaucratic effort. PSB had 
been vested with broad but ambiguous responsibility for coordinating and assessing the 
“psychological” dimension of Cold War activities. But its precise role within the 
bureaucracy for transmitting political warfare “guidance” was not clearly stipulated, 
while it was not vested with sufficient authority to challenge the Departments of State 
and Defense as an equal partner. Their seniority effectively left PSB beholden to 
departmental views.  
 
Its attempts to explore the question of a Cold War strategy were not well-received, 
particularly by officials in the State Department. This generated an acrimonious battle 
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over its jurisdiction. The feud subsequently overshadowed PSB’s attempts to develop a 
coherent national American strategy against the Soviet bloc. Two conflicting 
interpretations of PSB’s role lay at the heart of the conflict. One opinion, held by many in 
the CIA and the PSB Staff, viewed the new body expansively as the “headquarters for the 
cold war.” According to this interpretation, “the Board’s concern would embrace any or 
all of the major policies, programs or activities of the Government.” PSB should 
therefore be recognised as exercising sufficient authority to engage in broad strategic 
assessments, pulling the overall effort together on a conceptual level to establish a unified 
policy. A conflicting view prevailed primarily in the State Department that PSB should 
have a much more limited role, evaluating individual “programs specifically identified as 
psychological operations.” From this perspective PSB would merely “provide a forum for 
the exchange of ideas and information, a committee type structure for the coordination of 
psychological plans.” It should not broach fundamental questions of policy.47 
 
The PSB Staff quickly took a broad view of their role to develop an all-encompassing 
strategy incorporating an inter-departmental approach to orchestrate the growing number 
of Soviet bloc operations stimulated by NSC 68 and NSC 10/5. PSB Director Gordon 
Gray believed this had been President Truman’s intention and that his charter was “to 
draw a plan for the cold war.”48 NSC 10/5 also seemed to confirm the importance of the 
new body on the strategic level by making PSB responsible for determining “the 
desirability and feasibility of programs and of individual major projects for covert 
operations formulated by or proposed to the Director of Central Intelligence.” It should 
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also establish “the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations and the allocation of 
priorities among these operations.”49  
 
The broad interpretation of PSB’s role stimulated fractious debates over who controlled 
the formulation of American policy. The CIA and PSB Staff were eager to confront the 
strategic dilemma over how to proceed against the Soviet bloc, recommending the 
adoption of an explicitly offensive strategy to replace what some regarded as the defeatist 
and passive containment strategy.50 In November 1951, PSB therefore requested that 
OPC draw up “Plans for the successful detachment of these satellites, including China, 
with or without revolution, where feasibility is believed to exist.” Such plans were to 
include a detailed breakdown of their “feasibility, priority, emphasis and pace” along 
with their “manpower and logistic requirements.”51   
 
Following the impetus provided by PSB, by 1952 a coordinated set of offensive covert 
operations against the Soviet bloc codenamed Packet had been developed by the CIA. 
But a decision on whether to approve a liberation campaign was still pending at senior 
levels of the government. In May, PSB Deputy Director Tracy Barnes therefore requested 
a firm clarification of the American commitment to achieve liberation in order to 
implement Packet. Barnes asked PSB Members DCI Bedell Smith, Undersecretary of 
State David Bruce and Assistant Secretary of Defense William Foster whether U.S. 
policy endorsed “supplying overt physical support to revolutionary factions that might 
emerge in the wake of Stalin’s death, if the situation offered a reasonable chance of 
changing a regime to suit U.S. interests without going to war?” Barnes also hoped for an 
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unequivocal decision on whether American policy included or excluded “efforts under 
any circumstances to overthrow or subvert the governments of the satellites of the 
USSR?”52 
 
Wisner also pressed the case for a strategic affirmation of an offensive campaign, 
authorising Mallory Browne, director of PSB’s Office of Evaluation and Review, to 
produce an “Overall Strategic Concept for our Psychological Operations.” Browne 
concluded that “an offensive concept of psycho-strategy requires less an official change 
of policy than a frank recognition of what is really implicit in our existing policy 
objectives [….]” Strategic coherence could be generated by “abandoning “containment” 
and openly espousing “liberation”.” According to Browne the Soviet Union was “a 
colossus with feet of clay,” but the United States must adopt “a positive approach that 
acknowledges the vital necessity of overthrowing the Kremlin regime” before it could 
achieve results. Moreover, “our present strategy of fighting a defensive delaying action in 
the Cold War while we prepare primarily to defend ourselves in a hot one” should be 
discarded and replaced with “a fully planned and phased global strategy of offensive 
underground fighting.”53  
 
The argument for an offensive made by PSB and CIA officials failed to overcome 
hesitancy within the broader administration over U.S. capabilities to bring about the 
envisaged Cold War victory over the Soviet Union and concomitant “liberation” of 
Eastern Europe. The firm entrenchment of communist regimes with ruthlessly effective 
internal security systems buffered by close politico-military links to the Soviet Union 
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negated the viability of regime change through political warfare alone. A pre-emptive 
U.S. military campaign had been explicitly ruled out for several years, while by 1952 the 
contradictions in the State Department position were deepening. Although the Bohlen 
thesis urged a retrenchment of policy towards genuine containment, the Nitze camp 
maintained that political warfare should be retained to retract Soviet power once a 
sufficient U.S. position of strength had been achieved. This bred confusion over strategic 
goals and paralysis over the authorisation of Packet. 
 
 
The attempt by PSB and the CIA to clarify U.S. strategic goals towards the Soviet bloc 
was therefore frustrated, but not by a definitive high-level rejection of liberation. The 
strategic issue did not reach the NSC and the President because the State Department 
resisted PSB’s attempts to broaden its role within the bureaucracy.54 State had objected to 
the creation of PSB in the first place, fearing that it would infringe upon the department’s 
authority to formulate foreign policy.  Departmental officials like Paul Nitze and Charles 
Burton Marshall in the Policy Planning Staff remained adamant that PSB must be kept in 
check. Although the CIA and the JCS accepted that the Board should exercise wide 
responsibilities to cover “every kind of activity in support of U.S. policies except overt 
shooting war and overt economic warfare,” Nitze and Marshall were determined that its 
remit must instead be defined narrowly. A “more conservative concept” was necessary 
“to set limits- rather than leave practically un-delimited the jurisdiction of the Board” in 
order to avoid “duplication of and conflict with pre-existing agencies.”55 Nitze and 
Marshall opposed the concept of PSB as a “headquarters for the cold war” as this would 
be “a source of potential mischief.”56 Nitze lobbied Undersecretary of State Webb (and 
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later David Bruce) to ensure PSB should only link the agencies engaged in narrowly-
defined psychological operations, to guarantee that it did not infringe on the State 
Department’s bailiwick.57  
 
The State Department prevailed in blocking PSB, despite implicit encouragement from 
NSC directives and the recommendation of a progress report that PSB should “give 
increased emphasis to forward and strategic planning and to the evaluation of the total 
national psychological effort.”58 PSB complained that departmental obstruction would 
perpetuate the lack of an “agreed strategic concept,” of “clarification of basic national 
policy” and of “fully developed plans to implement national policy.” The State 
Department immediately counter-attacked against the “fallacy” of PSB’s charges 
claiming that far more pertinent were “the difficulties of the present international 
situation, the insufficiency of U.S. capabilities to affect the situation as markedly as we 
should like to be able to, and, admittedly, some failure in applying the capabilities we do 
have as effectively as we might.”59  
 
The failure to define a strategic conception left activists within the administration 
exasperated. PSB Director Gordon Gray recalled how “the State Department felt that this 
was an invasion of their business.” Paul Nitze, chief of PPS in the State Department, 
warned Gray against attempting to produce analyses of US strategy. At one point Nitze 
brashly told Gray, “Look, you just forget about policy, that's not your business; we'll 
make the policy and then you can put it on your damn radio.” Departmental obstruction 
left the PSB Director with “a feeling of complete frustration,” and, in his view, 
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diminished PSB to “largely an abortive organization, because most of the agencies 
wouldn’t cooperate” for the remainder of the Truman administration.60 
 
To make matters worse, at the same time that State emasculated PSB there was an 
increasing demand to determine the strategic basis of U.S. Soviet bloc policy. Serious 
doubts within government were raised during 1952 over both the present course of 
vacillation and a more offensive campaign. In August a PSB progress report on political 
warfare operations painted a gloomy picture of U.S. achievements to date and the 
unlikelihood of future success: 
There was no evidence of progress toward the achievement of the basic 
objectives set forth in NSC 20/4, namely the reduction and retraction of 
Soviet communist power. Moreover, short term possibilities of any 




By 1952 splits were materialising in the leadership of the merged CIA/OPC over the best 
way to proceed against the Soviet bloc. Despite his initial enthusiasm for guerrilla 
operations, the head of OPC’s Soviet bloc division Franklin Lindsay now had serious 
doubts over the strategic credibility of these activities. Lindsay became disillusioned with 
the dismal record of attempts by OPC agents to detach a communist country from the 
Soviet orbit through paramilitary operations. He gradually recognised that on the 
operational level “the odds are almost 100 percent that the nascent resistance would be 
fully penetrated [by the communist secret police] before it expanded to a size that made 
any difference.” In his own words, Lindsay “began to have real doubts about rolling back 
the Iron Curtain” on a broader strategic level. “It was peacetime, not wartime. The stuff 
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that had worked against the Germans did not work against the Russians, who seemed 
impervious. It was time to back off and think this thing through.”62  
 
In October 1952 Lindsay penned a 9 page memorandum to his superiors Frank Wisner 
and Allen Dulles in which he criticised the basis of the political warfare campaign:  
The instruments currently advocated to reduce Soviet power are both 
inadequate and ineffective against the Soviet political system. The 
consolidated Communist state […] has made virtually impossible the 
existence of organized clandestine resistance capable within the foreseeable 
future of appreciably weakening the power of the state [….] Guerrilla action 
in interior areas of the Soviet Union is impossible because of the 
impossibility of establishing a base relatively secure from Soviet police 
control. Areas bordering the Soviet sphere are without exception controlled 
by minor or secondary states, and the fear of provoking Soviet aggression 
effectively deters these states from supporting guerrilla operations across 
their borders. 
 
Yet Allen Dulles, in particular, refused to accept the fallibility of political warfare as a 
tactical expedient and apparently took umbrage with Lindsay’s rebuke line by line.63 That 
Dulles continued to be enamoured with such activities had major ramifications on the 
future course of the CIA’s operations, as soon afterwards he was appointed Director of 
Central Intelligence by President Eisenhower. This opened up new opportunities for the 
employment of political warfare not only in Europe and the Far East, but on a worldwide 
basis as the Cold War broadened in scope and reach.  
 
 
In its last year in office, the Truman administration failed to decide on a unifying concept 
for its strategy towards the Soviet bloc that either embraced liberation or accepted a de 
facto Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Its indecision meant that policy 
continued to chart an ineffective and contradictory middle course that retained elements 
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of an offensive and moderate stance. One of the final Truman policy statements, NSC 
135/3, permitted the continuation and intensification “as practicable” of “positive 
political, economic, propaganda and paramilitary operations against the Soviet orbit” as 
long as it did not entail undefined “unacceptable risks.” Despite widespread doubts over 
the credibility of the “Titoist” strategy, the policy paper still pressed for “the exploitation 
of rifts between the USSR and other communist states thus possibly offering to certain 
satellite peoples the prospect of liberation without war.”64  
 
The internal policy contradictions and strains were borne out in NSC 135/3 (and NSC 
141 that followed). Having left the space open for Cold War activists to pursue offensive 
operations, this policy paper simultaneously urged their restraint. It was a “valedictory” 
policy statement released on the cusp of the change of administration.65 Yet its 
contradictions were far more significant than this might suggest, stemming from an 
awkward accommodation of Bohlen’s contention that the Soviet priority was protection 
of its vital interests, not global expansion as NSC 68 had insisted. If Bohlen’s hypothesis 
was correct then Washington was faced with an unwelcome paradox. Should the 
campaign to retract Soviet power ever show signs of success then logically it would 
generate a considerable risk of Soviet reprisal against the United States or the Eastern 
European populations to protect its position. In other words, the closer to liberation it 
came, the closer the risk of provoking war. Bohlen concluded that U.S. objectives could 
not be achieved without the removal of the Soviet regime, something that in 1952 was 
inconceivable by political warfare or any other means short of war. The United States 
must therefore adopt a genuine strategy of containment. This would entail building up the 
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west and relying on a “doctrine of rational hope” that the Soviet Union would over the 
long term sow the seeds of its own collapse.66 
 
As a result NSC 135/3 pulled back from the brink, cautioning that “we should not over-
estimate the effectiveness of the activities we can pursue within the Soviet orbit.” It did 
not definitively reject the offensive however, instead warning political warfare agitators 
to “proceed with caution and a careful weighing of the risks in pressing upon what the 
Kremlin probably regards as its vital interests.”67 The accommodation of both poles of 
the foreign policy establishment exacerbated rather than mediated their differences.68 The 
policy itself was therefore strategically contradictory and inconsistent.  
 
The growing pessimism over US capabilities to influence the Soviet bloc was somewhat 
offset by the call for a more aggressive approach at a meeting of government officials and 
external consultants at Princeton in May 1952. At the conclusion of this meeting the 
participants declared that “it is a basic tenet of American policy that liberty shall be 
restored” to the Soviet bloc nations.69 Reflecting the high proportion of Eisenhower 
devotees at the conference, the delegates declared that “the Government of the United 
States is guilty of negligence with respect to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain.”  
 
The attempt at Princeton to elaborate on a more effective policy perpetuated the 
misguided notion that liberation could be achieved by peaceful means, without providing 
practical solutions. Harking back to the efforts of PSB, it was claimed that liberation 
could be achieved through a broad, all-encompassing political warfare campaign so long 
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as the “essence of political warfare” was adhered to that “it is planned and the means 
employed to carry it on are coordinated.” Urging that “a lesson in the importance of 
political warfare” must be learned, the conferees agreed that “we ourselves are free to 
engage in political warfare without fearing what we most intensely fear- that by so doing 
we shall unleash a third world war.”70 This optimistic outlook jarred with the experience 
of American operators to date that Soviet domination over its sphere of influence was not 
susceptible to limited political warfare operations. A more aggressive political warfare 
programme hypothetically capable of retracting Soviet power would, by 1952, inevitably 
provoke a firm military response from Moscow to such a direct threat to its security. In 
practice, therefore, Princeton did not resolve the strategic dilemmas that had hampered 
the Truman government. Nor did they provide a ready resolution for the incoming 
Republic administration.  
 
The Persistence of Strategic Flaws beyond the Truman Administration  
Despite the rhetorical emphasis of the Eisenhower campaign on liberation during the 
1952 presidential election, ambiguity over whether Washington favoured liberation or 
peaceful alternatives endured after 1953.71 The new administration was compelled to 
revisit the troublesome quandary of Soviet bloc policy that had dogged its predecessor. 
But once in office the Republicans also struggled to define a coherent strategy based on 
clear and realisable objectives.  
 
At the organisational level, because PSB had been undercut by the State Department 
under Truman, in September 1953 the new administration established a replacement 
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coordinating body linking operations with policy.72 But the Operations Coordinating 
Board (OCB) did not move beyond its coordinating function to develop a strategic 
approach tying together the different elements of U.S. policy towards the Soviet bloc.  
 
The re-evaluations of policy similarly fell short. Following Operation Solarium, 
Washington pursued a “New Look” for U.S. foreign policy. Yet in reality this 
emphasised a reliance on methods including sanctioning a place for nuclear weapons in 
U.S. foreign policy, without resolving the question of U.S. objectives in the Cold War.73 
The Eisenhower administration, like its predecessor, was indecisive when opportunities 
arose to adopt a more offensive strategy including Stalin’s death and the East German 
riots in 1953. Despite John Foster Dulles’s belligerent electioneering, under his watch the 
State Department consistently took a cautious line towards the Soviet bloc. Despite this, 
the aspiration remained to retract Soviet power. This meant that Washington continued to 
falter, as it had under Truman, in the middle ground between an offensive strategy of 
liberation and a defensive approach accepting co-existence with the Soviet Union. While 
the space for aggressive operations was not firmly sealed, at least until the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956, neither were alternative policy options wholeheartedly pursued 




The violent upheaval upon the streets of Budapest in late 1956 made it clear once and for 
all that Soviet power would not be retracted from areas deemed vital by the Politburo 
 373
through the employment of limited U.S. political warfare operations alone. In the short 
term Washington preferred to avoid assessing whether U.S. goals in Eastern Europe had 
been strategically unrealisable for almost a decade. Instead it pondered the narrower issue 
of whether the “fine line” between rebellion and gradualist “passive resistance” 
demarcated by NSC 174 in December 1953 had been overstepped by American-directed 
political warfare operatives.75 Whatever the extent of American responsibility for fanning 
the flames of revolution in Hungary, it had proved no easier to find a strategic solution to 
the pan-European dilemma than it had been to dispel America’s Cold War aspirations to 
bring Eastern Europe into the western fold. Time and again Washington failed “to turn 
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At the outset of the Cold War U.S. national security strategy overwhelmingly focussed on 
Western Europe. However, questions remained over the approach and objectives of that 
strategy. For example the European Recovery Program is generally considered by 
historians as the defensive mainstay of the American approach from 1947-48. ERP built 
up Western Europe by contributing to its recovery and containing Soviet expansion. But 
it is possible to read the Marshall Plan in a much wider sense. Not only was it an 
economic and political initiative to shore up Western Europe. It also played a key part in 
a nascent political warfare approach to the continent.    
 
Cold War antagonisms between east and west were confirmed- but not caused- by ERP 
and the subsequent consolidation of positions of strength on each side of the iron curtain. 
But just as importantly, the Marshall Plan very quickly became part of a wider debate 
among senior and working level policymakers over how Washington should prosecute 
the Cold War.  
 
Initially the Truman administration focussed on the mechanics for waging the Cold War, 
with the creation of the National Security State and approval of NSC 4-A and NSC 10/2. 
On the surface, the adoption of NSC 10/2 apparently resolved bureaucratic disputes. It 
authorised the machinery for American agencies to implement political and economic 
measures as well as a covert political warfare arm. But although NSC 10/2 attempted to 
determine the mechanics of the implementation of foreign policy, it did not settle the 
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question of strategic aims. While political warfare complimented the implementation of 
the strategic approach to Western Europe through ECA, the machinery was established 
prior to a strategic resolution over the American approach towards the other part of 
Europe.  
 
Thus by mid-1948 the political warfare machinery was established to potentially link the 
American approach to Europe on a unified basis. But U.S. policymakers never fully 
developed that connection as the strategic approach to Europe diverged between east and 
west. From early 1948 an enclave strategy was explored by the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Staff based on the utilisation of a political warfare capability, but strategic aims 
were left ambiguous. The incipient strategic approach put forward by PPS proved 
ineffective as it was increasingly undercut by the main thrust of U.S. policy heavily 
favouring Western Europe and containment.  
 
The Truman administration at large therefore failed to move significantly beyond the 
aspiration of liberating the Soviet bloc from communist influence. “Grand strategy” 
disseminated in policy papers such as NSC 20/4 and NSC 68 was ambiguous and broad, 
serving no practical strategic use to the Office of Policy Coordination and other 
operational agencies. Specific strategic planning also broke down when implemented as 
“rollback” activities against communist regimes in Eastern Europe.  
 
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 offered new hope that the peaceful 
retraction of Soviet power, as called for by NSC 20/4 and NSC 68, was possible. But the 
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Tito-Stalin rift made no impression on the viability of modifying Soviet power elsewhere 
in Eastern Europe by measures short of war. Only gradually did the administration 
acknowledge that American strategic aims would not be served by fostering “Titoism” 
and nationalist “communist heresies” amongst the eastern bloc states at that time. 
  
The lack of a unified strategic framework for U.S. policy in Europe riddled its Eastern 
European approach with contradictions from the late 1940s. Policymakers unanimously 
agreed that the United States should avoid a direct war with Russia unless to protect vital 
interests. Policy statements of the period increasingly recognised the fundamental 
importance of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, contrasted with its marginal strategic 
value to the United States. Yet sections of the government continued to press for the 
liberation of the region, despite the inevitable need to resort to war to achieve this goal. 
Strategic disorder prevailed over any development of a coherent design for peacefully 
retracting Soviet power. 
 
The strategic vacuum was filled by the operational arm of the government and in 
particular OPC. Washington sanctioned political warfare capabilities that allowed OPC to 
exceed cautious policy guidelines in the absence of a clear strategic mandate.  Frank 
Wisner’s organisation took matters into its own hands and rapidly emerged as a de facto 
policy-making body through its pursuit of operations in the field. The failure to harness 
these activities to a viable strategy undermined them from the outset.  
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No decisive strategic overhaul occurred for the remainder of the Truman administration, 
despite efforts by the Psychological Strategy Board to address the issue. As a result, from 
the late 1940s U.S. political warfare operations conducted against the Soviet bloc were 
intrinsically incoherent and strategically futile. The lack of a reassessment also undercut a 
commitment to seek out alternative courses to mediate relations with the Soviet Union, 
including diplomatic initiatives such as Program A to unify Germany.    
 
This legacy was passed on to the incoming Republican administration under President 
Eisenhower. Despite a rhetorical commitment to liberate the Soviet bloc it also struggled 
to reconcile American geopolitical impotence and offensive aspirations. Over the longer 
term, once this course had been proven untenable by the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, 
U.S. regional policy towards Eastern Europe was placed more firmly on an 
“evolutionary” rather than a “revolutionary” footing. By the 1970s the explicit aim of 




The formation of the U.S. National Security State in the late 1940s was in many ways 
unprecedented, in terms of expanding the machinery of American foreign policy to 
underpin a worldwide involvement. But the global scope of American policy did not 
automatically stimulate a sound and consistent framework linking together operations, 
organisation and strategy. Valuable lessons from the American experience in Europe in 
the early Cold War can therefore be learned.  
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The political warfare capability developed primarily to target the Soviet bloc at the outset 
of the Cold War was subsequently available for employment beyond the borders of Cold 
War Europe. Executive branch officials have repeatedly sanctioned “covert” political 
warfare interventions ever since in countries as diverse as Iran, Guatemala, the 
Philippines, Cuba and countless other places. In hindsight it is difficult to claim that the 
vast majority of these actions have produced anything but overwhelmingly negative 
results. It therefore remains pertinent for historians to examine the Agency’s expansion in 
light of the strategic incoherence that accompanied its “golden age.” 
 
Indeed, American policy-makers continue to face a more pertinent dilemma beyond the 
ideological challenge to validate American superiority over perceived adversaries long 
after the end of the Cold War. More important still is the persistent challenge to define a 
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